PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VIRGINIA MATOS-VIDUYA Y GALPA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Appellant Virginia
Matos-Viduya appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, finding her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide:

The information alleges:

“That on or about the 26th day of August, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of ATTY. JOSE VIDUYA y TAVARES, her husband, and with whom she was
united in lawful wedlock, by then and there stabbing him several times with a
bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said Atty. Jose Viduya
y Tavares mortal stab wounds which were the direct cause of his death
immediately thereafter.” (Rollo, p. 4)

The prosecution presented the following evidence:

(1)     Mrs. Remedios Domingo, a lessee on the ground floor of the
victim’s house, testified that on August
26, 1980, at about 12 o’clock
midnight, she was awakened by moaning
sounds, followed by a thud, emanating from the second floor where the victim,
Atty. Viduya, lived. 
Mrs. Domingo, who had been a lessee in the same house for twenty five
(25) years and had known her lessor to suffer from a
heart ailment, presumed that the latter was having a heart attack.  She immediately ran towards the apartment of
the victim’s family driver, Melanio Cambel, which was only four (4) meters away.  She shouted, “Melanio,
Melanio, your sir might have a heart attack, you
better go upstairs.” Awakened by her call, Melanio
proceeded to the victim’s house.  (TSN,
February 24, 1981, pp. 154-157)

(2)     Melanio
Cambel declared that he was the family driver and was
renting an apartment owned by the victim which is just a few meters from his
house.  At about midnight of August
26, 1980, he was aroused sleep by the shouts of Remedios
Domingo who was telling him to go upstairs as his “sir” might be
having an attack.  He ran upstairs to the
house of Atty. Viduya and was let in by Lydia Firmanes, a cousin of the accused.  Upon entering, Cambel
saw the victim clutching, with both hands, the handle of the refrigerator
located just outside the door leading to the victim’s room, leaning thereon for
support.  Immediately standing behind the
victim was the accused, his wife, holding a knife with both hands.  As Cambel
approached them, she stooped down saying “Diosko,
Diosko,” trying to conceal the knife from
him.  Cambel
ran towards the victim, lending him support so that the latter would not
fall.  However, the victim was heavy,
that even with Cambel supporting him, he nevertheless
fell down.  Still holding the victim, Cambel inquired from him what happened but the latter was
too weak to speak.  Not getting any
answer from the victim, Cambel asked the accused why
she stabbed her husband.  Initially, the
accused did not answer, but upon being questioned for the second time, she
hesitantly muttered. “Magnanakaw, magnanakaw.” Since other persons had by then arrived, Cambel requested assistance to bring the victim to the
hospital.  The victim was brought to St.
Jude Hospital, Dimasalang, Sampaloc, Manila
but was pronounced dead on arrival. 
(TSN, Dec. 10, 1980, pp. 260-268)

(3)     Florentino
Bagallon, an investigator of the Crimes against
Persons Section of the Manila Police, Force, Western Police District declared
that he conducted an on-the-spot ocular
inspection of the victim’s house and found, in the bedroom of the victim and
the accused, a single bed with a white blanket in disorder, soaked in a pool of blood.  He extended the
search to the ground floor of the house and recovered two pieces of bladed knives at the east yard of the victim’s
residence which was used as parking space for heavy trucks.  One of the knives had a
bended blade.  On the east wall, he found
a rectangular hole which used to hold an air-conditioning unit, and a wall
clock and table clock beside the rectangular hole.  He likewise noticed some pieces of wood
placed under a parked heavy truck on the east yard.  The accused informed him that those pieces of
wood used to cover the rectangular hole. 
Thereafter, he advised the accused and the victim’s son, Salvador Viduya, to go with him to the police headquarters for a
formal investigation. (TSN., Oct. 28, 1980, pp. 18-30)

Bagallon testified that at 3:15 in the morning of August 26, 1980, the accused executed a salaysay.  Significant portions of the said salaysay are quoted, as
follows:

“xxx                       xxx                   xxx

 7.T –  Ana
ba sa alam
ninyo ang dahilan ng kanyang
pagkamatay?

 S –  Sinaksak dahil sa panloloob na ginawa sa
amin.

 xxx                       xxx                   xxx

15.T
– Nang marinig ninyo ang ungol
na nanggaling sa inyong asawa
at kayo nga noon
ay nagising, ano naman ang inyong
nakita?

S –
Dalawang  lalaki, ang isa ay nakatayo sa
tabi ng kama
ko at may nakatutok
na patalim sa aking ulo
at sa kabilang kama naman ay nakita
ko na may isa pa ring lalaki na sumasaksak sa
aking asawa.

 xxx                       xxx                   xxx

26.T
– Nakikilala
po ba naman ninyo ang dalawang lalaking pumasok sa loob ng kuwarto ninyo?

S – Kung
sakaling makita
ko uli ay
maaari kong makilala.

27.T – Ano po ba
ang hitsura nila?

