G.R. No. 60783. October 31, 1990
JOAQUIN S. GAW, THRU HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN RELOVA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XI, COURT OF FIR…
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with writ of preliminary
injunction seeking to reverse and set aside:
1) the Decision* of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1982 in C.A. G.R. No.
SP-13738-R entitled “Joaquin S. Gaw, thru his
attorney-in-fact, Eusebio S. Millar vs. Honorable
Benjamin Relova, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch XI, Court of First Instance of Manila, Worldwide Philippine Marketing
Corporation and the Sheriff of Manila”, dismissing the petition for certiorari
with writ of preliminary injunction filed therein for lack of legal basis and
merit; and 2) the Resolution** of the same Court dated June 10,
1982, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Based from the records, the factual background of this case is as
follows:
This action originated from the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XI, when private respondent Worldwide Philippines Marketing
Corporation (WPMC for short) on February
2, 1981 instituted a complaint for sums of money with damages and
preliminary attachment against petitioner Joaquin S. Gaw, which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
137703.
WPMC had its complaint amended twice, the last of which was dated
May 22, 1981 to which an
answer with counterclaim was filed by Joaquin S. Gaw on July
29, 1981.
In the amended complaint, WPMC alleged, among others, the
following:
“5. That the defendant
taking advantage of the foregoing personal and business relationship with the
foregoing General Manager of the plaintiff, caused to be encashed
several personal and postdated checks on various occasions ranging from Aug.
1980 to Jan. 1981 totalling to an aggregate and
enormous amount of P315,332.00, Philippine currency, and specified hereunder,
to wit:
CHECKS AMOUNT DATE
EBC Check 11289889 P 100,000.00 September
18, 1980
ABC Check 30064865 40,000.00 October
1, 1980
TMBC Check 16344241 34,750.00 December
27,1980
TMBC Check 16376681 67,705.00 January
17, 1981
TMBC Check 16376603 72,877.00 February
2,1981
TOTAL – – P
315,332.00
and xerox
copies of which checks are hereto attached as Annexes “A”, “B”, “C”, “D” and “E”
and all made an integral part of this amended complaint.’”
(Rollo, pp.
51-52, Petition, Annex “B”, pp. 1-2)
In the answer, Joaquin S. Gaw
raised among others, the following as his special and affirmative defenses:
“20. That
with respect to the checks alleged in paragraph 5 of the amended complaint,
defendant alleges the following:
(a) Equitable Banking
Corporation (Divisoria Branch) Check No. 11289889
dated September 18,1980 is not defendant’s check; that he has not withdrawn
said check and he is not indebted to the plaintiff, much less to Charles E. Go
and/or the latter’s father in the sum of P100,000.00;
(b) That
he admits having drawn Allied Banking Corporation (Padre Rada
Branch) Check No. 30064865 dated October
1, 1980, in the amount of P40,000.00 which
evidenced the fact that he has obtained a loan from Charles E. Go in the said
amount of P40,000.00; that he alleges that he has paid
said loan of P40,000.00 but Charles E. Go refused to return to him said check,
unless he pays all the loan obtained by persons whom
he accompanied and who were granted loans by Charles Go, because, with respect
to the loans obtained by the persons whom defendant merely accompanied, he has
no liability.”
(Rollo, pp.
63-64, Petition, Annex “C”, pp. 5-6)
An order dated August 3,
1981 set the case for pre-trial hearing on August 25, 1981.
On August 4, 1981, WPMC filed a motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings alleging therein that Joaquin S. Gaw admits
the genuiness and due execution of the checks copied
or attached to the complaint because he failed to specifically deny them under
oath and WPMC further claims that Joaquin S. Gaw’s
answer failed to tender an issue and therefore, a judgment on the pleadings is
proper.
