JESUS C. BALMADRID AND MILA C. BALMADRID, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.

The Motion for Reconsideration of the March 22, 1991 Decision of
this Court is for resolution.

Spouses Jesus C. Balmadrid and Mila C. Balmadrid,
petitioners-movants, together with Maximo Binos and Teodolo Alcantara,
Superintendent and Cashier, respectively, of the Catanduanes Agricultural and
Industrial College (CAIC, for brevity), a Government-owned institution, were
charged with violation of Section 3
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. Respondent Sandiganbayan
convicted the petitioners on the basis of “conspiracy”, on July 2,
1981 for allegedly engaging on “A massive cover-up operation x x x”
(Rollo, 33) by falsifying the supporting documents, namely the Request for
Obligation of Allotment (ROA), the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV), General
Voucher (GV) and canvass papers, abstract of bids, purchase order, COA Inspection
report, in support of the four (4) checks drawn in favor of the Balmadrids as
proprietor of the family business known as ECBAL Enterprises. (Exhibits A-2, A­-3, A-4, B-2, B-3, B-4,
C-2, C-3, C-4, D-2, D-3 and D-4; Ibid., pp. 8-9) The four checks amounting to
P9,200.00 were to cover purchases of school supplies and materials and were
payable in the name of petitioner, Mila C. Balmadrid.

Finding the public officers
and the above-named petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the respondent
Sandiganbayan convicted all the accused including the petitioners-movants
sentencing each of them to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from
“FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to SEVEN (7) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY, as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office, to indemnify, jointly
and severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Catanduanes Agricultural and Industrial College, in the amount of P9,200.00 and
to pay the costs of this action proportionately.” (Ibid., p. 62)

In the judgment of affirmance, this Court ruled:

“Petitioners’
contention that the information failed to show that they are charged in
conspiracy with their co-accused public officers hold no water. The allegations in the information clearly
show the commission of a series of acts,
ranging from its inception through the issuance by Binos and Alcantara of
officially-issued CAIC checks for non-existent, fictitious or ghost purchases
of school supplies and construction
materials from Ecbal Enterprises up to the irregular and/or improper delivery
of supplies and construction materials, to CAIC from Hi-Tone
Construction and the illegal and criminal acts of petitioners to give semblance
of regularity to the transaction. The
crime, therefore, charged and penalized, is
not the singular or individual act of issuing CAIC checks in payment of
a civil obligation. Rather, it involves
the entire spectrum ranging from their issuance up to and including the
falsification of public documents to simulate or justify a transaction which was
initially intended to give the spouses Balmadrid unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in Binos’ and Alcantara’s discharge of their official
duties, which were committed with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, thus causing undue injury to the
CAIC. From the very nature and essence
of the act penalized under Section 3, paragraph (e), conspiracy necessarily
enters into the picture and its commission attributable to two or more persons
acting in conspiracy.

“It cannot be disputed or denied that the acts proved by the
prosecution’s evidence to have been committed by the accused private persons
were in furtherance of the aforesaid common objective resulting, at the last
stage thereof, in an attempt to deliver to the CAIC supplies and materials
which were hurriedly purchased by Binos from Hi-Tone Construction to disprove
the allegation in the information of ghost purchases. As indisputably shown by more than adequate evidence, the
individual and/or concerted acts of
accused spouses Balmadrid were not merely acts of accomplices or
accessories, as contemplated by the Revised Penal Code, but were acts showing
active participation and indispensable cooperation, which, if they were not
discovered or unearthed, would have led
to illegal, improper or irregular acts
being given a semblance of legality, propriety or
regularity.

“Since petitioners
have been shown to have participated in the conspiracy, they must be held
equally liable with co-accused Binos and Alcantara under section 3(e) of RA
3019. In a conspiracy, the act of one
is the act of all (People vs. Sandaydiego, 81 SCRA 120). The fact that petitioners are private
persons is of no consequence, considering that the rule of collective criminal
responsibility includes even private individuals who participate with public
officers in the perpetration of offenses ordinarily particularly applicable
only to the latter (United States v. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379).

