ROLANDO DIMACUHA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH IV TAGAYTAY CITY, RESPONDENT.

Dimacuha versus Concepcion

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction. Rolando Dimacuha, the accused in a homicide case pending before the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, at Tagaytay City, asked the Supreme Court to restrain the presiding judge, the Honorable Alfredo B. Concepcion, from proceeding with the trial and to order the transfer of the case to another sala. The petition matters because it is a leading statement on the disqualification and inhibition of judges, and on the accused's right to what the Court calls the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

Procedural History

Dimacuha was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, at Tagaytay City, presided over by Judge Concepcion. Through counsel, he filed an urgent motion for inhibition with a prayer to transfer venue. On March 25, 1982, the respondent judge issued an order denying the motion, and in that order he stated that he would not dignify the motion, much less resolve the same. Dimacuha then filed this petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court on June 22, 1982, to restrain the judge from proceeding and to secure the transfer of the case. The respondent judge filed an eighteen-page compliance and comment denying the charges as baseless, and the People of the Philippines filed its comment through the Office of the Solicitor General. The Supreme Court decided the petition directly.

Facts

Dimacuha was the accused in a homicide case pending before Judge Concepcion. Sometime in January 1982, he had a personal confrontation with the brother of the deceased, who told him in the vernacular that he was finished as far as the case was concerned and that the judge had already been paid to send him to the electric chair. Dimacuha informed his lawyer, who dismissed the matter as nonsense.

During the trial, friction developed between the judge and Dimacuha's counsel de parte over how to cross-examine a prosecution witness. At the hearing of March 17, 1982, the judge remarked in open court that the testimony of the prosecution witness was made clearer, which the Solicitor General observed may have hurt the professional pride of counsel. Counsel de parte was no longer present at the next hearing, and a counsel de oficio undertook the cross-examination of the second prosecution witness.

The motion for inhibition and transfer of venue remained unresolved. Counsel de parte manifested this in open court on April 29, 1982, but the judge ignored the manifestation and remarked that the court had appointed a counsel de oficio in case counsel did not want to appear. The judge's March 25, 1982 order had likewise refused to resolve the motion.

Issues

• Whether or not the charge that the respondent judge had been bought to convict the petitioner is sustained by the records.
• Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process because of the lack of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
• Whether or not the respondent judge should inhibit himself and transfer the case to another branch.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, on the resolution of motions, provides:

The court shall resolve the motion within a reasonable time after the same is submitted for resolution.

The Solicitor General invoked this provision to show that the motion for inhibition ought to have been resolved by the respondent judge.

Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, on disqualification of judges, provides:

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniary interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

The Court referred to the second paragraph of this section as the source of the judge's authority to voluntarily desist from sitting where his fairness might be seriously impugned.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the most serious charge, that the petitioner was already finished as far as the case was concerned and that the judge had been bought to sentence him to the electric chair, is not sustained by the records. The questions propounded by the judge himself to the prosecution witness seemed to elicit answers favorable to the accused, and the charges concerning the past actuations of the judge were not sufficiently demonstrated.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the petitioner was denied due process because he was under peril of the lack of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The Court held that due process requirements cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just.

On the third issue, the Court ordered the respondent judge to grant the motion for inhibition and to transfer the case. It repeated its exhortation to all judges:

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.

The Court added that a judge could in good grace inhibit himself where the case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others, and that if he resolves to desist voluntarily, his action gives meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137.

Doctrine

An accused is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and due process is not satisfied without that degree of objectivity on the part of the judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just. When a suggestion is made of record that a judge might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant, arising from circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, the judge should conduct a careful self-examination and exercise his discretion so that the people's faith in the courts is not impaired. A judge may in good grace inhibit himself where the case can be heard by another judge and no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others, and such voluntary desistance gives meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137. A motion for inhibition ought to be resolved by the judge, consistent with Section 1 of Rule 15.

Disposition

The petition was granted. The respondent judge was ordered to grant the motion for inhibition and to transfer the homicide case and all its records to Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, at Bacoor, Cavite, who was directed to conduct all further proceedings.

Remember This

Memorize the line that due process requires the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and that a judge whose fairness is seriously impugned may in good grace inhibit himself under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137. Examiners use this case on judicial disqualification and inhibition, on the resolution of motions under Rule 15, and on the due process rights of an accused in a criminal trial.