DOMINADOR R. MIRANDA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY, BR. XXXI, AND CHARITO MALLARI, RESPONDENTS.

The sole issue presented
in the instant appeal is whether or not a verbal lease of an apartment unit
where the rentals are paid monthly, may legally be terminated by notice at the
end of any given month and consequently, the judicial eviction of the lessee
from the premises may subsequently be effected on the conceded ground of
personal need thereof by the lessor’s son and his
family.  The question has already been
answered in the affirmative by this Court, and the same answer will now be
given.

In 1973 petitioner
Miranda leased a unit of a three-door apartment belonging to him to private
respondent Mallari, in consideration of a monthly
rental of P200.00, which was later increased to P242.00.  Their agreements were oral, and dealt only
with the rental rates.  The duration of
the lease and other matters usually treated of in contracts of this nature were
evidently never even discussed.

On May 31, 1979 Miranda
sent a letter to Mallari asking her to vacate the
apartment unit on or before September 1, 1979 because the former’s
married son and his family, who had been theretofore residing with him,
having no dwelling unit of their own, could no longer be comfortably
accommodated in his (Miranda’s) own residence. 
The request was reiterated in a letter of Miranda’s lawyer dated August 6, 1979.

But the deadline came and passed without Mallari
vacating the premises.  So on October 3, 1979, Miranda filed with
the City Court a complaint for ejectment against Mallari, grounded on the personal need of Miranda’s son,
who had no dwelling unit of his own, of the apartment occupied by Mallari.1 The City Court’s verdict, promulgated on July 20, 1981, went against Miranda
however.  The Court ruled that Miranda
could not repossess the subject apartment unit notwithstanding his married
son’s need to use the same as his dwelling because the verbal contract of lease
with Mallari had
not expired.

Miranda appealed to the Court of First Instance.2 Again he was rebuffed.  In its decision rendered on January 26, 1982, the Court, presided
over by respondent Judge, affirmed that of the City Court in toto.  The
Court held that while there was real need by the petitioner to repossess the
premises for his married son’s use, this being set out in Section 5 (c) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 25 as a ground for the judicial ejectment of a lessee, the provision could not apply since
the verbal lease did not prescribe a definite period and therefore could not be
said to be terminable on notice at the end of every month; this was because
Section 6 of the same batas pambansa had
suspended the legal periods established in Article 1687 of the Civil Code,
these periods being “understood to be from year to year, if the rent
agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily.” His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
respondent Judge, Miranda has appealed to this Court on the question of law,
“Whether or not the period of the verbal lease agreement between petitioner
and private respondent has expired within the meaning of Section 5 (c) of B.P.
25.”

As aforestated, the issue has already
been raised and resolved by this Court. 
In Rivera v. Florendo promulgated on July 31, 1986,3 this
Court made the following pronouncement, viz:

“What is suspended under Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is Article 1673
of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and not Article 1687 of the same Code. 
The effect of said suspension is that independently of the grounds for ejectment enumerated in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 25, the owner/lessor
cannot eject the tenant by reason of the expiration of the period of lease as
fixed or determined under Article 1687. 
It does not mean that the provisions of Article 1687 itself had been
suspended.  Thus, the determination of the period of a lease agreement can still be made
in accordance with said Article 1687.

“Admittedly, no definite period for the lease was agreed upon
by petitioners and private respondent. 
However, as the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is
considered to be from month to month in accordance with Article 1687.  When petitioners gave private respondent
notice to vacate the premises in question, the contract of lease is deemed to
have expired as of the end of the month. 
As we have ruled in Baens v. Court of
Appeals, supra,1 ‘even if the month to month arrangement is on a verbal basis,
if it is shown that the lessor needs the property for
his own use or for the use of
any immediate member of the family or for any of the other statutory grounds to
eject under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which happens to be applicable, then the lease is
considered terminated as of the end of the month, after proper notice or demand
to vacate has been given.  (See Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 116
SCRA 199).’

” * * * *

“The law * * , Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, ( in its
Section 5[c] ) * * allows ejectment on the ground of
need by the owner/lessor of the leased premises for
his own use or that of a member of his immediate family.  The inclusion of this ground was obviously
intended to correct the inequity and hardship imposed by P.D. 20 on small
landowners/lessors, whose property rights, protected
as they are by the fundamental law itself, We upheld
even during the effectivity of P.D. No. 20.  To adopt, therefore, the construction given
by respondent court is to render Section 5 (c) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 25 illusory in cases where the lease agreement
is verbal and for an indefininte period, because in
this case, the owner/lessor, notwithstanding his
pressing and urgent need for the premises could never successfully eject the
tenant as the period of lease would never expire during the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Blg.
25.”

The ruling was reiterated
in Zablan v. C.A., et al., G.R. No. 57844, September
30, 1987,1 in which it was further pointed out that (1) if the verbal lease
agreement on a month-to-month basis were held to be for an indefinite period
and not terminable at the end of any given month, “the law would be
rendered illusory” in the sense that “the owner/lessor,
notwithstanding his pressing need for the premises, could never successfully
eject the tenant because the period of lease would never expire during the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25″; and (2) that “(i)n
view of subsequent cases2 ** there no longer appears to be any need nor
reason to rely solely on our ruling in Rantael v. Court of Appeals3
** “.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo in Civil Case No. Q-3627 is reversed and set aside, and
private respondent Charito Mallari
and any and all persons claiming under her are commanded to vacate the leased
premises forthwith, to pay rentals at the rate of P242.00 a month from January,
1982 until they shall have vacated the premises, and to pay to the petitioner
the sum of P2,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees as
well as the costs of suit.  This judgment
is immediately executory and no motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

1 The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. V-36416 of the City Court of Quezon City,
Branch V

2 The appeal was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-3627 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, Branch XXXI

3 Per Fernan,
J., 143 SCRA 278

1 125 SCRA 634 (1983)

1 Per Sarmiento, J.

2 “Santos v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-60210, March 27, 1984, 128 SCRA 428; Rivera v. Florendo, supra; Velez v. Avelino, No. L-48448, Feb. 20, 1984,
127 SCRA 602; Dionio v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, No. L-63698, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 243″

3 “No. L-47519, April 30,
1980, 97 SCRA 453”