PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FELIXBERTO N. BOQUIREN, RESPONDENTS.

Assailed in this petition for certiorari and mandamus
are the Resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals [now the Intermediate
Appellate Court], dated September 9, 1981, October 19, 1981 and Decem­ber 1,
1981, which dismissed the appeal of petitioner Pantranco North Express Inc. on
the sole ground that the appeal docket fee was paid to the trial court, and not
to the appellate court.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

On May 15, 1980,
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, after due trial, rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. Q-22351, ordering petitioner Pantranco North Express, Inc. to
pay respondent Felixberto Bo­quiren the following amounts: P23,291.00, as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus costs.^[1]

On June 20, 1980,
or within the reglementary period for perfecting the appeal, petitioner filed a
notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. The trial court approved
the record on appeal^[2],
and the records were accordingly elevated to the appellate court.

On August
31, 1981, the
respondent appellate court issued a Resolution, dismissing the appeal as
follows:

“The record shows that on June 29, 1981, this Court sent a letter of notice to the
coun­sel for the appellant [peti­tioner herein] requiring him to pay and remit
the docketing fee, within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. The no­tice was received by the said counsel,
presumably on July 13, 1981,
when the registry return card was stamped by the local post office. The period
expired on July 13, 1981 [sic], but since then the fee was not
remitted. In view thereof, it may justly be assumed that the appellant has abandoned the
appeal. Hence, it must be dismissed.

“WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed, with­out
pronouncement as to costs.” [Annex “A”, Petition]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above order,
pointing out that on July 16, 1981,
or three (3) days after receipt of the notice requiring payment of the docket
fee, petitioner did pay said fee to the trial court, as evidenced by offi­cial
receipt No. 5399641. Petitioner further alleged that its appeal was based on
meritorious grounds and that it had no intention of
abandoning the same.

On October 19, 1981,
respondent court issued the second questioned Resolution, stating that:

“Upon consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated August 31, 1981, filed by counsel for the appellant, praying
this Honorable Court to set aside its resolution
dated August 31, 1981, and the opposition there­to; RESOLVED TO DENY its mo­tion
for reconsideration.” [Annex “B”, Petition]

On November 9, 1981, petitioner filed a “Mo­tion to
Reinstate Appeal”^[3],
alleging that the erroneous payment of the docket fee with the trial court
instead of the appellate court was excusable, having been “due to honest
mistake and misapprehen­sion of an inexperienced messenger who thought that
Court of Appeals is the same as Court of First Ins­tance.” It further
argued that since the amount remitted through the messenger was really intended
for payment of the appellate court’s docket fee, the erroneous payment made
with the lower court constituted substantial compliance with the Rules of
Court, which must be interpreted liberally; and that should the appellate court
not consider or recognize such payment, petitioner was willing to pay anew the
docket fee to the appellate court as the latter may direct or order.

Such plea
notwithstanding, the respondent Court issued on December 1, 1981 its
third Resolution, as follows:

“Upon consideration of the Motion to Reinstate Appeal, filed by counsel for the defendant-appellant; RESOLVED TO DENY said motion to re­instate
appeal.” [Annex “C” Peti­tion]

Hence, this petition.

We find the petition impressed with merit.

While the respondent appellate court has the power to dismiss an appeal for failure of the
appel­lant to pay the docket fees^[4],
the circumstances obtaining in this case amply support petitioner’s pos­ture
that it had substantially complied with the re­quirements of the rule. The
erroneous payment to the trial court had been adequately explained as having
been “due to honest mistake and misapprehen­sion of an inexperienced
messenger who thought that Court of Appeals is the same as Court of First
Instance.” Obviously, the amount sent through petitioner’s
“inexperienced messenger” was really intended to cover the appellate
court’s docket fee. Given these circumstances, the respondent Court should have
ordered the trial court to remit the amount erroneously paid therewith, instead
of in­sisting in its resolutions of dismissal. The time­ly payment made by
petitioner should have merited the leniency of the respondent Court. In the spi­rit
of liberality and fairness, the appeal may be given due course to afford
petitioner every oppor­tunity to establish the merits of its appeal without the
constraints of technicality. Needless to add, the discretionary power to
dismiss appeals must al­ways be exercised prudently, never capriciously, in
order to dispense substantial justice.

ACCORDINGLY, the writs prayed for are hereby granted and
the questioned Resolutions are set aside. This case is remanded to the
Intermediate Appellate Court for further proceedings and prompt disposition of
petitioner’s appeal on its merits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Makasiar, (Chairman), and
Abad Santos, JJ., no part.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

^[1] p. 42, Rollo.

^[2] p. 42, Rollo.

^[3] Annex M, Petition.

^[4] Section 1[d], Rule 50 of the Rules of Court; Dorego vs. Perez, 22 SCRA 8.