G.R. No. 60083. October 27, 1982
CRISPINA PEÑAFLOR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DOMINGO PANIS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES (OLONGAPO CITY BRANCH), AND PRESCILLA DELOS SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioner Crispina
Peñaflor is the owner of a residential house at No. 65, 14th Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo City, but resides in Roxas Street, Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Private respondent, Prescilla de los Santos leases a room in the said residential house
at P130.00 a month.
On September 10, 1980,
petitioner-lessor filed with the City Court of Olongapo, Branch II, an Ejectment
suit (Civil Case No. 2043) against private respondent-lessee because of her
(petitioner’s) need of the leased premises for a medical clinic for her
daughter.
Private respondent moved
to dismiss the Complaint for petitioner’s failure to bring the controversy
before the Lupon Barangay for conciliation or settlement, which is a
pre-condition to the filing of the Complaint, pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
Petitioner countered by stating that since the parties reside in
different municipalities, PD 1508 is inapplicable.
The City Court denied the Motion to Dismiss as well as a
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, stating that the ground alleged as a
basis for dismissal was not indubitable.
In her Answer, private
respondent maintained that petitioner has no need of the premises and that the
latter merely wanted to raise the rental.
In its Decision of May
26, 1981, the City Court ordered private respondent to vacate the
premises and to pay attorney’s fees of P500.00 and costs.
On appeal, the Court of
First Instance of Zambales reversed the City Court judgment and dismissed the Complaint
holding that since the dispute involved interest in real property, it should
have been brought first before the Lupon of the barangay where the property is
situated for conciliation and settlement.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion, petitioner has come to this
Court praying for reversal of the Order of dismissal.
The question of law is:
should the instant controversy have been brought first before the Lupon
Barangay pursuant to section 6 of PD 1508 establishing a system of settling
disputes at the barangay level, or was it correctly filed directly before the
City Court?
Section 2 of PD 1508
provides:
“SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. – The Lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city
or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes except:
(1)
Where one party is the government,
or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
(3)
Offenses punishable by
imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
(4)
Offenses where there is no private
offended party;
(5)
Such other classes of disputes
which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local
Government.” (Emphasis given).
The requirement of actual
residence in the same city or
municipality is made more explicit in the provision on venue, thus:
“SECTION 3. Venue. – Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent
or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant. However, all disputes which involve real
property or any interest therein shall
be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof
is situated.
The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
(1)
involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangays adjoin each other; and
(2)
involving
real property located in different municipalities.” (Italics ours).
While the provision on
mandatory conciliation, as a pre-condition to the filing of the Complaint, is
found in Section 6:
“SECTION 6. Conciliation, precondition to filing of
complaint. ? No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted
in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been
a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary
or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless
the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the following case:
(1)
Where the accused is under
detention;
(2)
Where a person has otherwise been
deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3)
Actions coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property and support pendente lite; and
(4)
Where the action may otherwise be
barred by the Statute of Limitations.” (Italics supplied).
Clearly, therefore, for the conciliation or settlement
proceedings to be operative, it is essential that the controversy must be
within the authority of the Lupon Barangay as spelled out in Sections 2 and 3, supra. Specifically,
the disputants must actually
reside in the same barangay, or even if in different barangays, the latter
should be situated within the same
city or municipality. Or
even if in different cities or municipalities, the barangays must adjoin each other.
There can be no dispute that taking into account the actual
residence of the parties herein, they fall outside the
scope of PD 1508. They do not reside
within the same barangay, nor in barangays within the
same city or municipality, nor in barangays which adjoin each other but situated in the same city or
municipality.
Respondent Judge, however, relied on the following proviso in
Section 3:
“However, all disputes which involve real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or
any part thereof is situated.”
As it clearly states, Section 3 is a rule on
venue. It presupposes that a controversy
is within the jurisdiction of a Lupon Barangay.
It by no means signifies that all controversies involving interest in
real property are within the jurisdiction of the Lupon Barangay where the
property is situated.
As clarified in Tavora
vs. Hon. Veloso, G.R. No. 60367, September 30, 1982, with Mr. Justice Efren I.
Plana speaking for the Court en banc,
“x x x the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict
or vary the rule on venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the
first paragraph of Section 3, thus:
Although venue is generally determined by the residence of the parties,
disputes involving real property shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or any part thereof is situated, notwithstanding that the parties
reside elsewhere within the same city/municipality.”
Stated otherwise, before
section 3 becomes operative, jurisdiction must first exist. As heretofore stated, in this case the Lupon Barangay has no jurisdiction
because the parties involved are not residents in the same barangay, nor in barangays within the same city nor in barangays
adjoining each other. Since no Lupon
Barangay has jurisdiction to pass upon the controversy between petitioner and
private respondent, no question of venue anent the barangay where the complaint
should be litigated can be invoked. PD
1508 is not applicable and,
necessarily, section 3 of said PD is not invocable for the dismissal of this Ejectment suit.
WHEREFORE, the
Order of dismissal, dated February 18, 1982, is SET ASIDE, and respondent Judge is hereby directed to
reinstate the appeal in Civil Case No. 2043 and to resolve it on its merits.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Vasquez, Relova, and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), on
official leave.