“Lastly, with regard to the other mentioned alleged errors of
the Sandiganbayan, the Court is bound by the facts found by the Sandiganbayan
(Gabison vs. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 62). Our power to review the decision of that special tribunal is the same as
Our jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (Calubaquib vs.
Sandiganbayan, 117 SCRA 493.)” (Ibid., pp. 430-431)

Without much delay, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of
the aforementioned Decision, contending that the aforestated conviction is not
supported by competent and substantial evidence as it rests on conjectures,
surmises, speculations and gratuitous conclusions and that the Decision
violated the cardinal rule that conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the defense evidence.

Considering the seriousness of the penalty meted out to the petitioners-movants, consisting of the
deprivation of liberty and their responsibilities to their own family, We have
once again given an assiduous study of the instant Motion noting some flaws in the
decision subject of the appeal.

In affirming the appealed decision of the public respondent, this
Court sustained the alleged finding of conspiracy among the petitioners herein
with their co-accused public officials in defrauding the government by means of
alleged fictitious purchases of materials and supplies for which the four (4)
checks were drawn in payment of the questioned purchases. In countless decided cases, this Court has
consistently held that “Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures,
but by positive and conclusive evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is
required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which
is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.” (Orodio vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
315)

There were sufficient proofs established by the petitioners that
there were four (4) delivery receipts showing
that the goods thus purchased by Binos were delivered to CAIC. These were dated June 12, 1979 (Exh. 7-A), June 18, 1979 (Exh. 6-A), June 21, 1979 (Exh. 5-A) and June 26, 1979
(Exh. 4-A). These delivery receipts
constituted deliveries to CAIC, although the goods were actually delivered at
later dates, due to the transportation difficulties peculiar to the area where
the goods were to be delivered to the purchaser CAIC situated at the
Municipality of Panganiban, whereas ECBAL Enterprises is located at Virac,
Catanduanes, some 60 kilometers overland of rough road. (Rollo, p. 341) To be able to bring the
goods in question to CAIC, they were loaded on a boat as land transportation
was unavailable because of the shortage of gasoline, and were off-loaded on to
Bagamanoc, about 5 kilometers more to CAIC in the Municipality of Panganiban,
Province of Catanduanes. Finally, upon
arrival of the goods, they were received and inspected by a police station
commander in the same locality, on November 13, 1979. (Ibid., p. 356)

The affirmance of the decision in question, hinges on the
conspiracy theory that respondent Sandiganbayan espoused that the act of one is
the act of all, however, the existence of conspiracy has to be proved first
before it can be made to apply on all the accused named in the
information. This requirement was
miserably absent here, thus ?

“It is settled that the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy. In other words, it must be shown to exist as
clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself in order to
uphold the fundamental principle that no one shall be found guilty of crime
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant in a criminal case must always be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proven, and in case of reasonable doubt and when his liability
shall not have been satisfactorily shown he shall have the right to be
acquitted, even though his innocence be doubted (U.S. v. Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 493
cited in People v. Sadie, 149 SCRA 240, 244)”. (Enrico Perez y dela Merced v. Sandiganbayan & People of the
Philippines, 180 SCRA 9)

Furthermore, the
conclusion arrived at that conspiracy characterized the acts complained about
was drawn from “(t)he (mere) allegations in the information (which)
clearly show the commission of a series of acts, ranging from its inception
through the issuance by Binos and Alcantara of officially-issued CAIC checks x
x x”. This is contrary to the rule
enunciated in the case of Misolas v. Panga, wherein this Court (En Banc), held
that “The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by the
facts brought about by an inquiry made by him.” It is within “the
power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense x x x has been committed and
that the qualifying circumstance attached to it has been established also
beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents
require.” (181 SCRA 648)

Moreover, in the case of People vs. Guinto, this Court held that:

“The principle has been dinned
into the ears of the bench and
the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation
is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional presumption
of innocence which the prosecution must
overcome with contrary proof beyond reasonable
doubt. This Court has
repeatedly declared that even if the defense
is weak, the case against the accused
must fail if the prosecution is even
weaker, for the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness
of the defense but on the strength
of the prosecution. Indeed, if the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of
the accused, he has a right to be acquitted and released even if he presents
naught a shred of evidence. x x x The accused-appellants
have been condemned
x x x based on uncertain evidence
clearly insufficient to sustain their conviction. It is their guilt
and not their innocence that has been
presumed. It is their innocence
and not their guilt that should have been pronounced. In these circumstances, only one thing that has to be done if the
Constitution is to be observed and justice is to be served.” (184 SCRA
287)

