THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GEORGE A. LUCES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

George A. Luces was accused of selling a prohibited drug in the
defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu. The information against him reads as follows:

“That on or
about the 2nd day of May, 1981, at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there sell, deliver, give
away to another pro­hibited drugs consisting of one Manila envelope of
Marijuana or Indian hemp without being authorized by law.” (Expediente,
p. 1.)

Luces was tried and
thereafter the court rendered the follow­ing judgment:

“THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, this court finds the accused,
George Luces y Alcantara alias Bebot, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime involving the sale and deli­very of Indian hemp as defined and penalized
in accordance with Sec. 4, Art. 2 of Rep. Act 6425, as amended, and hereby
imposes upon him, by way of imprisonment, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
a fine of P20,000.00, with costs against him, and the forfeiture in favor of
the government of the Indian hemp,
subject matter of this case. Without
subsidiary imprisonment as provided for in Rep. Act 5465.” (Expediente, pp. 43 and 57.)

The evidence of the
prosecution is stated in the People’s brief as follows:

“On May 2, 1981, a civilian informer went to the office of the
CANU (Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit) at Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, and gave the information that there was a certain pusher by the name of “Bebot” (ap­pellant
herein, whose full name is George Luces y
Alcantara) residing at Lucio Lopez Drive (p. 3, tsn, 1982).

“The informer was told by Major [Digman] Cenon, the Commanding
Officer, to return on the following day because he (Major Cenon) had to secure money for the ‘operation’ (supra).

“Two days after or on May 4, 1981, the informer returned. After a short briefing, the informer was
given four one hundred peso bills, the serial numbers of which were listed in
the police blotter, to be used in buying mari­juana from appellant. (p. 4, ibid).

“At around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, three policemen, Cpl.
Martin Cabatingan, Pfc. Diano and Pat. Ocampo, proceeded to Lucio Lopez Drive
where the informer and appellant were supposed to meet. Upon reaching the place, the policemen
placed themselves in strategic positions where they could watch the informer
and appellant (p. 6, ibid). Not
long after, the informer arrived. The
informer and appellant had a short conversation, after which the latter
left. A few minutes later, appellant
returned with a brown envelope (pp. 6-7, ibid). Appellant gave the envelope to the
informer. After the informer had
examined the contents of the envelope, he gave the money to appellant (p. 8, ibid).

“Corporal Cabatingan then called Major Cenon who brought with
him a search warrant. When Major Cenon
arrived, they apprehended appellant. They also searched appellant’s residence at Lucio Lopez Drive and found
a clay pot planted with mari­juana. From the wallet of appellant, the policemen recovered the four one
hundred peso bills (pp. 8-9, ibid).

“An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was
filed against appellant. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced
accordingly. Hence this appeal.”
(At pp. 1-3.)

Accused George Luces
abstained from presenting evidence. After the prosecution had rested its case on February 9, 1982, this is
what transpired:

“ATTY
CAMISO [for the defense]:

Your
Honor please, we pray for a time element we can prepare the accused. Because of the sudden incarceration of the
accused, we were not able to confer with him and the record will show that the
one who is actually handling this case is Atty. Froilan Quijano and he is the
one responsible for representing this accused, Your Honor.

In
view of the foregoing, Your Honor, we ask for enough time to confer with the
accused.

COURT:

There
was a trial time limit of 90 days. As a
matter of fact, 90 days have passed.

Petition
denied. Hearing at 2:00 o’clock.

[Note:
As amended by P.D. No. 44 on November 9, 1972, Section 39 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 reads in part as follows: “Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the
court not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the
information. Decision on said cases
shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of sub­mission
of the case.”]

SESSION ADJOURNED: – 12:20

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WHEN THIS CASE WAS CALLED AGAIN FOR
RESUMPTION OF HEARING ON FEB. 9,
1982, at 2:25 P. M. –

COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL
AVILA:

The same appearance for the state, Your
Honor.

ATTY.
CAMISO, JR.:

The same appearance for the accused, Your
Honor.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY
CAMISO, JR.:

Your
Honor please, we reiterate our request that we be given sufficient time to prepare our defense.

COURT:

Petition denied.

ATTY
CAMISO:

In that case, Your Honor, we are no longer
presenting the accused as a witness.

COURT:

Okay, submitted for decision?

ATTY
CAMISO:

Submitted for decision.

FISCAL
AVILA:

Submitted for decision.

COURT:

Session adjourned.” (TSN, pp. 9-10.)

The appellant makes the following assignment of errors:

“I – THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS IN
VIEW OF ITS FAILURE TO PRESENT AS A WITNESS THE ALLEGED ‘BUYER’, TEDDY PEPITO.

II – THE LOWER COURT ACTED
WITH PREJUDICE, BIAS AND HOSTILITY AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN NOT GRANTING
THE APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR A LITTLE TIME TO PREPARE HIS EVIDENCE AFTER THE
PROSECUTION RESTED ITS CASE – IT APPEARING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS SUDDENLY
INCARCERATED WHEN THE COURT UNEXPECTEDLY INCREASED THE BAIL BOND TO P30,000.00
WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE, AND CONSIDERING FURTHER THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED.” (Brief, p. 1.)

The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Myrna Areaola, a forensic chemist who
testified that the content of the enve­lope which she was asked to examine was
marijuana; and Corporal Martin Cabatingan whose testimony is summarized in the
People’s brief.

The appellant now complains that nobody corroborated the testimony of Cabatingan. The appellant avers that Major Cenon and
Patrolmen Diano and Ocampo and especially the informer should have testified.

There is no merit in the first assignment of error. For except in treason where the testimony of
at least two witnesses to the same overt act is needed, there is no law which
requires that the testimony of a single witness has to be corroborated. “In the determination of the values and
credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed and not numbered (People
vs. Marasigan, L-2235, Jan. 31, 1950; 47 Off. Gaz. No. 7, p. 2529). The testimony of only one witness, if cre­dible
and positive; an unsupported evidence of an accomplice, if it satisfies the
court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict.” (People v.
Argana, L-19448, Feb. 28, 1964; 10 SCRA 311, 317.)

In the case at bar the unrebutted and lengthy testimony of Cabatingan who was subjected to cross-examination
has proved the case for the prosecution;
it is sufficient.

The other assignment of error must also fail for the appellant
had ample time to prepare for his defense.

The record shows that the
appellant was released on June 23, 1981, when he posted a cash bail of
P500.00. On February 3, 1982, bail was
increased to P30,000.00. He was re-committed to jail when he was
unable to post the upgraded bail. The appellant, therefore, had over seven months to prepare for his trial. Even after he had been re­committed the
appellant had ample time to prepare for trial.

It may be allowed that
the bail of P30,000.00 is somewhat excessive under the circumstances but such
fact does not prove that the trial judge was biased or hostile against the
appellant.

The Solicitor General
states:

“Proper Penalty to Be Imposed

It must be noted that the court imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua upon the ap­pellant. The appropriate
maximum penalty under Sec. 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 should be twenty years
because there is no showing that the marijuana caused the death of a per­son.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully re­commended that, except for the
modification reducing the penalty from reclusion perpetua to an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20)
YEARS, the appealed decision be affirmed in
all respects, with costs against appellant.” (Brief, pp. 8-9.)

The Solicitor General
errs in respect of the penalty. The
appellant committed the offense on May 2, 1981 P.D. No. 1675 which took effect
on February 17, 1980, amended R. A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 so that Section 4 thereof reads as follows:

“Sec. 4. Sale,
Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of prohibited
Drugs. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.”

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court being in accord
with the facts and the law is hereby affirmed in toto with costs against
the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.