PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SEGUNDINO “GODING” JOTOY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused SEGUNDINO “GODING” JOTOY appeals from the
judgment^[1]
of the court a quo finding him guilty of murder,
imposing upon him a prison term of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him
to indemnify the victim’s wife in the amount of P12,000.00. Specifically, the Information alleges that
on 27 December 1979, in Davao City, with treachery, evident premeditation and
intent to kill, the accused feloniously attacked and stabbed one Maximo Lao
with a knife, inflicting upon
him mortal wounds which caused his death.

The version of the prosecution: On the night of 27 December 1979, at about 6:00 o’clock, Edna Bawasanta
went out of her house at Datu Bago, Bankerohan, Davao City to get her son who
was with her brother Maximo Lao at a nearby store. Then she retraced her way to her house with her son. Her brother Maximo followed some five (5)
arms’ length behind. While walking,
Edna saw the accused carrying a knife and coming from the opposite
direction. As he passed by her, Edna sensed that he was angry. So Edna looked back and was just in time to
see the accused put his left arm around her brother’s neck and stabbed him
repeatedly, first on the neck, and then on different parts of the body. Moored to her position, she could only watch
her brother fall to the ground after which she ran home to inform her father
who responded by rushing to the crime scene. He saw Maximo lying prostrate on the street. Maximo was immediately brought to the hospital but was pronounced
dead on arrival with the following injuries: (a) stab wound, 1.5 cm. by 0.6 cm., at the left base of the neck
directed downwards hitting the esophagus and penetrating the upper mediastrium;
(b) stab wound, 2.1 cm. by 1 cm., across the left parasternal line cutting the
cartilage of the 5th rib directed downwards posteriorly hitting the pericardium
thru the diaphragm, liver and puncturing the stomach; (c) stab wound, 2.2 cm.
by 0.8 cm., across the left midclavicular line cutting the cartilage of the 7th
and 8th ribs directed posteriorly and slightly downwards, hitting the stomach;
(d) stab wound, 2.2 by 0.8 cm., at the right side of the back on the level
of the 8th rib directed anteriorly and upwards, hitting the lower lobe of the
right lung, collapsing the same; (e) stab wound, 2.6 cm. by 0.8 cm., at the
posterior side, mid-portion of the right forearm; and, (f) hemothorax, left –
approximately 3,000 cc. of fluid and clotted blood. As diagnosed, the cause of death was hemorrhage secondary to
multiple stab wounds.^[2]

Appellant invokes self-defense and imputes error to the court a quo in not sustaining his theory; in finding that he committed the
crime with treachery and evident premeditation;
and, in not acquitting him on reasonable doubt.

Appellant attempts to persuade Us that what he did was simply an
act of self-defense as he calls Our attention to alleged repeated threats on
his life by the deceased for having “cautioned” a snatcher under the
deceased’s protective custody. In
addition, appellant sought to establish the propensity of the deceased for
violence through the records of the Davao METRODISCOM^[3] which
disclose the fact that the latter had been picked up five (5) times before for
various charges, the last being for attempted homicide.

It is oft-repeated that in criminal cases, the burden rests on
the prosecution to establish the
guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, when the accused
invokes self-defense, the onus probandi is shifted
and he is
duty
bound to prove the elements of the plea by clear and convincing evidence;^[4]
otherwise, conviction is inescapable.^[5]

In the case at bar, appellant testified that it was the deceased
Maximo who drew a knife and stabbed him when they met, but being bigger, he
succeeded in catching the hand and twisting the arm of the deceased, after
which he stabbed Maximo.^[6]

We are not convinced with the pretensions of appellant. For, aside from his self-serving assertion,
there is no other evidence to bolster his plea. He contends that the deceased made repeated threats on his
life. Assuming the same to be true,
they merely tend to show that the deceased harbored hostile feelings against
him, but they do not prove that there was in fact actual unlawful aggression on the part of
the deceased that fateful night of 27 December 1979.

On the contrary, circumstances indicate that there was in fact no
self-defense. For one thing, accused
testified that he was stabbed by the deceased. However, there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that the accused
suffered even a scratch as a result of the alleged stabbing. Secondly, the nature and number of the
wounds sustained by the deceased belie self-defense. The autopsy conducted reveals that of the five (5) stab wounds
suffered by the deceased, four (4) were fatal. Thirdly, appellant himself testified that he threw the knife near the
riverside after having stabbed the deceased, and that he did not report the
matter to the police for fear of being salvaged.^[7]

The fact that the accused threw away the weapon used instead of
surrendering it to the authorities and reporting the incident negates the claim
of self-defense.^[8]

But even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the
accused with a knife, as the latter would make Us believe, We still hold that there
was no self-defense because at that point when the accused was able to catch
and twist the hand of the deceased, in effect immobilizing him, the unlawful
aggression had already ended. Thus, the
danger having ceased, there was no more need for the accused to start stabbing
the deceased, not just once but five (5) times.

Since unlawful aggression was not established, discussion of the
other two elements, namely, reasonableness of the means employed and lack of
sufficient provocation, is futile because there can be no self-defense, either
complete or incomplete, if no unlawful aggression can be attributed to the
victim.^[9]

While We sustain the conclusion of the trial court that there was
no self-defense, We cannot uphold its finding that evident premeditation or
treachery existed to qualify the killing to murder.