Further, the Information did not even allege that the petitioners
conspired with their co-accused, as their role was that of a seller/payee in
the four (4) checks that were issued in payment of school supplies and
materials, as shown in the pertinent portion which is quoted below:

“x x x the accused Maximo S. Binos and Teodulo B. Alcantara
being then the Superintendent and Cashier, respectively, of the Catanduanes
Agricultural and Industrial College, a Government-owned institution of
learning, taking unusual and undue advantage of their respective positions as
such for personal benefit and performance of their official duties and
functions with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, intent to gain, breach
of trust and or with abuse of confidence, falsify documents by conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with a common purpose and
design did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the
preparation, issuance and encashment of four
(4) checks of the CAIC payable to
Mila C. Balmadrid. x x x” (Rollo, p. 425)

There is no denying that the checks issued to petitioner Mila C.
Balmadrid were encashed by her, but the same were in payment of purchases of
supplies and materials for the use of CAIC. These purchases were covered by the standard and regular government
documents namely, the Certificate of Emergency Purchase, Request for Quotations,
Abstract of Bids and Certificates of Inspection, properly accomplished but
suppressed by the prosecution during the trial. These documents were the basis for the issuance of the Request
for Obligation of Allotments (ROA), Request for Requisition and Issue Vouchers
(RIV) and General Vouchers (GV), corresponding to the issued four (4) checks,
which were the only ones introduced by the prosecution, marked as Exhibits A-1
to A-4, B-1 to B?4, C-1 to C-4, and D-1 to D-4. (Ibid., p. 342)

From the foregoing, it is very obvious that respondent
Sandiganbayan was overwhelmed by the posture presented by the Tanodbayan even
as it utterly failed to prove the elements of the offense charged nor the
presence of conspiracy. This situation
is aggravated by manifestly interchanging the elements of falsification of
documents by allegedly postdating the four (4) checks in question (Ibid., pp.
52-55) and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The crime charged under the latter law, has a different and
distinct set of elements from falsification of public, private or commercial
documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and cannot be used
interchangeably with those of the instant charge defined and penalized by a
special law. (Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, 1987 Ed. Vol. I, pp. 52-55)

Furthermore, petitioners have shown that the purchases from
Hi-Tone were for different school supplies and materials purchased from ECBAL
Enterprises, consisting of coupon bond paper, glass jalousies and GI sheets (p.
9, decision) which tally with the specifications found in the invoices and
delivery receipts issued by the latter company. The fact of the matter is that the prosecution does not deny the
existence of the goods at the bodega in Bagamanoc which delivery was refused by
the Officer­-in-charge appointed to replace Superintendent Binos by the name
Remigio Obeduza. (Ibid., p. 364)

Records likewise show that the goods subject of the controversy,
were inventoried no less than four (4) times, the first two inventories were
made by Jose Concepcion and Patrolman Icawat, who brought the goods by sea from
Virac to Bagamanoc and delivered them to the custody of the Station Police
Commander (Exh. J). The inventory
conducted by Concepcion on October 13, 1979 on instruction of Col. Geronimo
Zaballa, PC Provincial Commander of Catanduanes (Exh. 3-Binos) and the
Inventory Listing (Exh. 4-Binos) was submitted to Sgt. Mariano Rodriguez on June 26, 1979 consisted of
jalousies, GI sheets (10 ft. long), about 95 reams of coupon bond paper, 5 boxes
of stencil and Gestetner Ink.

The third inventory was conducted on November 13, 1979 by Sgt.
Pedro Barrameda of the Panganiban Police Station on instruction of Fiscal
Arturo Rojas in connection with the preliminary investigation against Binos,
which inventory was entered by Barrameda in the police blotter on November 23,
1979. (Exh. L, L-1 to L-5). The fourth and last inventory was conducted
by OIC Obeduza himself on instruction of respondent Sandiganbayan, on September
3, 1979. (Ibid., pp;. 366?367)
Thus, while the inventories taken were done on different dates, it is clear
beyond doubt that the goods were physically present otherwise, how could the
inventories be made?

From the foregoing, it is crystal-clear that CAIC or the
Government did not sustain any damage or that the acts complained of are
“manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the aforesaid college in the
amount of NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P9,200.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency
“, (Ibid., p. 28) that would necessarily warrant petitioners’
conviction, because, the checks were plainly in payment of the purchased goods.

