MRS. LEONILA L. SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. DR. WILSON TAN, DANTE G. ARDIVILLA, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MOLE, REGION VII, CEBU CITY AND ATTY. YOLANDA D. BAGUIO, AS CITY SHERIFF OF DUMA…

At issue in this petition is the extent of the observance of
procedural due process. A corollary
question is whether or not there is a denial of due process where the
investigation relating to a charge of illegal dismissal proceeded in the
absence of the employer who failed to appear despite previous notice.

The facts are simple. The
herein petitioner is the proprietress of the L & L Santiago Optical
Clinic. Dr. Wilson B. Tan, private
respondent herein, was an optometrist therein from April 11, 1977 up to
December 31, 1977 when his services were terminated by the petitioner. This prompted private respondent to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal against the latter before the Dumaguete
District Labor Office, Region VII, Dumaguete City.^[1]
Hearings were scheduled and held on April 26, 1978 and May 9, 1978 for
investigation purposes but petitioner failed to appear despite due         notice. On the basis of the investigation conducted the hearing officer^[2]
submitted his report to the then regional director Francisco Arnaldo,
recommending payment of private respondent’s 13th month pay for the year 1977
in the amount of P350.00, and P2,000.00 as backwages. The hearing officer also recommended the reinstatement of the
private respondent to his former position without adverse effect on his rank
and seniority rights.

Convinced that private respondent was terminated from employment
without valid cause, the regional director issued an order dated May 18, 1978,
directing the reinstatement of the former and the payment of his backwages as
recommended and a proportionate 13th month pay. Petitioner received the aforesaid order on June 28, 1978. She filed a memorandum of appeal only on
July 17, 1978 alleging that the regional director committed a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned order.^[3]

Meanwhile, private respondent filed a motion for execution which
the petitioner opposed on the ground that she had filed a memorandum of
appeal. A hearing on the motion was
scheduled and held on October 18, 1978 but petitioner failed to appear despite
due notice thereof. As prayed for by
private respondent, the regional director issued a writ of execution dated November 13, 1978,
holding that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. Said writ was later on amended on December
15, 1978 to include backwages from January 1978 to December 1978. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ
of execution alleging that her memorandum of appeal was filed on time. By virtue of the said motion the regional
director directed the city sheriff to hold the execution in abeyance until the
issue raised by herein petitioner shall have been resolved. The motion was set for hearing on January
26, 1979.

Petitioner filed a motion for postponement. During the hearing, however, counsel for
private respondent manifested that the hearing may be conducted ex–parte
and that since the appeal was filed out of time, the writ should be
enforced. On the basis of the
recommendation of the hearing officer, the regional director issued an alias
writ of execution modifying the order and the writ dated December 15, 1978, and
reinstating the order of May 18, 1978. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration whereas petitioner
filed a second motion to quash the alias writ of execution on the ground that
her first motion to quash has not yet been resolved.

On July 19, 1979, the regional director issued a writ of
execution increasing this time the award of backwages from P2,000.00 to P7,500.00. Pursuant thereto, a public auction sale of the personal
properties of petitioner was scheduled on September 12, 1979. However, the public auction sale did not
push through as scheduled as both parties filed their respective motions. Private respondent maintained that an
additional amount in the sum of P3,503.25 should be adjudged in his favor while petitioner prayed that the writ
be quashed. On March 3, 1980, the writ
dated July 19, 1979 was revoked and a new one was issued identical to the writ
dated December 15, 1978. While private
respondent filed a motion for immediate issuance of the writ of execution in
view of the finality of the order dated
March 3, 1980, petitioner filed on the other hand a motion to quash the amended
writ. In the order of March 4, 1981,
Assistant Director Lomuntad, as acting regional director, issued an order
denying petitioner’s motion to quash. Petitioner sought a restraining order before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros. A restraining order was issued and the
auction sale of petitioner’s personal properties was again held in
abeyance. Upon the lifting of the
restraining order, the auction sale was scheduled anew and petitioner
filed another motion to quash. In an
order dated June 9, 1987, the new regional director denied petitioner’s motion
for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition.

In fine, petitioner contends that the Regional Director committed
a grave abuse of discretion in relying solely on the report of the
investigating officer which was done in the absence of the petitioner without
giving the former a chance to refute and present her side. Petitioner alleges further
that the director’s failure to take her evidence into account, consisting of
her affidavit and that of her customer, is a denial of her right to due
process.

The petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner admitted that she received the notice of hearing scheduled on
May 9, 1978 through counsel. Neither
the petitioner nor her counsel attended the same. In the memorandum of appeal submitted by the petitioner to the
office of the regional director, no effort was exerted to explain the reason
for her failure to attend the said hearing. Besides, petitioner was aware that on the said date an investigation was
to be conducted. In the said
memorandum, petitioner insisted that it was only an investigation so she need
not be present.^[4]
Precisely, petitioner should have heeded the summons in order to present her
side but she deliberately did not appear in the scheduled hearing. Thus, petitioner’s contention that she was
not given an opportunity to be heard is untenable under the circumstances.

Likewise We do not find merit in petitioner’s allegation that the
then regional director disregarded the evidence she presented. The questioned decision bears the date May
18, 1978 whereas the affidavits submitted by petitioner are dated May 20, 1978
and July 10,1978 and were filed only on September 28, 1978 long after the
regional director had ruled on the case.

Moreover, it should be noted that petitioner’s appeal was filed
beyond the ten (10) day reglementary period required by the rules. Apparently, to hide this vital jurisdictional
fact, petitioner never intimated in her memorandum of appeal the date of
receipt of the order dated May 18, 1978. This issue was never mentioned by petitioner when she moved to quash the
writ of execution. She likewise did not
raise this matter in her succeeding motions and in her reply submitted to this Court. All that the petitioner did was to insist that the regional
director failed to rule on her first motion to quash.

Petitioner’s counsel admitted during the hearing on September 28,
1978 that the order subject of the appeal was received on June 28, 1978 while
the memorandum appeal was filed by petitioner on July 17, 1978. However, despite the finality of the order
of May 18, 1978, the regional director who is herewith charged by the petitioner
of depriving her of due process actually accorded petitioner all the chances to
refute the findings that private respondent was illegally dismissed. The petitioner’s appeal was set for hearing,
but petitioner and her counsel failed to attend the same. Again, when private respondent’s motion for
execution was opposed by petitioner the regional director set the case for
hearing anew. Except for the failure on
the part of the regional director to rule on petitioner’s first motion to
quash, every order and writ issued in connection with the petitioner’s case
clearly appears to have been in response to the pleadings filed by the parties.

Furthermore, the writ of execution prayed for by private
respondent was issued over the opposition of the petitioner. Such is in effect a denial of petitioner’s
appeal and motion to quash. Under these
facts, it is apparent that the regional director extended petitioner every
opportunity to afford her the chance to be heard on all her successive moves and pleadings, despite the undisputed
finality of the order dated May 18, 1978. In the span of four (4) years during which the case dragged on after the
order of May 18, 1978 became final
and executory, a total of seven (7) successive writs had been issued, execution
of judgment was suspended four (4) times, and four (4) hearings were held to
afford petitioner the right to be heard. Under the foregoing circumstances, petitioner’s claim that she was not
given the opportunity to be heard is obviously untenable.

On the other hand, anent petitioner’s contention that the
regional director erred in ruling that private respondent was illegally
dismissed, settled is the rule that a direct appeal to the Supreme Court on questions of law precludes a review
of the facts^[5]
unless the lower court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties which if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.^[6]
However, this
is not
as in the case at bar. We are
convinced that private respondent was indeed illegally dismissed by the
petitioner. It was admitted that a new
employee is now performing the duties of private respondent. In January 1978, a certain Dr. Davila
Lagarin took over the work of private respondent who, for his part, was
allegedly assigned in Davao. Moreover, We find the
explanations of petitioner to be conflicting. She alleged in her affidavit that private respondent was reassigned in
Davao due to a treacherous act of the latter whereas in her motion for
reconsideration she averred that private respondent was merely assigned to
Davao as part of a rotation of employees. In the memorandum submitted to this Court, petitioner also stressed that
private respondent never wanted to be reinstated as he is now maintaining an
optical clinic of his own. Be that as
it may, We are convinced that if private respondent later changed his mind
about being reinstated, it was due to the numerous maneuvers taken by the
petitioner for the purpose of ousting private respondent from his employment. The findings of the regional director that
private respondent was illegally dismissed are supported by substantial
evidence and are entitled to respect. The respondent regional director did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to quash filed by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The questioned decision of
private respondent dated May 18, 1978 is made immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
IFU Case No. 78-51.

^[2]
Atty. Jesus Gabor.

^[3]
Pages 12 to 13, Rollo.

^[4]
Pages 12 to 13, Rollo.

^[5]
People vs. Raquinco, 17 SCRA 914
(1966); Abuyo vs de
Suazo, 18 SCRA 600 (1966); Miguel vs. Catalino, 26 SCRA 235 (1968);
Lanyan vs. Guerrero, 29 SCRA 107 (1969); Victorino vs.
Laro, 33 SCRA 54 (1970).

^[6]
Abellana vs. Dosdos, 13 SCRA 244 (1965); Uytiempo vs. Aggabao, 35
SCRA 186 (1970).