THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CAMILO PAREJA, LEONARDO CALAYO, AQUILINA MIRA, BALBINA CALAYO, JORGE JESALVA AND CARLITO MIRA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal from the resolution of the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II dated March 29, 1978,
finding Camilo Pareja,
Leonardo Calayo, Aquilina
Mira, Balbina Calayo, her
husband Jorge Jesalva and Carlito
Mira who were defendants in Civil Case No. 2548 (Victoria Llona,
et al. v. Camilo
Pareja, et al.) guilty of contempt of court for
having returned to the unregistered parcels of lands subject of the action and
gathered products therein after the possession thereof had been delivered to
the plaintiffs pursuant to the final judgment in the case.  Appellants contend that they could not be
cited for contempt inasmuch as the motion for contempt is an incident of the
decision in Civil Case No. 2548 which has become functus
oficio considering that the lands in dispute
are disposable and alienable part of
the public domain and that during the pendency of the
contempt proceedings, they were awarded titles over the disputed lands pursuant
to their free patent applications with the Bureau of Lands which has the
authority under the law to dispose of public lands.

The resolution of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon was appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
latter court certified the appeal to Us since only
pure questions of law are involved.

The facts of the case, being uncontroverted,
are stated by the Court of Appeals as follows:

“On March 5, 1971, the spouses Victorio
Llona and Victoria Llave
filed an action to quiet title to two adjoining parcels of land (with a total
area of 14 hectares more or less) and recover damages, against Camilo Pareja, Leona Martinez,
Leonardo Calayo, Jorge Jesalva
and Aquilina Mira. 
It was docketed as Civil Case No. 2548
of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.

“On November 11,
1971, the lower court rendered a decision by default which is quoted in
full hereunder.

‘This is a case filed by the spouses Victorio
Llona and Victoria Llave
against Camilo Pareja, Leona
Martinez, Leonardo Calayo, Jorge Jesalva
and Aquilina Mira, for the quieting of title to two
parcels of land described in the complaint as follows:

‘Parcel 1 – A parcel of coconut and cogon land, situated at Malawaan, Bonga, Castilla, Sorsogon, containing an
area of 6.0585 hectares, more or less, bounded on the North by Silvino Llona; on
the East by Macario Garcia; on the South by a Brook;
and on the West by Silvino Llona.  The permanent improvements are coconuts;
declared under Tax Declaration No. 4693 in the name of Victorio
Llona, and assessed at P490.00.

‘Parcel 2 – A parcel of coconut and cogon land situated in Malawaan, Bonga, Castilla, Sorsogon, containing an
area of 81,730 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Silvino Llona; on the East by Catalino Lastrilla; on the South
by Silvino Llona; and on
the West by Consolacion Velasco.  The permanent improvements are coconut;
declared under Tax Declaration No. 7875 in the name of Victorio
Llona and assessed at P920.00.’

with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

‘The record of the case shows that summons and copies of the
complaint were served on the 15th and 16th day of March, 1971 upon the
defendants Camilo Pareja,
Leona Martinez, Leonardo Calayo, Jorge Jesalva and Aquilina Mira.  Despite their having been served with summons
and copies of the complaint none of the defendants filed an answer to the
complaint.

‘On May 7, 1971,
upon motion of the plaintiffs, thru counsel, this Court issued an order
declaring the defendants in default and allowing the plaintiffs to present
evidence in support of the complaint before the Deputy Clerk of Court.

‘When this case was called for the reception of evidence, the plaintiffs and their counsel
appeared.  Two witnesses – the plaintiff Victorio Llona and Paulino Levantino – were
presented.