In his opposition dated August 13, 1981, Joaquin S. Gaw alleged that there is absolutely no allegation in WPMC’s complaint to the effect that the signature appearing
on the checks as drawers are his signatures, for which reason, he need not
specifically deny under oath the due execution and genuineness of said checks
pursuant to and in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 the Revised Rules of
Court; and that with respect to the P40,000.00 check, he admits that said check
is his check but he alleges that he has paid the same and considering that the
defense is payment, he therefore, need not under oath, specifically deny the
due execution and genuineness of said check.
On August 18, 1981,
Joaquin S. Gaw prayed for
the cancellation of the pre-trial scheduled for August 25, 1981 for the reason that his motion for leave
to file third party complaint has not yet been resolved by the court, but the
same was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated August 21, 1981.
In the same order, the lower court ruled in part:
“x x x
Plaintiff’s motion for partial judgment dated August 3, 1981 is held in abeyance until the
termination of the pre-trial hearing.
xxx.”
A motion for reconsideration of the order dated August 21, 1981 denying his motion
for leave to file third party complaint was filed by Joaquin S. Gaw on August 22, 1981.
In view of the pendency of such motion, an
order dated August 25, 1981,
resetting the pre-trial hearing on September
16, 1981 was issued.
September 1, 1981,
a motion to admit third party complaint was filed by Joaquin S. Gaw and the same was admitted on September 4, 1981. After an exchange of pleadings between the
parties, respondent judge issued an order dated September 16, 1981 granting Joaquin S. Gaw’s motion to cancel the pre-trial hearing as
follows:
“O R D E R
Finding defendant’s motion to cancel the pre-trial hearing this
morning meritorious, issues not having been joined, the same is hereby
granted”. (Rollo,
p. 21)
But on the same date, the trial court rendered a partial decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, partial judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the total sum of P140,000.00,
with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint.
SO
ORDERED.”
(Rollo,
p. 90; Petition, Annex “J”, p. 3)
On October 27, 1981,
respondent judge issued an order, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby granted with
respect to ABC Check No. 30064865 in the sum of P40,000.00
and the decision is hereby modified and partial judgment on the pleadings is
hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the total sum of
P100,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint.
SO
ORDERED.”
(Rollo,
p. 111; Petition, Annex “O”, p. 3)
Meanwhile, on December
9, 1981, private respondent filed a petition for reconstitution of
judicial records in view of the fire which razed the sala
of the lower court at the City Hall
of Manila including the court’s
records of this case.
Petitioner and intervenor Gaw Chee Hun filed a “Joint
Manifestation with Motion for Time to Supply Deficiencies and Submit Additional
Matters to Complete Judicial Records” which was granted on December 29, 1981.
On January 5, 1982, or even before respondent Judge could act on
private respondent’s petition for reconstitution of judicial records and
petitioner’s and intervenor’s joint petition to
supply deficiencies of said records, private respondent moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution which was opposed by the petitioner.
On February 1, 1982,
respondent judge issued an order declaring that the records of Civil Case No.
R-81-500CV are reconstituted.
On February 4, 1982,
respondent judge issued an order, the dispositive
part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding that the partial judgment of this Court dated September 16, 1981 as modified by the
order of October 27, 1981,
final and executory, the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the
amount of P100,000.00 is hereby granted.
SO
ORDERED.”
(Rollo,
p. 143; Petition, Annex “Z”, p. 3)
On the same date, a writ of execution was issued (Rollo, p. 144; Petition, Annex “AA”).
On certiorari with preliminary injunction, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in its decision promulgated on
May 7, 1982, in the Tagalog dialect, the dispositive
part of which reads:
“KAYA, ang kahilingan at karagdagang kahilingan iniharap ay pinawawalang saysay sa dahilang ang
mga ito ay walang matibay na sandalan at kagalingan.
Siyang Ipinag-uutos.”
(Rollo, p. 197)
A motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted decision filed
by petitioner on May 27, 1982
was denied on June 10, 1982
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
On May 9, 1984,
the Second Division of this Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, 248).
