AGUSTIN GUTIERREZ, JR., AND CYNTHIA GUTIERREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE ANTONIA CORPUZ MACANDOG, ELPEDIA GUTIERREZ, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF AND HIS DEPUTY, EDILBERTO CABALLERO, AND PHI…

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul two orders of the respondent judge of
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The first order authorized the release of
P50,000.00 to the private respondent to be taken from the loan secured by the
estate of Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., from the Philippine National Bank (PNB); and
the second denied the motion for reconsideration which was filed by the heirs
of the decedent.

Agustin Gutierrez, Sr. died intestate on January 3, 1977 in the municipality of New
Escalante, Negros Occidental. He was
survived by the following legal heirs: Lolita A. Gutierrez, his surviving
spouse by the third marriage, Agustin, Jr., Herne, Mauricio, Cynthia, Augusto
and Bambi (minor) all surnamed Gutierrez, Rosario G. Tabares, Concepcion G.
Balane, Eva G. Gamo, Susan G. Medalla,
Corazon G. Espelita, and Thelma G.
Bering.

Upon proper motion dated April 18, 1977, the respondent court
issued an order appointing Cynthia B. Gutierrez as special administratrix of
the estate of the late Agustin Gutierrez,
Sr., pending the issuance of the letters of administration.

On July 15, 1977, the corresponding letters of administration was
issued by the court.

On February 20, 1981, Cynthia Gutierrez, acting in her capacity as administratrix of the
estate, filed with the court a “Motion for Authority to Secure Additional
Loan” of at least P300,000.00,
which she needed “to manage and operate the estate for this crop year
1981-1982.”

On March 20, 1981, the respondent judge issued the questioned
order providing, among others:

“Acting on the Motion for Authority to Secure Additional Loan
dated February 20, 1981 filed by the counsel for the Administratrix, and the
Motion for Extension of Time to Submit
Accounting and for an Order to Release Portion of the Amount direct to the
Planters Prod­uct, which is P148,440.00, said motions are granted, provided the
verbal claim in open court in the amount of P50,000.00 by the oppositor in this
case, Mrs. Elpedia Gutierrez, shall be given to her upon the release of the
additional loan of P300,000.00 for the crop year 1981-1982 for her support,
considering that she is the wife of one of the heirs of the estate of Agustin
Gutierrez, who is Mauricio Gutierrez. The husband not giving support to his wife, this Court due
to compassionate justice, hereby grants as aforementioned said Elpedia
Gutierrez the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);” (p. 27, Rollo)

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

On March 23, 1982, administratrix Cynthia Gutierrez as well as
Mauricio Gutierrez, among others, filed a verified “Motion to Reconsider
Order dated March 20, 1981 and for an Order Directing the PNB Not to Release
Any Withdrawals by Elpedia Gutierrez” on the following grounds: a) that the grant of P50,000.00 in favor of Elpedia Gutierrez was never
prayed for by the administratrix in her motion; b) that Elpedia Gutierrez is
not an heir of the late Agustin Gutierrez, Sr. and neither is the estate under
obligation to give support to her; c) that to add more burden to the estate to
the tune of P50,000.00 is highly unjustifiable and detrimental to the affairs
of said estate; and d) the heirs of Agustin Gutierrez, Sr. are not agreeable to
releasing the amount from the estate in favor of Elpedia Gutierrez.

It is noteworthy to mention that on August 31, 1979, Mauricio
Gutierrez filed a petition for legal separation against the private respondent
stating as ground, the latter’s attempt on his life. However, before a decision could be handed down by the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Bacolod City, Mauricio Gutierrez and his eldest
son were killed in an ambush.

On June 18, 1981, the respondent judge issued the second
questioned order denying the motion for reconsideration with the additional
directive that the sum of P50,000.00 “be released by the PNB to her
(Elpedia Gutierrez) due to the urgency and exigency as the said amount is
needed for her support and her children” and that the above amount
“be deducted from whatever share Mauricio Gutierrez is entitled to the
estate of the late Agustin Gutierrez, Sr. his father.” (Rollo, p. 34).