‘In the course of the testimony of Victorio
Llona, the following evidence were
adduced:  Parcel 1 was originally owned
by Catalino Lastrilla whose
ownership and possession started as far back as 1906 (Exh.
L); subsequently or in 1944, Felicidad P. Tiamzon became the declared owner of the same parcel of
land (Exh. L); in 1946, Eleuterio
Tiamzon (husband of Felicidad
P. Tiamzon) sold said parcel to Silvino
Leona (father of the plaintiff Victorio Llona) as shown by the deed of absolute sale (Exh. D) executed by Eleuterio Tiamzon; the same deed of absolute sale was registered at
the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon on March 12, 1946
as shown by the annotation of registration (Exh.
D-1); sometime after the death of Silvino Leona or on
the 28th day of February, 1966, Victorio Llona who is one of the plaintiffs acquired said Parcel 1
from his brothers and sisters (Exh. H); Victoria
Llona caused this parcel of land to be declared in
his name and paid the land taxes of said parcel (Exhs.
J-4 and J-5); Tax Declaration No. 8426, in the name of Victorio
Llona, was subsequently revised or cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 4693 (Exh. I), also in the name of Victorio Llona, when the area of said parcel was found after the survey
to be 60,585 square meters only instead of 120,000 square meters as shown in
the deed of absolute sale (Exh. D) and
deed of quit-claim (Exh. H);

‘As regards Parcel 2, was originally owned by Uy
Haveria alias Uy Sit Co
(husband of Maria Laroga) who acquired this parcel in
1912 (Exh. M); on June 19, 1943 Maria Laroga sold this parcel of land to the spouses Felicidad de Tiamzon and Eleuterio Tiamzon, the deed of
sale (Exh. M) of which was
duly registered at the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon as
shown also by Exh. M; this Parcel 1
(Exh. D-2) was later sold by Eleuterio Tiamzon to Silvino Leona, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. D) of which was duly
registered at the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, as
shown by the annotation of registration (Exh. D-1);
on April 11, 1957, the
heirs of Silvino Llona sold
this parcel of land to Simon Laroga (Exh. C); on July 19, 1963, the spouses Simon Laroga and Maria Ocampo sold the
same parcel of land to the spouses Agustin Maldonado and Estelita
Dellosa (Exh. B); Agustin
Maldonado had this parcel of land declared in his name, Tax Declaration No.
6841 (Exh. C), which cancelled Tax Declaration No.
4866 in the name of the previous owner, Simon Laroga;
on February 7, 1966, Estelita Dellosa (widow of
Agustin Maldonado) sold this parcel 1 to plaintiffs Victorio
Llona and Victoria Llave (Exh. A); said sale in favor of the plaintiffs Victorio Llona and Victoria Llave was duly registered at the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon (Exh. A-1); this same
parcel of land was then declared for taxation purposes in the name of Victorio Llona under Tax
Declaration No. 7875 (Exh. F), which was later
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4692, also in the name of Victorio
Llona (Exh. E); the land
taxes of this property were paid as shown by Official Receipts Nos. A-7247440 (Exh. J), B-0349215 (Exh. J-1),
C-6826070 (Exh. J-2), D-584973 (Exh.
J-3) and F-18119840 (Exhs. (sic) J-6);

‘Motivated by the desire to have Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, which are
adjacent to each other, titled, the plaintiffs had the said two parcels of land
surveyed (Exh. K), and had Parcel 1 and Parcel 2
consolidated during the survey into one parcel only (Exh.
K-1);

‘Victorio Llona
declared further that:  the defendants
entered the land in question every now and then to gather coconuts; Camilo Pareja entered the land in
question three times – the first time he entered he gathered and got 96
coconuts, the second time he took away 185 coconuts, and the third time he
gathered and carried away 400 coconuts; Leona Martinez, Leonardo Calayo, Jorge Jesalva and Aquilina Mira are claiming interests over certain portions
of the land in question only because, upon request and intercession of Leona
Martinez, they were allowed by the father of plaintiff Victorio
Llona to cultivate certain portions of the land in question; they, the plaintiffs,
together with the predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land
in question openly, publicly, adversely, notoriously, peacefully, continuously
and uninterruptedly in concept of owners since 1912 over  Parcel 2, and as far back as 1906 over Parcel
1, (Exhs. M and L); as a consequence of the filing of
this case against the defendants, the plaintiffs incurred P600.00 for
attorney’s fee, P300.00 for incidental expenses, and P1,000.00 for actual damages.

