PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERNESTO FLORES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is a prosecution for rape with homicide based on information
reading as follows:

That on or about October 4, 1972, in Sitio
Veterans, Barrio Dado, Municipality of Alamada,
Province of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Jesusa Maning, a virgin,
thirteen years of age, against her will and without her consent; that on the
occasion of the said rape and for the purpose of enabling him to have carnal
knowledge of the said Jesusa Maning
as above mentioned, the herein accused, taking advantage of his superior
strength and with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stuff her mouth with a (sic) soil to prevent her
from shouting and making any outcry and then choke her by the neck, which as a
result thereof (sic) said Jesusa Maning
died of asphyxia shortly thereafter.

Contrary to law particularly Article 335, paragraph 6, as amended,
of the Revised Penal Code, with the further aggravating
circumstance that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place which was
especially sought for to facilitate the commission of the crime.^[1]

The accused in this case is Ernesto Flores, born on April 12, 1949, an elementary school
graduate, a farmer, and a resident of Dado, Alamada, North
Cotabato.  His alleged
victim was Jesusa Maning,
thirteen years of age at the time of her death, and the late daughter of Felicisimo Maning, also of Dado, Alamada, North Cotabato.

The prosecution relied on the testimonies of six witnesses, and various documentary
evidence, among which was a one-page (alleged) extrajudicial confession of the
accused.  (Actually, there were two
confessions.)

Felicisimo Maning
testified that he went looking for the victim on October 4, 1972 when she failed to arrive home at five o’clock in the afternoon from Dado
Elementary School.  He alleged that he, together with several
companions, among them Arturo Molina and Juanito Estella, inquired from residents if
they had seen Jesusa. 
He was told that his daughter was seen earlier on her way home. 
He related that he continued his search and chanced upon a
certain Pilo who informed him that he saw his
daughter with the accused near a cornfield. 
He testified that he searched the cornfield, and that at about eleven o’clock in the evening, he (and his
companions) found Jesusa’s cadaver.

Another prosecution witness, Juanito
Estella, then a sixth grade student, testified that he saw Jesusa
that fateful day with the accused.  The
accused was allegedly four or five meters ahead of Jesusa.  He asked where the accused came from and the
accused allegedly answered that he came from a councilor’s house where a party was
held.  He said that in the middle of the
cornfield where Jesusa’s dead body was recovered,
there laid a trail.  The trail, which was
about twenty meters from the body, was the pathway along which Jesusa and the accused were purportedly seen walking.

Arturo Molina, another witness for the prosecution, submitted his
sworn statement wherein he stated that on the day in question, Felicisimo Maning^[2]
sought his assistance in locating his missing daughter, and that on their way,
they bumped into Juanito Estella, who allegedly
informed them that he saw her with the accused. 
He said that they found Jesusa’s corpse at the
cornfield nearby at about eleven o’clock
late in the evening.

The following day, October
5, 1972, Dr. Victor Castronueva, a
physician, examined Jesusa’s corpse and rendered his
medico-legal report and post-mortem findings. 
The same are hereinbelow reproduced:

Name     :           Jesusa Maning

Age        :           13 years

Sex        :           Female

Status    :           Single

Address:            Veterans Area, Alamada,
Cotabato

Date – Time and Place
of Death and alleged commission of rape, October 4, 1972-6:00 P.M., Veterans Area, Alamada,
Cotabato.

Alleged Case – Rape with Homicide.

Date, time and place
of post mortem examination:

October
5, 1972-3:30 P.M., at the Municipal building, Alamada, Cotabato.

Requesting
Officer:  Sgt. Marcelo H. Concepcion.

Preliminary Findings:

The deceased is a female appearing at about the stated
age with fairly developed body, black hair, wearing a checkered red and white cotton dress with jersy
(sic) under garment and white cotton panty with blood stains at the back
portion.  The mouth is full of dark-brown
soil (mud).  There is evident marked lividity of the lips, fingers and toe nails and on the
skin.  The forearms are flixed (sic) with evident rigor mortis.

Post Mortem Findings:

1.      Abrasion – 3.5 cm. by 1/2 cm. located at
the left face from the lateral angle of the eyelids extending laterally and
backward;

2.      Abrasion – Contused 4.5 cm. by 2 cm
located at the right antero–lateral aspect subhyoid region of the neck with its medial tip at the
median line extending laterally;

3.      Abrasion – 1 cm by 1/4 cm located at the antero lateral aspect of the neck left side, 4 cm from the
median line at the subhyoid region;

4.      Contusion- 2 cm by 1 cm located at the dorso-lateral side of left elbow joint;

5.      Contusion – 1 cm by 1/2 located at mid
portion of left arm lateral side;

6.      Contusion – 1 cm in diameter located at
the distal portion of the right forearm medial side;

7.      Lacerated wound 5 cm by 2 cm located at
the right leg on the region of the calf directed
parallel to the leg;

8.      Contusion – 2 cm in diameter located at
the posterior thigh, right, midway between its distal and proximal ends;

9.      Multiple abrasions popliteal
area left knee;

10.    Multiple abrasions and contusions left gluteal area and proximal portion posterior aspect left
thigh;

11.    Genital Findings:

The deceased has no
pubic hair.  Labia majora
and minora are coaptated.  Separation of the labias
revealed complete hyminal (sic) lacerations
corresponding to 6 and 3:00 o’clock
at the face of the watch.  Vagina admits
a tube of 2 cm with moderate resistance.  Its rugosities are
almost obliterated.  There is a scanty
white clear fluid coming out of the vaginal opening.