Before evident premeditation can be appreciated, the elements
thereof, namely, the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; the
overt act showing that the accused clung to his determination to commit the
crime; and, the lapse of time between the decision and the execution of the
crime sufficient for meditation and reflection, must be established.^[10]
None
of these elements was established.

While appellant admits that he and the deceased had a
misunderstanding during a drinking spree, i.e., when accused cautioned a
snatcher under the protection of the deceased as a result of which the latter
made repeated threats on his life, Edna Bawasanta herself claims that the
accused and her brother were “friends” and that there was no quarrel
between them.^[11]
In fact, the prosecution did not even attempt to prove that the accused ever
acted in such a way as to show that he harbored hostile feelings towards the
deceased. Evident premeditation
therefore cannot be properly appreciated against the accused, for it must be
established as indubitably and clearly as the criminal act itself.^[12]

As regards the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the
prosecution attempted to prove the same through the testimony of Dr. Jose Ladrido, Jr., the City Health
Officer who conducted the autopsy on the deceased. Dr. Ladrido testified that it was possible that two (2) out of
the five (5) stab wounds were inflicted from behind.^[13]
However, Edna Bawasanta, who witnessed the attack at its inception, testified
that she only saw the “stabbing in front”.^[14] As
between the testimonies of Dr. Ladrido and Mrs. Bawasanta, We are more inclined
to accept the latter’s version because she actually saw the infliction of the
wounds, while Dr. Ladrido only drew his conclusion from the location
thereof. More importantly, the fact
that the accused passed by Edna who was five (5) arms’ length ahead of the
deceased points to two (2) things: that
the attack was frontal, and that it was not so sudden as to have caught the
deceased completely unaware.

Edna testified that she met the accused coming from the opposite
direction, looking angry and carrying a knife. Apparently, the accused carried the knife in such a way that it could
easily be seen, otherwise, Edna would not have noticed it. Since she actually saw the accused approach
with a knife, and that was what prompted her into looking back, it is safe to
conclude that the deceased, positioned some five (5) arms’ length behind, had a
similar opportunity to see the accused approach, looking angry and holding a
knife. With this, the deceased was
afforded enough time to prepare himself for the impending assault. Hence, it cannot be said that the attack was
so sudden and treacherous as to qualify the crime to murder. Absent any qualifying circumstance, the
accused should only be held guilty of homicide.

Appellant also argues that the lone testimony of Edna is not
sufficient for conviction in view of her blood relationship with the
deceased. Well-settled is the rule that
mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not automatically impair his
credibility and render the testimony less worthy of faith and credit.^[15]
We
agree with the trial court that Edna’s clear and positive testimony
deserves full credence as compared to the unimpressive denials of the accused.

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal the range
of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum to be imposed upon the accused should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range
of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its
periods, while the maximum, in the absence of modifying circumstances, should
be taken from the medium of the imposable penalty. Consequently, We resolve to impose upon the accused a prison term of eight (8) years four
(4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of the accused for MURDER is REDUCED to HOMICIDE. However, conformably with recent jurisprudence, the indemnity
imposed by the trial court for the death of Maximo Lao is increased
to P50,000.00, payable to his heirs.

Accordingly, accused-appellant SEGUNDINO
“GODING” JOTOY is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium,
as maximum.

The period during which the accused was under preventive
imprisonment should be credited to him in the service of his sentence.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino,
and Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by then Presiding Judge Antonio M. Martinez of the Court of First
Instance of Davao City, Br. IV, now Associate Justice, Court of Appeals.

^[2] Exh. “A”.

^[3]
Exh. “1”.

^[4]
People vs. Bigcas, G. R. No. 94534, 20 July 1992, 211 SCRA 631, 638; People vs. Lacao, G.R. No. 95320, 4 September 1991, 201 SCRA 317, 326.

^[5]
Ortega vs. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 57664, 8 February
1989, 170 SCRA 38, 42.

^[6]
TSN, 29 June 1981, pp. 4-5.

^[7]
Ibid., p. 5.

^[8]
People vs. Solis, G. R. No. 93629, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 405, 415; People vs.
Delgado, G. R. No. 79672, 15 February
1990, 182 SCRA 343, 350.

^[9] People vs.
Bayocot, G. R. No. 55285, 28 June 1989, 174 SCRA 285, 291.

^[10]
People vs. Clamor, G. R. No.
82708, 1 July 1991, 198 SCRA 642, 655; People vs. Nabayra, G. R. Nos.
96368-69, 17 October 1991, 203 SCRA 75, 83.

^[11]
TSN, 22 June 1981, p. 7.

^[12]
People vs. Caraig, G. R. No.
91162, 3 October 1991, 202 SCRA 357, 368.

^[13]
TSN, 1 June 1981, pp. 3-7.

^[14]
TSN, 22 June 1981, p. 5.

^[15]
People vs. Galendez, G. R.
Nos. 56465-66, 26 June 1992, 210 SCRA 360, 373; People vs. Uy, G. R. No. 84275, 14 February 1992, 206 SCRA 270,
280.