‘The evidence presented during the reception of evidence
sufficiently proved the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs over Parcel
1 and Parcel 2, subject of this case. 
Their possession, together with those of their predecessors in interest,
which was open, public, peaceful, adverse, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted and in concept of owner, started as far back
as 1906 for Parcel 1 and 1912 for Parcel 2. 
For which reasons, whatever rights any other persons may have over said
property, if there be any, have already prescribed.

‘Furthermore, the records of this case show that the defendants
were duly served with summons and copies of the complaint in this case.  Instead of filing an answer to the complaint
within the reglementary period as required of them by
law, thereby availing of their rights to protect their interests over the
property, they chose to ignore the same and attempted to show some semblance or
color of ownership by entering the property every now and then to gather the
products therefrom which is a clear indication that
the defendants are wanting in muniments of title and
other evidence in their possession to prove their ownership over the property
in question.

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered and as prayed for, this Court hereby
renders judgment declaring the plaintiffs the rightful owners of Parcel 1 and
Parcel 2, subject of this case and entitled to the peaceful possession of said
property.  The defendants, as well as
their agents, laborers or representatives, are hereby ordered to refrain from
asserting any interest or rights over the property in question.

‘The defendants are also
ordered jointly and solidarily to pay the plaintiffs
P500.00 for attorney’s fee, P300.00 for incidental expenses, and P500.00 for
actual damages.

‘SO ORDERED.’

“On November 29,
1971, the defendants received a copy of the decision.

“On December 20,
1971, they filed a motion to set it aside (p. 37, Rec.).  Pareja claimed that
he was the rightful owner of Parcel 2 and that Aquilina
Mira and Jorge Jesalva were the owners of portions of
Parcel 1.  The motion was opposed by the
plaintiffs.  The trial court denied the
motion on January 19, 1972 on the ground that the defendants were bound by the
negligence and mistake of their lawyer, Atty. Lumen Policarpio,
who failed to answer the complaint (p. 48, Rec.).  The defendants did not appeal.

“On plaintiffs’ motion, the trial court ordered the execution
of the judgment on March 23, 1972
(p. 52, Rec.).  A writ of execution was
issued on March 28, 1972
(p. 54, Rec.).

“The sheriff’s return on the writ of execution certified
that–

‘x x x I have
caused to be served this writ to the defendants mentioned therein and
respective copies of this writ were given to each and everyone of said
defendants who refused to acknowledge receipts of the same in the presence of
PC Sgt. Welfredo Granpon
and Patrolman Rogelio Cal Ortiz, of the Municipal Police Force of Castilla, Sorsogon, and the
plaintiffs Victorio Llona
and his spouse, on the 27th day of June, 1972, at Malawaan,
Bongña, Castilla, Sorsogon, and that possession was delivered physically to
the plaintiffs.

‘Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
June 28, 1972.

/s/ Gumersindo
A. Aquino

/t/GUMERSINDO A. AQUINO

Deputy Provincial Sheriff’

“On July 24, 1972,
the plaintiffs asked for a writ of demolition because the defendants refused to
vacate the property (p. 55, Rec.).

“Over the defendants’ opposition the court issued a writ of
demolition on February 19, 1973, Deputy Provincial Sheriff Oscar D. Calolot’s return of the writ reads as follows:

‘In compliance of the Order of the Court dated February 19, 1973,
issued by Honorable Feliciano Gonzales, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, Branch I in Civil Case No. 2548, Victorio Llona, et al., versus Camilo Pareja, et al., the
undersigned received the writ on August 2, 1973 and served on the 3rd day of
August, 1973, the proceedings thereon being:

‘1.  That the defendants, Camilo
Pareja, et al., were furnished a copy of the Writ of
Demolition each as shown or evidenced by signature and thumbmark
and remarks at the dorsal side of this Writ.

‘2.    Hired two (2) carpenters, Martiniano Docta and Antonio Laguardia in the demolition of the houses of the
defendants.