S – Yun pong sumaksak sa asawa
ko ay maitim, mga 5’3 po, nakasuot
ng dark color at yong tumutok naman sa
akin ay may mga 5’2, kayumanggi,
slender, putian ang suot na damit.

 xxx                       xxx                   xxx

31.T – Nang maganap ang
pangloloob sa inyo at pananaksak sa asawa mo hanggang
sa makaalis ang dalawang lalaki,
nasaan ba naman ang mga
taong kasama mo sa bahay?

S – Nagising silang lahat sa
pagsigaw ko.

32.T
– At ano ba naman ang
isinigaw mo?

S – Magnanakaw, magnanakaw!!!
(Underlining ours, Exh. “H”, pp. 5­-6,
Folder of Exhibits)

xxx                        xxx                   xxx

Pfc. Bagallon also stated that on
August 26, 1980 at about 5:30 in the afternoon, the accused was again invited
to the police headquarters for further investigation.  In her second “salaysay”
executed on the aforesaid date and time, she reiterated her narration contained
in her first “salaysay” executed earlier
that morning.  This time, however, she
declared that one of the malefactors was a certain Edito
Pateño, their former employee.  (Exhibit “L”, p. 12, Folder of
Exhibits) On August 30, 1990 at 2:20 in the morning, Mrs. Virginia Viduya again executed a “salaysay”
(Exhibit “M”, p. 13, Folder of Exhibits).  Later, at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning
of the same date, Mrs. Viduya executed her extrajudicial confession wherein she
categorically admitted authorship of the killing of her husband.  However, she claimed that she merely acted in
self?defense.  (Exhibits
“N”, p. 17, Folder of Exhibits)

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded, not guilty to the charge.

The version of the defense, during the trial is as follows:

The accused and her husband were asleep in separate beds when she
was awakened by her husband’s moans.  She
saw two men, one pointing a knife at her temple and the other stabbing her
husband.  She identified Edito Pateño as the man who poked
a knife at her temple.  Pateño was about to stab her so she parried the knife and
tried to wrest it away from him and in the process, the blade became bent.  She
ran after them shouting “Magnanakaw, magnanakaw” but they had already escaped.  (Exhibit “L”, p. 11, Folder of Exhibits) She recognized Melanio Cambel, their family
driver, as the man who stabbed her husband (TSN., March 17, 1981, p. 352).  Cambel even
threatened and slapped and nearly choked her to death at the first night of the
wake because he could not force her to sleep (TSN., June 10, 1981, pp.
427-428).  She was misled and deceived by
Pfc. Bagallon into signing her extrajudicial
confession (TSN., June 10, 1981, p. 431) since he told her that she will not be
detained if she signs the document. 
(TSN., March 27, 1981, p. 372)

After due trial, the lower court rendered its decision adjudging
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. 
The relevant and dispositive portions of the
judgment are quoted as follows:

“xxx                           xxx                   xxx

“Finding the confession made by
the accused Virginia Matus Viduya
admissible in evidence together with the convincing proof of the corpus delicti
by the prosecution, this Court holds that accused Virginia Matus
Viduya is guilty of the crime of Parricide as defined
and penalized by the Revised Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt.

“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby sentences the accused Virginia Matus to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jose Viduya in
the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), Philippine currency and to
pay the costs of suit.” (Rollo, p. 15)

Hence, this appeal.

The appellant assigns the following errors:

I

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED, THE SAME
HAVING BEEN SIGNED WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AND BEING INVOLUNTARY AND UNCORROBORATED.

II

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE INCREDIBLE AND IN RELYING ON THE ALLEGED CONFESSION TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED.” (Rollo,
p. 47)

Article III,  Section 12 (1)
of the 1987 Constitution mandates that:

“Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.  If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with
one.  These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.”
(Emphasis supplied)

In  this case, it is
undisputed that the extrajudicial confession was executed without the presence
of counsel.  We quote the relevant
excerpt from the extrajudicial confession:

“xxx                       xxx                   xxx

T –   Ikaw ay may karapatan pa rin kumuha ng
serbisyo ng isang abogado para
makatulong mo sa imbestigasyong ito at kung wala kang makukuha,
ikaw ay aming bibigyan ng libreng
abogado, ano ngayon ang iyong
masasabi?

S –   Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal (pointing to
Assistant Fiscal DOMINGO A. MENDOZA) kayo hindi ko na kailangan
ang abogado.

xxx                        xxx
                   xxx”

(Exhibit “N”, p. 17, Folder of Exhibits)

The trial judge, in holding that the extrajudicial confession is
admissible, reasoned out that there is no prohibition for Assistant Fiscal
Domingo A. Mendoza to act as counsel for the accused as it is his primordial duty not only to prosecute a case but also to
protect the rights of an accused and to see that no violence, force, coercion
or intimidation be used to secure
from a person under custodial
investigation his statement. (Rollo, p. 13)

Section 12(1) of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution favors the accused and is fully applicable to
this case.  It is also elementary that a
Fiscal or Prosecutor cannot be a lawyer for the accused at the same time.

In his testimony, Assistant Fiscal Mendoza stated that his main
functions as Assistant Fiscal in the City of Manila
are to prosecute cases and to        render
duties as an inquest fiscal.* Whether or
not the subsequent trial of a confessant’s case will be assigned to him as
prosecutor is immaterial.  He cannot
pretend to act as defense counsel.