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner maintains that the questioned orders are null and void
ab initio because in the first place, the claim
in question was in the nature of support for the private respondent and her
children against one of the heirs of the decedent and therefore, was not
enforceable against the estate of the latter. Secondly, the amount of P50,000.00 to be given to the private respondent
was ordered to be charged not against the assets of the estate but against the
loan obtained by it. Thus, there would
be no valid basis for the deduction of P50,000.00 from the said loan as the
borrowed money does not even form part of the estate. Thirdly, assuming that the claim for support can be made against
the estate of Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., the same was made verbally and without
the prior notice to the administratrix of the estate and without conformity of
the heirs before payment of all the debts due from the estate.

On the other hand, the respondent judge capitalizes on the fact
that after she issued the first questioned order, Mauricio Gutierrez died and,
therefore, the release of the amount of P50,000.00 was prompted by human
compassion, exigency, urgency and common sense. Furthermore, according to the respondent judge, there are
conjugal properties belonging to Mauricio and Elpedia Gutierrez which are in
the possession of the estate of Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., and which are not accounted
for and this is the reason why the private respondent and her two minor
children are claiming them. Accordingly, this is also the reason, why only the herein petitioners
are interested in questioning the release of the amount of P50,000.00

We find merit in the petition.

The respondent Elpedia’s claim for support should no have been
addressed to the estate of Agustin Gutierrez, Sr.

When the first questioned order was issued by the respondent
judge, Mauricio Gutierrez was still alive. In fact, he was one of those who opposed
such order. The respondent judge had no
authority to issue the said order because
she knew fully well that the claim had no leg to stand on as Elpedia was not an
heir to the estate and the decedent had no obligation whatsoever to give her
support. Respondent Elpedia, at this
point, should have asked for support pendente lite before the juvenile court where the action for legal separation which
was filed by her husband was pending. Then, when Mauricio Gutierrez died, she should have filed an action for
the settlement of estate of her husband where she and her children could
receive such allowance as may be directed by the court under Section 3,
Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Therefore, the second order, even though it was issued after the
death of Mauricio Gutierrez, is also null and void for being without any legal
basis.

While it may be true that by right of representation, the
respondent Elpedia and her children are entitled to the rightful share of
Mauricio Gutierrez to the estate of Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., the same cannot be
given in advance. It has to wait until all the claims against the
estate have been settled. Under Section
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, all claims against the estate of a deceased
must be filed within a limited time so that thereafter, the heirs can claim
their share in the estate.

As was held in Py Eng Chong v. Herrera,
(70 SCRA 130, 135):

“xxx The above quoted provision (Sec. 5 Rule 86) is
mandatory. This requirement is for the
purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim
and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of
the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. ‘The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the
affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.'”

It was, therefore, premature for the respondent judge to order
the release of the amount in question.

Moreover, the claim for support even assuming that it is
meritorious was not reduced into writing and filed with the court. This, alone, should have militated against
the granting of such claim. The fact
that the private respondent asserts that some of her and her husband’s conjugal
properties were in the possession of the estate is not sufficient to dispense
with the mandatory requirement of filing a claim against the estate. If it were true that said conjugal
properties were being included as part of the estate of the decedent, then the
private respondent, aside from opposing the inclusion, should have filed a
separate action for the recovery of the
properties. The alleged inclusion can
never be an excuse for the private respondent to acquire P50,000.00 from the
estate and much less if the amount is to be taken only from a loan incurred by
the said estate.

In the case of Valero vda. de Rodriquez
v. Court of Appeals (91 SCRA 540, 545-546), we ruled:

“The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by
the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp.
448-449 and 473; Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).”

In the case at bar, the private respondent did not file a
separate action for the recovery of the alleged included conjugal properties,
and in asking for support, she also failed to file a formal claim with the
court. Thus, no hearing was conducted
to determine the merit of such claim and the administratrix was not also given
ample opportunity to contest the claim which is her rightful duty to examine or oppose, being the
administratrix of the estate.

As we have ruled in Estate of Olave v. Reyes (123
SCRA 767, 771-772):

“The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of
the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased
persons. That way, the executor or
administrator will be able to examine
each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. Further, the primary object of
the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the
probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely
arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the
due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his
entire estate is burdened with the payment of all his debts and no creditor
shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shall share pro-rata in the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased.”

We, therefore, find that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the two questioned orders without factual and
legal bases.

WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned orders of the respondent judge dated March 20, 1981 and June 18,
1981 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order and mandatory order we issued on November 16, 1981
are made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.