‘3.   Request two (2) PC soldiers escort
namely:  T/Sgt. Conchito
Magello and S/Sgt. Antonio Sarmiento
for the security of the Sheriff.

‘4.   Demolished
the houses
of defendants,
Jorge Jesalva, Leona Martinez, Aquilina Mira and Gloria Calayo, wife of Leonardo
Calayo.

‘5.   Advised the
defendants to respect the right and lawful possession of the plaintiffs over
the land in question.

‘In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 6th day of
August, 1973.’  (Exh. B-1, Motion for Contempt, p. 74, Rec.)

“More than two (2) years later, on August 14, 1975, the plaintiffs filed a motion
for contempt against the defendants on the ground that in March 1975 they
reentered the property.  The motion was
supported by the affidavit of plaintiffs’ tenant, Sebastian Calayo,
stating that defendants Camilo Pareja
and Balbina Calayo and
their workers, Danilo Las Piñas,
Mariano Calayo and Luis Las Piñas,
Jr., had gathered coconuts from the land; and that Balbina
Calayo, wife of defendant Jorge Jesalva,
occupied the house of plaintiffs’ tenant, Salvador Latuga.  The affidavit of Salvador Latuga
stated that Camilo Pareja,
Leonardo Calayo and Aquilina
Mira built new houses on the land.  He
confirmed that Balbina Calayo
drove him (Latuga) out of his house (p. 79, Rec.).

“Defendants answered the motion for contempt.  They did not deny that they have reentered
the land, but they alleged that it is public agricultural land whose
administration and disposition pertains to the Director of Lands; that the
decision of the trial court adjudicating its ownership to the plaintiffs was
null and void for lack of jurisdiction; and that, hence, they are not guilty of
contempt of court for disobeying the void judgment.  They asked that the motion for contempt be
denied (p. 85, Rec.).

“On November 24,
1975, the trial court ordered Deputy Provincial Sheriff Oscar Calolot to inspect the land which was reentered by the
defendants and to identify the portions respectively occupied by them (p. 113,
Rec.).  Calolot’s
return of service reads as follows:

‘In compliance with the order of the Court dated November 24, 1975,
issued by the Honorable Feliciano S. Gonzales, Judge of the C.F.I of Sorsogon, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 2548 of the above?entitled
case, the undersigned had accomplished on December 1, 1975 the following
services:

‘1.  That during our ocular inspection on the land
in question at Boñga, Castilla,
Sorsogon, it was found out that respondent Camilo Pareja had constructed a
residential house made of coconut leaves and bamboo materials right in the same
premises where the previous house of Leona Martinez was built and demolished by
the undersigned in the year 1973.  That
at the infront (sic) yard of Camilo
Pareja’s house we saw a pile of coconuts and upon
inquiry he (Camilo Pareja)
admitted that he gathered 400 coconuts from the said land he had occupied.

‘2.   On the other hand, in the northern portion
of the land in question, the place where the previous house of Aquilina Mira was demolished in 1973 is also occupied by
Leonardo Calayo, co-accused of Jorge Jesalva in the Criminal complaint filed against them of the
death of the plaintiff in this case.  A
residential house was built by Leonardo Calayo on the
said land.

‘3.   On the upper portion of the land in the
Northern part, a house was constructed by Carlito
Mira, son of Aquilina Mira, one of the respondents in
this case.

‘4.   Likewise, Mrs. Balbina
Jesalva, wife of Jorge Jesalva
had remained in the land in question and built also a hut of her own just a few
meters away from her previous house which was demolished in 1973 and found out
to have gathered coconuts from the said land.

‘5.   Furnished copy of the order of Camilo Pareja and Leonardo Calayo the respondents present during the time of service
as evidenced by their signatures on the dorsal side of the Order.’