An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot exercise
the function of defense counsel even during custodial investigation.  To allow such a happenstance would render
illusory the protection given to the
accused during custodial investigation.  What the Constitution requires in
Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent
counsel, one who will effectively
undertake his clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Moreover, the answer of the accused (“Nandiyan
naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na
kailangan ng abogado“) is a palpable indication that she did not
fully understand her in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said that she
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.  The rule espoused in People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289
[1986]), bears repeating:

“xxx                           xxx                   xxx

“Like other constitutional rights, the right against
self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be
waived.  To be valid, however, a waiver
of the right must not only be voluntary it must be made knowingly and
intelligently, which presupposes an awareness
or understanding of what is being waived. 
It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately
explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person interrogated
knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the
questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.”

This ruling has been reinforced and made clearer by the new
provision of the Bill of Rights.

The extrajudicial confession having no probative value on the
grounds that it was executed without the presence of counsel and there having
been no intelligent waiver of the right to remain silent, this Court no longer
deems it necessary to inquire into the alleged deceit employed by Pfc. Bagallon in extracting the above-mentioned confession from
the accused.

The remaining issue left for determination is whether or not the
prosecution evidence, absent the extrajudicial confession, is sufficient to
sustain the lower court’s conviction of the accused.

A rule firmly entrenched in
our criminal justice system is that the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.  (People v. Ramirez, 116 SCRA 48 [1982];
People v. Co, 163 SCRA 453 [1988]).  In the case before us, the defense of
the accused is weak.  In trying to exculpate herself, the
appellant tried to shift culpability to another person.  The attempt is not convincing.  As the trial court ruled:

“xxx                           xxx                   xxx

“The claim of accused that it was Melanio
Cambel who stabbed her husband for reasons that he
had been indifferent, never cared to bring the victim to the hospital, that he
was drunkard, a Casanova and failed to repair the headlamp of their car on
time-such motive is too incredible to believe. 
That he slapped and choked her when every body were (sic) asleep at the
first night of the wake at the Funeraria Paz and she
did not shout but merely cried are beyond the comprehension of human
instinct.  Evidence to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible
in itself.  (Vda.
de Bonifacio v. BLT Bus Co., Inc., 34 SCRA 618
[1970]) It is a common knowledge and a recognized custom within us that no
relative or friend will sleep on the very first night of a wake – more so when
the case of death is a shocking one. 
Human perception can be warped by the impact of events and the testimony
colored by the unconscious workings of the mind.  No better test has yet been found to measure
the value of a witness’ testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common
experience of mankind.  Whatever is
repugnant to these belong to the miraculous and could not be of judicial
cognizance (People v. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451
[1967]).” (Rollo, pp. 14-15)

But though the accused’s defense is
weak, the prosecution’s evidence is not strong enough to adduce proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is the guilty
party.

A thorough review of the prosecution’s evidence discloses that
the only proof linking the accused to the killing of her husband is the
testimony of Melanio Cambel.  Cambel testified
that he saw the accused behind the victim,
holding a knife with both hands. 
It is not shown how
twelve stab wounds, most of them serious, could have been inflicted by a woman
under the circumstances of his testimony. 
Two knives were involved in the stabbing.  Other than Melanio Cambel’s testimony, there is no other evidence, direct or
circumstantial, pointing to the accused as the author of the crime.

The Solicitor General capitalizes on the inconsistencies in the
three affidavits which the accused executed prior to the taking of her
extrajudicial confession.  He is of the
persuasion that her issuance of three statements, the truth of which she
affirmed in open court but the contents of which differ from each other, is
another circumstantial evidence of her culpability.  This Court, however, is of the view that the
conflicting affidavits executed by the accused merely weaken her defense and
cannot be considered as circumstantial evidence for the prosecution.

Moreover, the trial court’s complete reliance on only one of three (3) extrajudicial statements and
its total rejection of the two other statements without any independent
evidence or proof for such action, is not explained.

Considering the paucity of the State’s evidence, we are not
satisfied that the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to the
accused-appellant has been overthrown.  The constitutional presumption of
innocence can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the degree of proof that, after
investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainly in an unprejudiced
mind of the appellant’s culpability. 
(People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 [1971]) The
prosecution failed to produce such proof. 
This Court, therefore, has no other recourse but to acquit the accused-
appellant.

It is high time that our law enforcement agencies learn to live
with the new requirements of the Bill of Rights.  A former Senator and distinguished
libertarian was reportedly asked
about academic qualifications of policemen
and he answered, “they have only one degree ­– the third
degree.” This perception, justified or not, is the reason for the present Bill of Rights provision on
extrajudicial confessions.  It should
become a thing of the past.  Better
investigation procedures and more sophisticated techniques, not to mention
industry and persistence, must replace the former persuading and coercing of,
or total dependence on extrajudicial confessions.

WHEREFORE, the
JUDGMENT of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and another entered
ACQUITTING her on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortez, JJ., concur.

* As an inquest fiscal, he advises police investigators as to whether or
not a prima facie case exists in cases which they investigate. (TSN., Dec. 10,
1980, p. 245)