LIBERTAD SANTOS, LOURDES SANTOS, LEOVEGILDA SANTOS, AURELIO SANTOS JR., ROSALINDA SANTOS, JAIME SANTOS, AND GERARDO SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. …

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of: (1) the March 31, 1981
decision of the Court of Appeals*
in CA-G.R. No. 10192-SP entitled “Libertad Santos, et al. v. Hon. Jesus M.
Elbinias, etc., et al.”, affirming the validity of the orders of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan:**
(a) dated August 11, 1978 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and (b) dated December 17, 1979 enforcing said writ
pending trial and final decision in
Civil Case No. SM-922 entitled
“Republic of the Philippines v. Libertad Santos, et al.”, an action
for “Annulment of Title and Reversion, Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction”; and (2)
the resolutions dated July 28, 1981 and May 31, 1982 both denying petitioners’
first and second motions for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts, as found by respondent Court of Appeals,
are as follows:

“This petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Preliminary Injunction was spawned by a complaint lodged by respondent
Republic of the Philippines in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch V (Civil Case No. SM-922)
against Aurelio Santos, et al., for
‘ANNULMENT OF TITLE AND REVERSION, DAMAGES AND WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.”

“The complaint alleged, inter alia, that on
September 15, 1911, an agreement to sell Lot 4492 of the Santa Maria Pandi
Friar Land Estate in Angat, Bulacan, with an area of 16,088 square meters was
executed by the Government of the Philippines, repre­sented by the Director of
Lands, in favor of Venancio de la Fuente, as evidenced by Sale Certificate No.
2892. On December 9, 1929, De la Fuente
assigned all his rights and interests in said Lot 4492 to Felix Tiongson by
Assignment of Sales Certificate No. 2892. Subsequently, a portion of the lot consisting of 12,570 square meters
was reacquired by the Government which constructed thereon the Marungko Water
Reservoir. Of the remaining portion of said lot consisting of 3,518 square
meters, the Bureau of Lands
issued on March 17, 1930 to Felix Tiongson Sales Certificate No. 2892-1. On December 16, 1942, Tiongson assigned all
his rights and interests over this 3,518 square meter portion to Marcelino
Bongco, who, in turn, assigned the same to Aurelio Santos on September 20,
1946. On April 26, 1948, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed
a Deed of Sale over the area of
35 ares, 18 centares, or 3,518 square meters of Lot 4492 in favor of Aurelio
Santos. On June 15, 1948, the Bureau of Lands transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan the Deed of Sale
for the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title in favor of Aurelio
Santos over the area of 3,518
square meters and, accordingly, T.C.T. No. T-2743 was issued on June 28, 1948
by the Register of Deeds to Santos over the area in question. On January 11, 1961, through the Project of Partition in Special Proceedings
No. 1170 of the CFI of Bulacan, T.C.T. No. T-2743 of
Aurelio Santos was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. T-30791 was
issued to him and to his
children (now petitioners). On November
7, 1972, Aurelio Santos and his children filed with the CFI of Bulacan a
petition entitled ‘In the Matter of the Issuance of Another Transfer
Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 4492, S.M. de Pandi Estate, Bulacan, with
Technical Descriptions in Lieu of TCT No.
T-30791 and Correcting Its Area and Civil Status Therefor’ wherein they sought
the cancellation of their TCT No. T-30791 and to order the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan to issue another title ‘containing the corresponding technical
description and areas as certified by the Bureau of Lands.’

“Plaintiff Republic claimed that Aurelio Santos and his
children acted fraudulently and in bad faith in filing their petition of
November 7, 1972 because they represented to the Court that they were the
owners of the whole of Lot No. 4492 when they knew for a fact
that they owned only 3,518 square meters thereof which was the only portion
sold by the Government to Aurelio Santos; that
defendant Aurelio Santos, acting for himself and in behalf of the other defendants, presented to the
Court misleading facts in their
aforesaid petition by submitting a technical descrip­tion of Lot No. 4492 issued by the Bureau of Lands
including a report prepared by one Godofredo R. Villasenor of the Land Registration Commission which
stated, among others, that ‘the correct area (of Lot 4492) is 16,088 square
meters as against the erroneous area of 3,518 square meters appearing in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-30791, Bulacan Registry’; that these
documents were procured without defendant Aurelio Santos first informing the Government offices
of the fact that what was assigned or ceded to him was the property described
in Sales Certificate No. 2892-1 covering an area of 3,518 square meters only
and that an area of 12,570 square meters of said Lot 4492 was segregated and
reverted to the Government for the construction of the Marungko Water
Reservoir; that on February 5, 1974, defendant Register of Deeds, acting upon
the order dated January 10, 1974 of the CFI of Bulacan, issued to defendant
Aurelio Santos and his children, TCT No. T-193403 already showing that what was
owned by the registered owners was the whole of Lot No. 4492 with an area of
16,088 square meters instead of 3,518 square meters only, thereby including in
the title the portion covered by the Marungko Water Reservoir; that TCT No.
T-193403 was illegally and erroneously issued and, being null and void, should
be cancelled and the area of 12,570 square meters should be segregated as it
belongs to the Government; and that unless said defendants were restrained from
further occupying and asserting rights of ownership over the area in question,
social unrest would ensue and undermine the Government’s effort to maintain
peace and order in the locality.

