🎧 Case Brief Lecture

MARTINIANO VELOSO Y GREY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. BENITA PACHECO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

G.R. No. 586. April 30, 1902 April 30, 1902

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Veloso versus Pacheco

The Case

This is the case of Veloso versus Pacheco, an action of unlawful detainer brought by Martiniano Veloso y Grey against Benita Pacheco in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The plaintiff sought to recover possession, and the defendant, after judgment went against her, asked for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The real question that reached the Supreme Court was not who should win the land, but which procedural law governed a case that was pending when the new Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings took effect on the first of October 1901. The case matters because it fixes a rule on the transitional application of remedial laws: new remedies created by a new procedure attach to all judgments entered after the new law took effect, regardless of the procedure followed before judgment.

Procedural History

The plaintiff commenced the action of unlawful detainer on the twenty eighth of September 1901 in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On the same day the judge ordered that the case be tried in accordance with the provisions of article 1571 of the Law of Civil Procedure then in force. During the trial the defense offered the testimony of the defendant as a witness on her own behalf, and the judge rejected that evidence, ruling that under the law by which the case was being tried the parties themselves could not be witnesses. Judgment was rendered on the twentieth of December 1901 in favor of the plaintiff.

On the fourth of January 1902 the defendant moved for a new trial under the provisions of articles 113 and 145 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings now in force. By an order of the thirteenth of January the judge granted the motion, and it was against this order that the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

Facts

The case was commenced only two days before the present Code went into effect. As a pending case on the first of October 1901, it fell within the class described in article 795, paragraph 4 of that Code. The court, however, in the proceedings up to and including the judgment, applied the provisions of the old Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. When it granted a new trial after the judgment, it applied the Code now in force.

Under the old law, a judge of the Court of First Instance had no power, after entry of judgment, to set that judgment aside or change it. The right to secure a new trial on the ground, for example, of newly discovered evidence did not exist in the law in force before the first of October 1901. Neither the Court of First Instance, nor the Audiencia, nor the Tribunal Supremo had such power. The remedy of revision before the Tribunal Supremo was much more limited in scope than the provision of article 145, paragraph 2 of the Code now in force.

The plaintiff appealed from the order granting the new trial, and the Supreme Court had to decide whether that order was proper and, indeed, whether it was appealable at all.

Issues

  • Whether or not the provisions of articles 113 and 145 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings apply to all judgments entered after the first of October 1901, regardless of the procedure followed in the case before judgment.
  • Whether or not the order of the court below granting a new trial is appealable to the Supreme Court.

Applicable Provisions

Article 123 of the Code in force provides:

Nor shall any ruling, order, or judgment be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other.

This provision bars the present appeal, because the order granting a new trial was issued before any final judgment was rendered in the retrial.

Article 146 of the same Code provides:

The decision upon a motion of this kind shall not be ground for exception.

This provision confirms that the ruling on the motion for a new trial cannot itself be the subject of an appeal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that articles 113 and 145 apply to all judgments entered after the first of October 1901, regardless of the procedure applied to the case before judgment. The Court reasoned that the question was not one of substituting one procedure for another, but of adding a remedy that did not exist under the former law. The old law gave a judge no power to set aside a judgment after entry, and gave no right to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The new Code grants remedies that did not exist before. The Court held that article 145 either applies by its own force or it does not; it applies to all cases pending on the first of October 1901, or to none, and it was not left to the discretion of the judge. A party is entitled to the benefit of these articles if he can bring himself within their terms.

On the second issue, the Court held that the order granting the new trial is not appealable. The court below had jurisdiction to entertain the motion and decide it one way or the other. It decided in favor of the defendant, set aside the judgment, and ordered the case retried. The new trial had not yet been had, and no final judgment had yet been entered. Under article 123, no ruling or order is subject to appeal until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other, and under article 146 the decision upon such a motion shall not be ground for exception.

Doctrine

The rule a Bar candidate must retain is this: remedial laws apply to all judgments entered after they take effect, regardless of the procedure followed in the case before judgment. A new remedy created by a new procedure, such as a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, is not a matter of substitution but of addition, and it attaches by its own force to every pending case. The court has no discretion to apply it in one case and withhold it in another; it must consider every motion and decide each upon its merits. This doctrine is tied to articles 113 and 145 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings, which the Court held applicable to all judgments entered after the first of October 1901. The doctrine is also tied to article 123, which bars appeals from interlocutory orders until final judgment, and to article 146, which makes the decision on a motion for a new trial not a ground for exception.

Disposition

The appeal was dismissed, with neither party entitled to costs of the instance, because the order granting the new trial was not appealable.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a new remedy granted by a new procedure applies to all judgments entered after it takes effect, regardless of the procedure followed before judgment. Examiners like to use this case on the transitional application of remedial laws and on the rule that an order granting a new trial is interlocutory and not appealable until final judgment.