“During the hearing of the contempt motion, the defendants
proved that:

“Seven months before the plaintiffs commenced Civil Case No.
2548, Land Inspector Maximo Estolonio,
had submitted a report to the Director of Lands on July 30, 1970 wherein he certified that a parcel of six
hectares, subject of opposing claims of Catalino Lastrilla (predecessor-in-interest of defendants Aquilina Mira and Jorge Jesalva)
and Victorio Leona @ ‘Llona‘
(plaintiff herein), is alienable and disposable
public agricultural
land. 
His report reads as follows:

‘The District
Land Officer

Land District Office No. IV-2,

Bureau of Lands, Sorsogon, Sor.

Sir:

‘In compliance with order of that office dated May 5, 1970, I have the honor to report that an
ocular investigation was conducted in the premises May 28, 1970 and the following were ascertained:

‘That the land subject of this investigation is
a Public Land situated in
Sitio Look, Barrio Bogña, Municipality
of Castilla,
Province of Sorsogon;

‘That this parcel of land is
bounded:  On the North, Lot 653, Pls-202
of Inocencio Doctor, Lot 654, Pls-202 of Fausto Lotino; on the East by, Nazario Garcia (homestead); on the South by, Creek, and on
the West by, Public Land occupied by Policarpio
Camacho (before) now Epifania Albania, having an area of 6 hectares,
more or less;

‘That this parcel of land falls
inside Block II, project 3, certified as alienable
and disposable
area December 10, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry;

‘That this area was found planted to:  627 coconut trees
with ages from 2-5, from 8-12 and from 20-25 years old, root crops, other fruit
trees, and houses
of – (1)
Victorio Calayo, (2)
Jorge Jesalva, (3) Leonardo Calayo, and
(4) Leona
Vda. de Calayo, all found inside
the area
in question and tenants of Catalino Lastrilla;

‘That said Catalino
Lastrilla claims said
land and the improvements thereon and to
have been in his occupation since before the last global war (1941) and
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Rufina Latonero Pareja;

‘That the area was formerly planted to abaca;

‘That in an interview with Victorio Leona during the
ocular investigation
he also
claims ownership
of the land as part and parcel of the bigger area
south of the land subject of this investigation;

‘That he claims this area to have been possessed from Felicidad Tiamzon in 1946 and
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Felicidad
Tiamzon in 1949 and previously declared in the name
of Catalina Lastrilla in 1928 as per records in his
possession; and

‘Attached hereto is the tentative sketch plan of the land in
question with improvements indicated thereon.

‘In view of the foregoing, the above findings is
respectfully submitted.’ (Exh. 2)

“On December 21,
1970, another parcel of 81,811 square meters was surveyed for
defendant Camilo Pareja (Exh. 1, Contempt, p. 167, Rec.).  This corresponds to parcel No. 2 in Civil
Case No. 2548.

“On March 5, 1971, or eight months after Lands Inspector Estolonio had submitted his report (Exh.
2), Victorio Llona filed
Civil Case No. 2548 to quiet title to both parcels of land, with damages.  The pendency of the
administrative investigation in the Bureau of Lands concerning these portions
of the public domain was not disclosed to the court in Civil Case No.
2548.  As previously stated, the
defendants were declared in default, and a judgment by default was rendered
against them on November 11, 1971,
and executed on August 6, 1973
by the demolition of their houses thereon.

“Subsequently, Aquilina Lasalla Mira and Balbina Calayo, wife of Jorge Jesalva,
filed free patent applications, FPA No. V-3-15140 for Lot No. 3-Psu in Castilla, Sorsogon (Exh. 8-Contempt, p. 177, Rec.), and FPA No. V-3-15141 for Lot Not. 1-Psu (Exh.
9-Contempt, p. 179, Rec.), respectively.

“In March 1975, the defendants Pareja,
Mira and Jesalva reentered the parcels of land in
question.

“On June 6, 1975,
Pareja filed a free patent application FPA No. V-3-11291 for the 8 hectares (corresponding to plaintiffs’ parcel
No. 2) which had been surveyed for him in
1970 (Exh. 4-Contempt, p. 171, Rec.).

“Pareja’s free patent application
was opposed by plaintiff Victoria Vda. de Lleona (or Llona).