“On August 11, 1978, the Court a quo issued the
following:

‘O R D E R

WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION

“The proceedings today is on the petition for writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. The plaintiff was
represented by Atty. Adolfo Garcia.

“The solicitor, to sustain the plaintiff’s motion, presented
exhibits from Exhibit ‘AG’” to Exhibit ‘Q-3,’ inclusive. The defendants, thru counsel, introduced
Exhibits ‘1’, ‘2’’ and ‘3’, inclusive.

“Counsel for the defendants manifested that he was
agreedable to the issuance of a writ of preliminary manda­tory injunction
ordering the defendants to allow plaintiff to open the two gates of the subject water dam to allow the
water free flow and to further allow the plaintiff to utilize and/or repair the
existing canals constructed by the Government relative to the subject water dam
provided that no additional canal or work be made on the property of the
defendants. The Solicitor joined in the said motion.

“WHEREFORE, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is hereby issued ordering all the defendants
herein as to jointly and severally allow the plaintiff to open the two gates
adverted to by their counsel,
and to further allow the plaintiff to utilize and/or repair the existing canals
for a free water flow from the subject reservoir; and that all these defendants
are hereby enjoined from doing any act or thing by any third party to
disturb the status quo as of today and/or
to defeat the objective sought to be achieved by the herein writ.

“The Solicitor is hereby urged to caution the representatives
of plaintiff and/or any private persons acting in behalf of plaintiff to
proceed peaceably with their act or
work under the terms and conditions of this writ in view of the apprehensions expressed by counsel for defendants
over the possibility of violence that may be inflicted on
the persons of the defendants.

“Upon this motion, counsel for the defendants is hereby given
additional 10 days from today within which to file his answer to the petition,
there being no objection from the Solicitor.

“The pre-trial of this case is hereby set to October 11,
1978.” (Annex “B”, Rollo, p. 25). (Emphasis supplied)

“On July 24, 1979, the defendants (now petitioners) moved to
dissolve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction contending that its
purpose was to regulate the use and appropriation of water accumulated in Lot
4492 and ultimately to settle the water dispute between the parties over said
property; that upon the promul­gation of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (Water
Code) on December 31, 1976, which pertinently provide that:

‘ART. 88. The Council shall
have original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation,
utilization, exploration, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within the meaning and
context of the provisions of this
Code.’

jurisdiction to settle water rights became
vested in the National Water Resources Council; and that therefore, the Court a
quo, having no jurisdiction to settle water rights, could not issue a
preliminary mandatory injunction on the use and appropriation over water
rights.

“On August 22, 1979, the Solicitor General filed his
opposition to the defendants’ motion alleging that a cursory reading of the
complaint revealed that the action was one for cancellation of title over a portion comprising 12,570 square meters of Lot 4492 which
portion is known as the Marungko Water Reservoir, and the reversion thereof to
the Government; that the purpose of the writ was to allow the Government to
open the two gates and to utilize or
repair the existing canals for a free water flow from the
Government-built reservoir which purpose was neither to regulate the use and
appropriation of the waters allegedly accumulated in Lot 4492 nor to ultimately
settle the water dispute between the parties but only to enable the Government
to open the two gates and to utilize or repair the existing canals from the
reservoir; that the case of Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Judge Mante, et al., cited by
defendants finds no application in the instant case which does not involve the
settlement of water rights under the Water Code and Presidential Decree No.
424; and that defendants’ motion was a calculated strategy to delay the early
termination and adjudication of the case.

