G.R. No. 59830. July 31, 1984
JUAN BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. CITY FISCAL OF DAGUPAN AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
RELOVA, J.:
the City Fiscal of Dagupan a complaint against Conchita Estrada,
Avelina Baniqued and Federico Bautista, for estafa thru falsification of
public document. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
Assistant Fiscal Dominador M. Manaois dismissed the complaint for lack
of prima facie evidence to support the indictment.
Petitioner Juan Bautista did not move for the reconsideration of the
fiscal’s resolution; neither did he appeal therefrom to the Ministry of
Justice. Instead, Mr. Bautista filed a new complaint with the City
Court of Dagupan against the same respondents, charging them with the
same offense – estafa thru falsification of public document (docketed as
Criminal Case No. 11074).
After conducting the preliminary examination, the City Court found that
an offense has been committed and the respondents therein – Conchita
Estrada, Avelina Baniqued and Federico Bautista, are probably guilty
thereof. Accordingly, a warrant for their arrest was issued and an
order directing respondent city fiscal to file the corresponding
information.
Respondent city fiscal, through Assistant Fiscal Manaois, filed a
manifestation with the city court that he will reinvestigate the case in
view of his prior resoÂlution finding no prima facie evidence
against the responÂdent therein. Subpoenas were issued by the city
fiscal’s office to the complainants and to their witness, Emilio
Fernandez, but the subpoenas were ignored by them. WhereÂupon, for
failure of complainants and their witness to submit themselves for
reinvestigation, respondent city fiscal filed with the city court a
motion to dismiss the case. Opposition was filed by herein petitioner
to the motion. The city court denied respondent city fiscal’s motion to
dismiss.
Thereafter, the city court again forwarded the records of the case to
respondent city fiscal for the filing of the information. In turn,
respondent city fiscal filed a manifestation informing the city court of
his inability to prosecute the case because of his sincere and honest
belief that he has no prima facie case to warrant the prosecution of the accused. A petition for mandamus was
filed in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (docketed as
Civil Case No. D-5219) which rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, this
Court hereby GRANTS the petition and hereby ORDERS the city fiscal to
file the corresponding information for falsification of public documents
against herein accused.” (p. 33, rollo)
From the above decision of the lower court, appeal was interposed to the
then Court of Appeals which reversed the decision and dismissed the
petition for mandamus.
Hence, this petition for review by certiorari, praying that the decision
of the appellate court be reversed and another one entered directing
the City Fiscal of Dagupan to file the corresponding information and to
prosecute the case.
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically provides
that “all criminal action either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be proseÂcuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal.” In Alberto vs. de la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406, the Court held
that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to
file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he
has evidence to support the allegation thereof. Although this power
and prerogative of the fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence
at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person
committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, it
would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to
prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so, because in his
opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction,
or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure
would be to appeal the Fiscal’s decision to the Ministry of Justice
and/or ask for a special prosecutor.”
There is no question that the prosecuting fiscal has the right to
conduct his own investigation. As early as 1938, it has been the ruling
that after a criminal case has been forwarded by the inferior court to
the trial court which has jurisdiction to try it on the merits, and
before the fiscal has filed the necessary information, the latter not
only has the power but also the duty to investigate the facts upon which
the complaint filed in inferior court was based, to examine the
evidence submitted and such other evidence as the parties may deem
proper to submit on their own free will or on demand of the fiscal for
the purpose of determining whether there is at least prima facie
evidence establishing the guilt of the accused and overcoming the
presumption of innocence in his favor. If after he has done all these
and considering all the circumstances of the case, the fiscal believes
that the evidence is not sufficient to establish prima facie
the guilt of the accused, he should submit to the court before which the
case is pending the corresponding motion for dismissal. (People vs. Ovilla, 65 Phil. 722). Further, in Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs.
Judge Ambrocio, T. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914, the court very clearly said
that “because of the right of a prosecuting attorney to conduct his own
investigation of a criminal case elevated to him from the justice of the
peace, naturally, there is corresponding duty or obligation of the
prosecuting witness, especially the offended parties, to submit to said
investigation. Consequently, said offended parties and their legal
counsel, the private prosecutor, are not justified in refusing to submit
to the same and to give their testimonies x x x. It is rather
embarrassing for a prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a
case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion he does
not have the necessary evidence to secure conviction or he is not
conÂvinced of the merits of the case. If the prosecuting attorney fails
or refuses to file said information within a reasonable time, then
either the offended parties or the court could invoked Section 1679 of
the Revised Administrative Code so that the Department of Justice could
designate one to act as Provincial Fiscal and file the corresponding
complaint or information.” Finally, in Salcedo vs. Suarez, 80
SCRA 237, We held that “[u]pon receipt of the record in the court of
first instance from the municipal court, it is well settled as
reaffirmed in Talusan vs. Ofiana that the Provincial fiscal (or
his assistant) has the power ‘to conduct his own investigation or
reinvestigation of a case already elevated to the Court of First
Instance by a Municipal Judge or justice of the peace who conducted a
preliminary investigation thereon, in order to determine his own course
of action as prosecuting officer’, and thereafter he may either move to
dismiss the case or file the corresponding information.”