The main issue in this case is:
Whether or not the respondent Appellate Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari holding that appeal
is the proper remedy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It will be recalled that on September 16, 1981, when the lower court rendered a
partial judgment on the pleadings against the defendant (herein petitioner) for
the following reason:
“Considering that the checks in question
had been attached to the complaint and made integral parts thereof as Annexes
“A” and “B” of the amended complaint, the allegations of the defendant’s answer
that he denies the same and which is not under oath tendered no issue. Under the rules, said answer was an admission
that the defendant executed said checks and that the plaintiff failed to
recover the amounts stated in the two checks.
Under Rule 19, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, judgment on the pleadings
is well taken.” (Rollo, pp. 89-90, Petition, Annex
“J”, pp. 2-3)
there was no
hearing, the pre-trial hearing having been cancelled and as found by the same
trial court in its Order dated Sept.
16, 1981, the issues have not yet been joined. (Rollo, p. 21)
Under similar circumstances this Court ruled that the lower court’s
exercise of judicial authority in granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings and in rendering a decision without conducting a hearing to allow the
parties to present their respective evidence was oppressive and amounted to
excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. The petition was considered a special civil
action of certiorari (Marina vs. Eastern Quezon
College, 168 SCRA 105-106 [1988]) reiterating an earlier ruling that certiorari
is available despite the existence of the remedy of appeal in such cases. (Co Chuan Seng v.
C.A., 128 SCRA 308 [1984]) Hence, respondent Appellate Court erred in ruling
that appeal and not certiorari is the proper remedy.
Not unlike the foregoing situations, the instant case does not
fall within the purview of Sec. 1 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which provides
that the lower court may, on motion of a party, direct judgment on the
pleadings “where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.”
A careful perusal of the complaint filed by the private
respondent against the petitioner will readily show that there was an absence
of an allegation to the effect that the check in question in the amount of P100,000.00 bears the latter’s signature. On the contrary, petitioner in his answer
stressed that it was not his check, that he has not drawn said check, and he
was not indebted to the private respondent and/or to the latter’s father.
It is therefore evident that petitioner’s answer not only
tendered an issue but clearly contested private respondent’s allegations in the
complaint. Accordingly the lower court
should not have rendered judgment on the pleadings.
The lower court went further by stating that a judgment on the
pleadings was proper due to petitioner’s lack of specific denial under oath as
to the genuinenes and due execution of the questioned
check.
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on
implied admission (by failure to make a sworn specific denial) of the
genuineness and due execution of a document or instrument subject of an action
or defense, but the same is not without exception. One of the exceptions is when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument, as held in the case of
Lim Chingco v. Terariray,
et al., 5 Phil, 120 [1906] sited in Paras, Rules of
Court Annotated, Vol. I, Rules 1-56, 1989 Second
Edition, pp. 258-259 and under which petitioner clearly falls, as there was no
allegation in the complaint that the aforementioned check was drawn by the
petitioner nor that the signature affixed thereto belongs to him. He is therefore under no obligation to
specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the said
check.
Furthermore, where there are factual issues in the answer that
had to be ascertained at a hearing and not on the basis of the bare allegations
in the pleadings, or evidence had yet to be submitted by the parties and to be
assessed by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to rule on the
strength alone of the plaintiff’s allegations and to disregard the defendants’
expressed denial thereof in their answer (Rocamora
vs. Regional Trial Court-Cebu, G.R. 65037, 23
November, 1988).
Undoubtedly said partial judgment being a clear denial of due
process is null and void and it follows that the same did not gain finality;
hence, a proper subject of this petition for certiorari.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision and
resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the records of this case are hereby REMANDED to the lower court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
*
Penned by Justice Onofre A. Villaluz
and concurred in by Justices Crisolito Pascual and Guillermo P. Villasor.
**
Penned by Justice Onofre A. /illaluz.