“On August 14, 1975,
the plaintiffs filed a motion to declare the defendants in contempt of
court.  The defendants opposed the
motion.

“While the contempt motion was pending in the court, the
administrative case was also being heard by the District Land Officer, Perfecto
Julianda.

“On July 30, 1976,
Julianda ordered the parties ‘to observe status quo
in the possession and cultivation of the land’ (Exh. 5-Contempt, p. 173, Rec.).

“On October 1, 1976,
Director of Lands Ramon N. Casanova, dismissed Llona’s
protest and directed the District Land Officer ‘to continue with the formal
investigation of this case and thereafter submit a report to this office for
appropriate disposition (Exh. 6-Contempt,
p. 174, Rec.).  The Director of
Lands opined that, in view of the provisions of Sections 2 and 4 of the Public
Land Act, ‘it is the Bureau of Lands and not any other agency which has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine to whom and in what manner lands of the
public domain should be disposed of.’ he added that –

‘In the course of the formal investigation,
Victoria Vda. de Leona, thru counsel,
questioned the authority of the Bureau of Lands to continue with the hearing of
this case citing the decision in Civil Case No. 2548 for quieting of title with
damages involving the same parties and subject-matter wherein an adverse
resolution was rendered by the court against Camilo Pareja.  In reply
thereto, Camilo Pareja
claimed that the Bureau of Lands still has the power to continue with the trial
contending that the decision mentioned was a mere judgment by default, and that
the land in question is still a public land, having been released by the Bureau
of Forest Development as alienable and disposable only in 1968.  Consequently, the court lacks the authority
to adjudicate the land in favor of the client.’ (Exh. 6-A, Contempt, p. 174, Rec.).

“On March 29, 1978,
the lower court rendered judgment finding the defendants guilty of contempt of
court.  In due time
they appealed.

“During the pendency of the appeal
in this Court, Aquilina Mira received on August 3, 1978, Free Patent No. 004922
for the parcel of 1.2659 hectares which she applied for, and which is a portion
of parcel 1 subject of the plaintiffs’ complaint in Civil Case No. 2548.  On August
7, 1978, OCT P-16550 was issued to her for the lot (Annex B,
Appellants’ Brief).

“On August 3, 1978,
Balbina Jesalva Calayo received Free Patent No. 004920 for the parcel of
2.64 hectares that she had applied for. 
This piece of land is also a portion of parcel 1 which had been
adjudicated to the plaintiffs under the decision in Civil Case No. 2548.  On August 7, 1978 OCT No. P-16548 was issued to her for said parcel of land
(Annex A, Appellants’ Brief).

“On March 20, 1979,
defendant Camilo Pareja
received Free Patent No. 586956 for the 8.1811 hectares which he caused to be
surveyed in 1970 and which was adjudicated to the plaintiffs as parcel No. 2 in
Civil Case No. 2548.  On May 10, 1979, Pareja
received OCT No. P-17333 for that lot (Annex C, Appellants’ Brief).

“In the light of the above undisputed facts, the only
questions that present themselves for resolution are legal questions which are
set forth in the appellants’ assignment of error as follows:

‘1.  that the court erred in giving due course to
the motion for contempt since it amounted to a ‘prejudicial interference’ on
the power of the Director of Lands
to control the disposition and alienation of public lands;

‘2.  that the supervening facts and events after
the decision was executed had – changed materially the legal position of the parties in relation to the
possession of the property in question as to render the decision in this case
incapable of execution and/or its enforcement unjust and inequitable; and

‘3.  that the court erred
in holding the appellants guilty of contempt
of court.’

“Stated in another way, the issues in this appeal,
may be reduced to the following questions:

“(1)   Did the lower court
in Civil Case No. 2548 have jurisdiction to adjudicate to the plaintiffs the
ownership of unregistered lands?

“(2)   Who has the legal title to the parcels of
land occupied by the appellants:  Is it
the plaintiffs, by virtue of the default judgment in Civil Case No. 2548?  Or, the appellants, by virtue of the free
patents issued to them by the Director of Lands?