“On December 6, 1979, plaintiff Republic filed a Manifestation
and/or Motion alleging that it had repaired the existing canal’s portion
outside Lot No. 4492 going towards the Marungko Reservoir itself, and that it
would undertake the repair of the existing canal’s portion inside Lot No. 4492 held by the defendants; that to repair such portions of the
existing canals inside the lot,
it sought security from the police addressing a letter-request to the Station
Commander (Integrated National Police) of
Angat, Bulacan, and that instead of providing security, the Station
Commander referred the matter to defendants’ counsel; and that the Station
Commander should be ordered to obey the writ of preliminary injunction and to
provide the requested security.

“On December 17, 1979, the Court a quo issued the
following:

‘O
R D E R

“Plaintiff’s motion to admit opposition is granted and
therefore the motion to dismiss is deemed submitted for resolution.

“Plaintiff’s manifestation and motion regarding enforcement of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is also granted. Therefore, the Station Commander of Angat is
hereby ordered to provide police security when plaintiff or its agents repair
the existing canal inside Lot 4492, and defendants and/or persons acting in
their behalf are hereby ordered to obey the subject writ by allowing plaintiff
to utilize and/or repair the existing canals for a free water flow from the
subject reservoir. All concerned are
hereby warned to comply under pain of contempt.'” (Annex “F”, p.
39, Rollo). (Rollo, pp. 100-105).

Petitioners assailed the foregoing order of the court a quo
in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals which found no manifest
grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Jesus M. Elbinias,
in issuing the questioned
orders and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners filed motions for reconsideration of the said
decision but were denied on July 28, 1981 and May 31, 1982, respectively.

Hence, this petition.

The Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda in the resolution dated January 10, 1983.

Considering the length of time that this case has been pending with this Court and to
determine whether supervening events may have rendered this case moot and
academic, the Court required both parties to move in the premises in the resolution dated June 15, 1988. Petitioners manifested that the subject
petition has not been rendered moot and academic and the original suit in the
Court a quo is still pending proceedings.

Petitioners submit the following legal questions for resolution of the Court:

1.    PENDING
TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND FINAL
DECISION IN AN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AND REVERSION, CAN THE RESPONDENT
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION WHICH IN EFFECT WOULD PREMATURELY DEPRIVE THE
PRESENT REGISTERED OWNER/S THEREOF OF THE USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THE DISPUTED
PORTION OF THE PROPERTY?

2.    CAN
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ISSUE AN ORDER GRANTING THE ENFORCEMENT OF
A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION PRIOR TO THE RESOLUTION OF A PENDING
MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO DISSOLVE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION?

3.    WHERE
THERE IS STILL A QUESTION ON WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT TO THE USE AND ENJOYMENT
OF THE WATER FOUND IN THE DISPUTED PORTION OF THE PROPERTY,
CAN THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION IN SPITE OF THE CLEAR PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 88 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1067 VESTING EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
THEREOF TO THE WATER COUNCIL CREATED UNDER SAID LAW?

The petition is devoid of merit.

It is undisputed that the main cause of action in the court a
quo is one for annulment of title
and reversion to the Government of a 12,570 square meters lot covering the
Marungko Water Reservoir alleged to have been illegally and erroneously titled
in the name of petitioners. A writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was sought to restrain the latter
from further occupying and asserting rights of ownership over the area in question to prevent social unrest in the
community caused by the deprivation of the public use and enjoyment of the
waters from the Marungko Reservoir, and to aid the Government in maintaining peace and order in the locality.

The assignments of error raised by petitioners in this petition
are anchored on two basic arguments, namely: (1) that the court a quo lacks jurisdiction on the ground that the
suit involves water rights properly within the jurisdiction of the Water Council created under Presidential
Decree No. 1067, and (2) the
issuance by the court a quo of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is premature and improper.

I.

The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has
jurisdiction actions for annulment of title, reversion and damages (Heirs of
Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez, 142 SCRA 252 [1986]). The nature of an action in
court is determined by facts
alleged in the complaint (Malayan Industries Corporation v. Judge Mendoza, 154 SCRA 548 [1987];
Alger Electric Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 37 [1985]; Cultura v. Tapucar, 140 SCRA 311 [1985],
Municipality of La Trinidad v. CFI Baguio-Benguet, Br. I, 123 SCRA 81 [1983])
and not by the facts averred in the answer or opposition of the adverse parties
(Salao v. Crisostomo, 138 SCRA 17 [1985]).