Moreover, this in-depth review was made to give life to the
posture of this Court in the case of Arias vs. Sandiganbayan which
incidentally has great similarity to the instant case, (180 SCRA 311) by
holding that:

“The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed to
convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable doubt, as co­-conspirators
in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the irregular
disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been satisfied.

x x x x x x x

“There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict
public officers whose acts have made the bidding out and construction of public
works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the public
eye. However, the remedy is not to
indict and jail every person who may have ordered the project, who signed a
document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere in its
implementation. The careless
use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent
persons who may have been made unwitting
tools by the
criminal minds who engineered the defraudation.

x x x x x x x

It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with
conspiracy in the falsification of public documents or preparation of spurious
supporting papers. The charge is
causing undue injury to the Government and giving a private party unwarranted
benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence.

x x x x x x x

The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has
assumed that the P5.00 per square meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax
declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan property and if the
Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it
must have suffered undue injury. However, the Solicitor General explains that the conclusion is erroneous
and maintained that there was ‘no undue injury caused to the Government as the
P80.00 per square meter acquisition cost is just, fair and reasonable.’

Due to the foregoing, this Court ruled in the aforesaid case,
that:

“We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office
plagued by all too common problems – dishonest or negligent subordinates,
overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence – is
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not
personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from
inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a
transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving
authority.” (180 SCRA 309)

The instant case is akin to the above-quoted resolution of this
Court of the very same issues at hand, such as conspiracy and damage to the
CAIC, a government institution of learning, when from all indications
manifested in the appealed decision of the respondent court, even the
credibility of the immediate accuser, Rudy Revelar, an Auditing Aide whose
temporary assignment has already expired and was disgruntled when Binos filed a
complaint against him before the Commission on Audit, the agency under whom
Revelar is employed. (Rollo, p. 349)

All the other testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to
wit: dela Rosa, Mariano Rodriguez,
Pedro Barrameda, Florencio Pena and Delfin Co did not impute any wrongdoing to
the petitioners regarding the preparation of the CAIC checks in question,
hence, the conclusion arrived at pertaining to the culpability of the
petitioners becomes a serious issue.

In the case of People vs. Salcedo, this Court ruled that:

“Credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the
province of the trial judge, but the Supreme Court is not bound by factual
findings of the lower court which are contradicted by evidence. x x x Thus, it does not apply where the
lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered,
would affect the result of the case [(People v. Royera, 130 SCRA 265 (1984);
People v. Martinez, 144 SCRA 303 (1986); Arcadio Cortez y Vengzon v. C.A. and
People of the Philippines, 163 SCRA 139 (1988)]. In fact, it has been settled
that the Supreme Court is not bound
by factual findings of the lower
court which are contradicted by the evidence
(Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. v.
C.O.B. Group Marketing, Inc., 141 SCRA
86 (1986), [(195 SCRA 345; March 18, 1991)]

In several instances, respondent Sandiganbayan imputed guilt to
the petitioners and their co-accused when nothing is shown by certain
documents. Exhibit “G” was
referred to by the respondent as evidencing a “civil obligation existed
between Mila Balmadrid as creditor and Binos and Alcantara, as debtors. This instrument was misleadingly referred to
x x x as “joint affidavit” executed by Binos and Alcantara. The truth is that it is NOT a “joint
affidavit” because it was not executed under oath. (TSN, pp. 53-60, Dec. 4, 1980) In other
words, it was a private writing, a letter-demand to pay CAIC’s obligation to
the ECBAL Enterprises. (Rollo, p. 331)

After dwelling at length on irrelevant issues, respondent even
questioned the signature of the accused Alcantara who was the Treasurer during
the period in question, which posture countermands the provision of COA
Circular No. 76-26, paragraph 5, which reads:

“5. Countersignature of checks

“Checks covering transactions not subject to pre-audit shall
no longer be countersigned by the resident auditors. However, these checks should be countersigned by responsible
agency officials except deputized disbursing officer accountable for the checks
and personnel of the accounting unit, in accordance with existing regulations
or as provided for in corporate charters.” (Ibid., p. 354)

As Treasurer of CAIC, under the above set-up Alcantara is
authorized to sign checks for disbursements that are exempt from pre-audit.

WHEREFORE, finding the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners Jesus C. Balmadrid and his wife, Mila C. Balmadrid to be well
taken, the same is hereby GRANTED and both of them are hereby ordered
ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.