G.R. No. 59762. May 11, 1984

FILOMENO CATORCE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEDRO BAGAYAWA, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 11, 1984 FIRST DIVISION MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:


Petitioner Filomeno Catorce, a pauper litigant, seeks a review of the
decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-13089-CAR
setting aside, on a procedural ground, the judgment rendered in his
favor by the former Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch II, Naga City,
in CAR Case No. 6676-CS-80, for Reinstatement, Fixing of Leasehold
Rentals and Damages, which he filed against private respondent Pedro
Bagayawa.

The controversy stemmed from the following facts:

In 1954, petitioner was instituted tenant over a parcel of
irrigated rice land situated at Sta. Cruz, Buhi, Camarines Sur, with an
area of .7065 hectare, by the owner thereof, Simeona Merilles. Their
agreement was subject to the condi­tion that petitioner would shoulder
all the expenses of production under a sharing system of 1/4 – 3/4 in
favor of petitioner. The landholding in question was planted to rice
two times a year, the “cataunan” cropping season covering the period
from June to November, and the “doble”, covering the period from
December to May, with the highest production at 25 cavans per cropping
season.

In 1960, the property was mortgaged by the landowner to Andrea
Bagayawa, mother of respondent, who from that time on, received the
landowner’s share of the harvest from petitioner.

In October, 1977, Andrea took possession of the land without
petitioner’s knowledge and consent, and caused the cultivation thereof
without giving any share of the harvest to petitioner. The latter tried
to retrieve possession but Andrea told him that she would work the land
for the “cataunan” season only to recover the expenses she had incurred
in the cultivation of the land. Petitioner acceded to buy peace.

After the “cataunan’ cropping season, petitioner tried again to get
possession but Andrea and her son, respondent Pedro Bagayawa, refused
and, instead, continued tilling the land. Petitioner reported the
incident to the Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform at Nabua,
which sent mediation notices to Andrea[1]
, but the latter never appeared. Petitioner, assisted by the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, then
filed a Complaint with the Agrarian Court (CAR Case No. 6040) on January
9, 1980 which was, however, dismissed with­out prejudice for not having
passed first the Lupon Pambarangay as mandatorily required by
Presidential Decree No. 1508. Andrea died on January 30, 1980, and
respondent, her son, took over possession of the land.

On November 20, 1980, petitioner again filed a Complaint for
Reinstatement, Fixing of Leasehold Rentals and Damages against Andrea’s
successor-in-interest, respondent Pedro Bagayawa. The latter failed to
file an Answer within the reglementary period. The case was then set
for hearing, notice of which was served upon respondent, but the latter
did not appear, and petitioner was allowed to present his evidence by
affidavits.

On April 22, 1981, the Agrarian Court rendered judgment by default (1)
declaring petitioner the bona fide tenant (now agricultural lessee) of
the landholding in question; ordering respondent or any person or
persons acting for and in his behalf, to vacate the subject landholding,
deliver possession thereof to petitioner, and maintain peti­tioner in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the same; (3) ordering respondent
to indemnify petitioner 120 cavans of palay at 46 kgs. per cavan, or
their equivalent money value based on the prevailing government price
for palay, as actual damages for the illegal ejectment of the latter;
(4) ordering respondent and petitioner upon reinstatement of the latter,
to desist from further observing the share tenancy system but to adopt
leasehold; (5) fixing the leasehold rental for each of the two cropping
seasons at 5 cavans of clean palay at 46 kgs. per cavan; (6) dismissing
petitioner’s other claims for insufficiency of evidence; and (7)
ordering respondent to pay the costs of the suit.

On June 11, 1981, respondent moved to set aside the judgment of default
stating as grounds thereof: (1) that he was not negligent in the
prosecution of his case; (2) that he has a meritorious defense; (3) that
the complaint has already prescribed; (4) that the evidence is
insuffi­cient to justify the decision; and (5) that he was not given his
day in Court.

On June 18, 1981, the Agrarian Court denied respondent’s Motion to Set
Aside for lack of merit. Respondent their filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said Order and a Notice of Appeal in the event said
Motion were denied, attaching thereto his Answer wherein he denied the
material allegations of the Complaint, and stated by way of Special and
Affirmative Defenses (1) that the landholding in question was
surrendered by petitioner; (2) that the latter has no cause of action;
and (3) that the action has already prescribed, the same having been
filed more than three years after the alleged ejectment in October 1977.
The Agrarian Court denied reconsideration and gave due course to the
appeal.

On January 18, 1982, respondent Appellate Court set aside the Decision
of the Agrarian Court ruling that petitioner’s cause of action was
already barred as the same was commenced beyond the three-year-period
within which to enforce said action, as mandated by Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389.

We are constrained to reverse.

It has been established that petitioner had been en­gaged as a tenant or
agricultural lessee on the property it question in 1954 by the
landowner, who subsequently mortgaged the same to Andrea Bagayawa,
private respondent’s predecessor-in-interest in 1960 and that he
continued to work the land until he was dispossessed of the same by
Andrea in October 1977. As stated earlier, respondent Court had ruled
that as petitioner filed the complaint only on November 20, 1980, more
than three (3) years had already elapsed since the accrual of the cause
of action, and hence, the action is now barred.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, does provide
that “an action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be
barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action
accrued,” respondent Court had overlooked the fact that petitioner had
first filed a Complaint for reinstatement on January 9, 1980, but that
the same was dismissed for non-compliance with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 1508. The pres­criptive period, therefore,
should be reckoned from the filing of that first Complaint, in which
event, only two (2) years and three (3) months from the accrual of the
cause of action have elapsed. Clearly, petitioner had not slept on his
rights, the dismissal of said Complaint having been due to a procedural
technicality.

But even assuming that the prescriptive period is correctly reckoned
from the filing of the second Complaint on November 20, 1980, this Court
in Cristobal vs. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175, 185 (1977) held:

“xxx In brief, it is indeed the better rule that courts under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute
of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong
and injustice would result.”

Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the landholding in
question. Not only did respondent fail to Controvert this fact, but he
even impliedly admitted the same in his Answer to petitioner’s Complaint
when he raised, as one of his defenses, the alleged voluntary
surren­der, of the landholding by petitioner. Respondent Court should
have taken this fact into consideration for tenants are guaranteed
security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and possession of
their landholding except when their dispossession had been authorized by
virtue of a final and executory judgment,[2] which is not so in the case at bar.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been designed to promote economic and social stability.[3] Being a social legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent[4]
, which is “to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers” and
to make them “more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens,
and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society”.[5]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals, now the
Intermediate Appellate Court, in CA-G.R. No. SP-­13089-CAR is hereby set
aside, and the judgment of the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch
II, Naga City, in CAR Case No. 6576-CS-80, dated April 21, 1981, is
hereby reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.


[1] p. 20, CAR Records.

[2] Tumulin vs. CA, 48 SCRA 450 (1972); Paulo vs. CA, 54 SCRA 253 (1973); Sodsod vs. Del Valle, 56 SCRA 612 (1974).

[3] Gonzales vs. GSIS, 107 SCRA 492 (1981).

[4] Ibid.; Padasas vs. CA, 82 SCRA 250 (1978).

[5] Section 2(2) and (6), R.A. No. 3844, as amended.