🎧 Case Brief Lecture

OLIVIA M. NAVOA AND ERNESTO NAVOA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, TERESITA DOMDOMA AND EDUARDO DOMDOMA, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 59255. December 29, 1995 December 29, 1995

← Read the full text of the decision

Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.

Navoa versus Domdoma

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by spouses Olivia and Ernesto Navoa against Teresita and Eduardo Domdoma, arising from a complaint for the collection of various sums of money based on loans and a jewelry transaction. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, but the Court of Appeals set aside that dismissal and remanded the case for trial on the merits. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's cleanest statement of how a cause of action is tested: the court looks only at the face of the complaint, hypothetically admits every well-pleaded fact, and asks whether a valid judgment could be rendered on those facts. It is a staple in remedial law and in civil law on obligations and delay.

Procedural History

The private respondents, the Domdomas, filed a complaint for collection of sums of money with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the petitioners, the Navoas. The Navoas moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action and that the plaintiffs had no capacity to sue. After the Domdomas filed their opposition, the trial court dismissed the case, and it denied the motion for reconsideration.

The Domdomas appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court modified the order of dismissal by returning the records of the case for trial on the merits, upon the filing of an answer, subject to the provisions of Articles 1182 and 1197 of the Civil Code for the first cause of action, with the other causes of action to be tried on the merits subject to the defenses the defendants may allege in their answer. The Navoas then came to the Supreme Court by petition, assigning errors on appellate jurisdiction, on the failure to affirm the dismissal, and on the finding that the complaint stated a cause of action.

Facts

Teresita Domdoma and Olivia Navoa became acquainted in the jewelry business, with Teresita selling Olivia's jewelries. Over a series of transactions, Teresita sold jewelries for Olivia worth no less than 120,000 pesos, and later additional jewelries worth no less than 20,000 pesos. Olivia also obtained loans from Teresita, secured by Olivia's personal checks, and promised Teresita a share in the profits, which Teresita in fact received in the first two transactions.

On August 15, 1977, Olivia obtained from Teresita a diamond ring valued at 15,000 pesos and issued a check as security, on the condition that if the ring was not returned within fifteen days it would be considered sold. After the fifteen days, Olivia asked Teresita to hold the check until told to deposit it; when it was finally deposited in November 1977, it was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. On several dates in August and September 1977, Teresita extended further loans to Olivia in various amounts, each secured by a separate check dated one month after the loan. When these checks were deposited on their due dates, they were all dishonored.

The Domdomas then sued for collection of the amounts, plus interest, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The Navoas moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint specified no fixed period for payment, that the checks were mere security, and that no formal demand had been made before suit. The trial court dismissed; the Court of Appeals remanded for trial; the Navoas elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  • Whether or not the petitioners are estopped from assailing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals after having actively participated in the proceedings and received an adverse judgment.
  • Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.
  • Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action on the first cause of action and on the second to the sixth causes of action.

Applicable Provisions

Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides:

Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

This bears on the case because the Court held that the filing of the complaint was itself the judicial demand, so that the petitioners' continuing refusal to pay showed a cause of action.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals after receiving an adverse judgment from it. Having participated actively in the proceedings before the appellate court, they can no longer question its authority.

On the second and third issues, the Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf, and its requisites are a right in favor of the plaintiff, an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect that right, and an act or omission of the defendant violating the right. In determining its existence, only the statements in the complaint may be considered, and lack of cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint. A defendant who moves to dismiss on that ground is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments, and the test is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer.

Applying that test, the Court found that on the first cause of action the ring was considered sold to Olivia fifteen days from August 15, 1977, and despite the sale she failed to pay the price, violating Teresita's right. On the second to the sixth causes of action, the loans were secured by checks dated one month after each loan, from which the only fair inference is that the loans were payable one month after they were contracted, with the checks drawn to answer for the debts. The petitioners failed to make good the checks on their due dates, and their continuing refusal to heed the demand stated in the complaint showed a cause of action. The Court quoted Article 1169 of the Civil Code in support.

Doctrine

A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf, and it requires a right in favor of the plaintiff, a corresponding obligation on the defendant, and an act or omission violating that right. Its existence is determined solely from the allegations of the complaint, with the defendant on a motion to dismiss hypothetically admitting all well-pleaded facts and the inferences fairly deducible from them. The test of sufficiency is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer. Where the complaint shows a subsisting obligation and a refusal to pay, the filing of the action is itself the judicial demand that places the debtor in delay under Article 1169 of the Civil Code, and a cause of action exists.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the trial court for the filing of the petitioners' answer and thereafter for trial on the merits was affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize the rule that on a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action the defendant hypothetically admits the complaint's well-pleaded facts, and the only question is whether a valid judgment could be rendered on those facts. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of a cause of action, the limited scope of the motion to dismiss, and the rule that a judicial demand in the complaint itself puts the debtor in delay.