Indeed, how can the prosecuting fiscal secure the conviction of an
accused on evidence beyond reasonable doubt when he himself is not
convinced that he has a prima facie case against him!
But then, let’s say that the fiscal simply refuses to institute a case
against a respondent even if the evidence is sufficient to warrant the
filing of an information. As Stated above, the remedy is appeal to the
Ministry of Justice (then Department of Justice) and, if there is
evidence, administrative complaint against the prosecuting officer for
ignorance of the law, neglect of duty, partiality and/or bribery.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, We find no cogent reason
to set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated November
5, 1981.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., reserve his vote.
Aquino, J., see concurrence.
CONCURRING OPINION
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the deed of sale of land dated August 9, 1977 signed
by Marcela Bautista in favor of Conchita Estrada for the price of
P14,000. It was alleged that Marcela at the time of the execution of the
sale was already weak. She was suffering from conÂsumption. She died 45
days later or on September 23, 1977.
According to Emilio Fernandez (who testified in the city court at the
preliminary examination), during the execution of the sale on August 9,
1977, Conchita Estrada, the spouses Federico Bautista and Juliana
Bautista, and Avelina Baniqued were in Marcela’s house in Dagupan City.
Conchita, Federico and Juliana were trying to persuade Marcela to sign
the deed of sale. When Marcela did not sign, Juliana signed Marcela’s
name.
Juan Bautista (his relationship to Marcela is not shown) filed with the
city fiscal’s Office of Dagupan City a complaint for estafa through
falsification of public document against Conchita, Juliana, Federico and
Avelina. He claimed that the land sold was previously donated by
Marcela to him and his wife, Nenita Marquez.
After hearing, Fiscal (Special Counsel) Dominador Manaois issued a resolution dated July 23, 1979, dismissing the complaint. He compared Marcela’s signature in the deed of sale with the genuine signature
in the deed of donation. He did not find any great difference. He
concluded that there was no falsifiÂcation. Emilio Fernandez did not
testify at that hearing.
Complainant Juan Bautista did not appeal that ruling to the Ministry of
Justice. About a month later, or on August 20, 1979, he filed the same
complaint in the city court of Dagupan.
After a preliminary examination, wherein Fernandez testified,
the city court found probable cause for falÂsification. It issued a
warrant of arrest against the four accused. They posted bail. The city
court forÂwarded the record to the city fiscal for the filing of the
corresponding information.
Fiscal Manaois reinvestigated the case. He disÂagreed with the city
court. He did not believe the testimony of Fernandez. Fiscal Manaois
filed on April 10, 1980 in the city court a motion to dismiss the case.
Bautista opposed the motion. The city court denied it.
The city court re-forwarded the record of the case to the city fiscal.
On August 18, 1980, the city fiscal and Fiscal Manaois filed a
manifestation apprising the city court that they could not file the
information.
In view of this impasse, Bautista filed in the Court of First Instance on September 9, 1980 a petition for mandamus to
compel the city fiscal to file the inÂformation for falsification of
public document. After hearing, the trial court granted the writ in its
decision of November 21, 1980.
The city fiscal appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its decision
of November 5, 1981 reversed the decision of the trial court and
dismissed the petition for mandamus. Bautista appealed to this Court.
I concur because the rule is that it is discretionary on the part of the
fiscal to proceed with a criminal case and direct the prosecution
thereof and, there being no grave abuse of discretion on his part in
dismissing the complaint, mandamus does not lie (Gonzalez vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 63 Phil. 846).
However, after the completion of the preliminary examination and
nonpresentation of evidence by the accused, it was the duty of the city
court to elevate the record to the Court of First Instance which has jurisdiction to try the case (Sec. 12, Rule 112, Rules of Court).
Then, as has been the practice, the Court of First Instance would refer
the case to the city fiscal. That would have obviated the filing of a mandamus action against the city fiscal.
The city fiscal, upon review of the record, and finding that the city
court erred in finding that there was probable cause, may file a motion
in the Court of First Instance (not the city court) to dismiss the case
(People vs. Ovilla, 65 Phil. 722).
If the city court did not find any prima facie cause, it should still elevate the record to the Court of First Instance.
In such a case, the fiscal, to whom the case is referred, may review
the record and conduct another preliminary investigation (People vs. Pervez, 110 Phil. 214; People vs. Mapa and Abalo, 115 Phil. 77).
The fiscal, as the one in control of the prosecution of the case, must
have the ultimate power to decide which as between conflicting
testimonies should be believed (People vs. Liggayu, 97 Phil. 865, 871).
In the instant case, it may be argued that Fiscal Manaois acted with
grave abuse of discretion in not giving credence to the testimony of
Fernandez and that the city fiscal should have assigned the case to
another investigating fiscal, instead of to Fiscal Manaois who had
already previously dismissed the case.
Since Juan Bautista did not seasonably appeal to the Minister of
Justice, his remedy is a civil action as indicated in article 35 of the
Civil Code.