“(3)   If the free patents should prevail as the
legal and valid disposition of the lots occupied by the appellants, can they be
held guilty of contempt of court for having reentered and repossessed the
parcels of land which are covered by their free patent titles?” (Rollo, pp. 52-65)

We reverse.

A judgment which has become final and executory
may be set aside in any of the
three ways allowed by our present rules: 
(1) by petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Revised Rules of
Court; (2) by direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment
where the alleged defect is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained in the judgment; and
(3) by direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against
the challenged judgment which is void upon its face or that the nullity of the
judgment is apparent from its own recitals (see Macabingkil
v. People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation, L-29080, August 17, 1976, 72 SCRA 326).  In case of a collateral attack such as in
this case, the appellants must show from the fact of the record itself that the
challenged judgment is utterly void based not on mere errors or defects of
judgment but on the ground that the court had no power or authority to grant
the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or over the parties or both (see Reyes, et al. v. Datu,
94 Phil. 446, citing I Freeman on Judgments,
Sec. 322, p. 642 and Sec. 326, p. 650).

The records reveal that the disputed parcels of land were already
declared by the Director of Lands as alienable and disposable public
agricultural lands seven months before the complaint was filed in the trial
court.  Considering the nature of the
land, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over it.  While it was true that the said court was
never informed of the true nature of the land until later, such omission
however, could not alter the public character of the land as to confer
jurisdiction to it.  Under the Public
Land Act, the administration and disposition of public lands are entrusted to
the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately, to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Com. Act. No. 141, as amended, Sec. 4
thereof; see Guerrero v. Amores, Secretary
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 34492, March 28, 1988, 159 SCRA
374).  Thus, the Director of Lands has
the exclusive authority to grant licenses, permits, leases and contracts or
approve, reject, reinstate or cancel applications or decide conflicting
applications (See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil.
134).  Nonetheless, the authority of the
Lands Department to administer, dispose of and alienate public lands, does not
deprive other branches of the government of their respective functions or
powers such as the authority of the police forces to stop disorders and quell
breaches of peace and the authority on the part of the courts to take
jurisdiction over possessory actions arising
therefrom not involving, directly
or indirectly alienation and disposition
(See Pitarque v. Sorilla,
92 Phil. 5, underlining supplied).  The possessory actions aforementioned relate to cases of
forcible entry and accion publiciana
where the basis of the remedy is mere possession as a fact, of physical
possession, not legal possession (Pitargue v. Sorilla, ibid, p. 131). 
However, the action filed in this case was for quieting of title of
unregistered lands which involves a determination of ownership.  It is a question which the Bureau of Lands,
not the courts, should properly resolve after due investigation.  Since from the onset, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 2548, its decision of November 11, 1971 and
its resolution of March 29, 1978 should be set aside for being null and
void.  In Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Villa, We ruled that: 
“Jurisdiction over the subject matter is fundamental for a court to
act on a given controversy.  It is
conferred by law not by consent of the parties. 
It can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings and for lack of it, a court can dismiss a case ex mero motu (L-23988, January 2,
1968, 22 SCRA 3).  Once a judgment is
declared void, the same becomes non-existent and thus, it leaves the parties
litigants in the same position they were in before the trial (see Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Sison, L-40309,
August 31, 1983, 124 SCRA 394).

We find that the Director of Lands, who was never a party to this
case, had already made an administrative investigation on the rights of the
parties to the disputed parcels of land and thereafter, issued free patents to
the appellants.  In fact, appellants
already received their respective certificates of titles.  The correctness of the final decision of the
Director of Lands is not herein involved but it is valid and binding until
reversed in a proper proceeding
by the court (see Hernandez, et al. v. Clapis, et al., 98 Phil. 684).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Sorsogon, 10th Judicial District, Branch 11, dated November 11, 1971 in Civil Case No 2548 and its resolution
dated March 29, 1978 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE for lack of Jurisdiction. 
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

Grino– Aquino,
J., no part.