In the case at bar, the complaint of the Republic is for
cancellation of title over a
portion of 12,570 square meters of Lot No. 4492 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi
Estate, known as the Marungko Water Reservoir, and the reversion thereof to
said respondent. The complaint contains
factual allegations sufficient to support its prayer for the annulment of
petitioners’ title to Lot 4492, and for the reversion of the portion of said lot covered by the Marungko Water
Reservoir to the Government. The suit
clearly involves title to, and possession of real property, exclusive original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Regional Trial Courts under
Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Formerly Sec. 44(b), Rep. Act
296. As such, the court a quo
has jurisdiction over the action for annulment of title and reversion filed by
the Government.

Article 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (Water Code) speaks of
limited jurisdiction conferred upon the National Water Resource Council over
all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development,
control, conservation and protection of waters and said jurisdiction of
the council does not extend to, much less cover, conflicting rights over real
properties, jurisdiction over which is vested by law with the regular
courts. Where the issue involved is not
on a settlement of water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water
use for which a permit was already granted, the regular court has jurisdiction
over the dispute, not the National Water Resources Council (Amistoso v. Ong,
130 SCRA 228, 237 [1984]).

II.

Petitioners’ contention that
a preliminary injunction may not
issue prior to resolutions of pending motions to dismiss and dissolve
aforesaid writ, trial on the merits and final decision in an action for annulment of
title and reversion, is not tenable.

Preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy which the parties litigant may avail of in order to preserve or protect their rights or
interests, during the pendency of the principal action (Calo and San Jose v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 447 [1946]; Rosario v. Cuneta, 150 SCRA 575
[1987]).

The Solicitor General took the position which was correctly
sustained by the Court of Appeals that the allegations in the complaint
regarding the appropriation or use of water in the Marungko Water Reservoir
located inside Lot 4492 for which injunctive writ was issued are incidental
matters that have no bearing with the main cause of action which is the assertion
of ownership over the land in question and its reversion to the public domain.

As expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, it is indubitable that a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued at
any time after the commencement of an action and before judgment, when it is established that the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint shows facts entitling him to such relief
(Angela Estate, Inc. v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 24 SCRA 509 [1968]; Rosauro v.
Cuneta, supra).

The general rule that injunctions are not available to take
property out of the possession
or control of one party and
place it into that of another is
not without any exceptions, as where: (1) the applicant has clearly established its rights to the property in
question, and (2) the defendant is clearly a mere intruder, or (3) where the action seeks to prevent a
purchaser at an auction sale from molesting
the debtor’s co-owners whose rights
have not been affected by the sale (Emilia v. Bado, supra; Angela
Estate, Inc. v. CFI of Negros
Occidental, supra; Pio v. Marcos, 56 SCRA 753 [1974]; Buayan Cattle Co.,
Inc. v. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 276
[1984]; Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643 [1986];
Rosauro, et al. v. Cuneta, 151
SCRA 575 [1987]; Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Judge Ruiz, 148 SCRA 336 [1987]).

In the case at bar, it can be
gleaned from the questioned order dated August 11, 1978, that the trial court gave both parties the
opportunity to be heard as they introduced evidence on the propriety of
the issuance of the injunctive writ. It
is well-settled that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to a
judge or body in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction where a party
was not deprived of its day in court as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses (National
Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWEMIF) v. Valero, 132 SCRA 578 [1984]).

Similary, the records show that all the requisites for the proper
issuance of a mandatory injunction such as: (a) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (b) the
right of a complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent
and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage (Rivera v.
Florendo, 144 SCRA 643 [1986]), have been fully satisfied in this case.

The government’s title to the property in question has been shown
to be clear, well-defined and certain and that there is an urgent need for its
issuance in order to prevent social unrest in the community for having been deprived of the use and enjoyment of waters
found in the reservoir located in the subject premises.

In fact, counsel for the petitioners agreed to the grant of the
questioned writ of injunction but
later made a complete turnabout impugning the same and claiming that the court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Unquestionably, petitioners are now estopped to question said issuance
after submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by their expressed conformity
given through their counsel. Indeed, a
party can not adopt inconsistent positions (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 505 [1984]). The doctrine of estoppel bars a party from trifling
with the courts (Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756 [1983]).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit, the assailed order of the court a quo dated August 11, 1978 is AFFIRMED,
and the instant case is hereby remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Romero, and Melo,
JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., (Chairman),
on official leave.

*
Penned by Justice Porfirio V. Sison, concurred
in by Justices Elias B. Asuncion
and Juan A. Sison

**
Penned by Hon. Jesus M. Elbinias, then Presiding
Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch V.