Cause of Death:  -Asphyxia
(Anoxia)

Remark – Recent hymenial (sic) lacerations were noted on the deceased.^[3]

Cause of death was established as asphyxia, brought about, in the
opinion of Dr. Castronuevo, by “hands pressed in
the neck.”^[4]
He also found the mouth of the victim filled with mud, a testimony corroborated
by Felicisimo Maning, Juanito Estella, and Arturo Molina.  According to him further, the victim suffered
“hyminal [sic] lacerations”^[5]
and that her vaginal opening yielded secretions.  It was not however determined whether the
secretions were vaginal or seminal fluids. 
He also saw blood stains at the back portion of Jesusa’s
torn panties.

The records allege that on the same day the accused was brought
to the station commander of Alamada, North
Cotabato, Ernesto Concepcion,
by the barrio captain and “some of the army officials.”^[6]
He was allegedly interrogated there and shortly after which, he allegedly confessed
authorship of the offense.  He also
allegedly signed a statement (an extrajudicial confession) admitting the rape
of Jesusa Maning.  The statement was later forwarded to Judge
Jesus Reyno of the Municipal Court of Alamada.

The records also show, however, that on the same day, the accused
had been brought to the Philippine army headquarters at Alamada,
and interrogated there by Sgt. Rogelio Bonifacio,
First Lt. Ricardo Referente, and Second Lt. Ricardo Kierulf.^[7]
It also appears that he executed a confession there.^[8]

Judge Reyno asserted that the accused
was presented to him on October 6,
1972.  He (Judge Reyno) claimed to have interpreted his confession in Cebuano, a language allegedly known to him (the accused), and later translated
into English.  He also said that he
personally investigated the accused but did not put his question to
writing.  According to him “he was
in a hurry because the life of the accused was in danger because of the gravity
of the crime.”^[9]

He alleged that he also subsequently called the accused to the
witness stand where the latter allegedly affirmed his sworn statement.  He allegedly also advised the accused of his
right to counsel but the latter allegedly insisted that they proceed.^[10]
He then ordered the forwarding of the case to the then Court of First Instance
for trial.  His order reads as follows:

Above-named accused having volun­tarily admitted in open court and
under oath that he raped and choke (sic) the neck of the victim – Jesusa Maning, resulting in the
latter’s death, the Court is of the opinion that there is a probable cause to
believe that the crime of “Rape with Homicide” has been committed by
the accused.

Case remanded to the Court of First Instance, Cotabato City
for further action.

The Chief of Police, is hereby directed to
cause the transfer of the accused to the Provincial Jail and likewise to cause
the records of the case to be delivered to the Clerk of Court, Court of First
Instance, Branch 11, Cotabato
City.

SO ORDERED.^[11]

The accused denied the charges against him and insisted that he
was forced to sign the confession(s) in question.  He also claimed that he was maltreated by the
authorities.

The records show that the reception of the evidence for the
accused was postponed fifteen times.  The
accused himself testified on June 2,
1977, but failed, for one reason or another, to present the
supporting testimonies of his witnesses, Vivencio Munar, Aurora Flores, and Leopoldo
Flores.  On the same date, the trial
court issued subpoenas directing the above witnesses to appear under pain of
arrest.  However, in spite of the
subpoenas, none of them appeared in court. 
On November 8, 1977,
his case was rested with only his testimony on record.

In his testimony, he stated that he never knew the victim, Jesusa Maning.  He alleged that at about two in the morning
of October 5, 1972, he was
picked up by certain policemen and armed soldiers of Alamada.  He was taken with his wife to the army
headquarters.  He was not allegedly
informed why he was being taken except that he would be “ask[ed]
something”.^[12] Upon reaching the army headquarters, however, he was allegedly
“beaten,” “kicked,” and “maltreated”,^[13] while his wife watched.  He also declared that he was
“burned”^[14] on the face and his hand “buttstroked” against cement.^[15] He averred that he was hit on the head with
a bottle and suffered a cut lip because of punching.^[16] He did not allegedly recognize his
tormentors because it was “dark”.^[17]

He was later transferred to the municipal jail where he claimed
he was likewise manhandled, kicked, and beaten on the breast, back, and
abdomen.  He claimed that he complained
later to the chief of police who allegedly promised to take him to a
doctor.  He claimed, however, that
“if I will be out of jail, they [would] shoot me, according to the chief
of police.”^[18]

He also said that he signed his confession(s) “because if I
[would] not … they [would] kill me.”^[19]
He alleged that he did not complain to Judge Reyno
because he was allegedly “warned that … if I [did], they [would] kill
me.”^[20]
He insisted that his alleged confession(s) was (were) not his voluntary
statement(s).

It was likewise his contention that on October 4, 1972, he was harvesting corn with his
brother-in-law, Vivencio Munar,
and his (the accused’s) brother, Leopoldo
Flores.  They were allegedly through by six o’clock in the afternoon.  He, the accused, allegedly arrived home at seven o’clock in the evening.

He declared that he was not informed why he was being held by the
authorities.  At the trial, he alleged
that his wife has since left him.^[21]
He stated, finally, that he did not furnish the information narrated in his
alleged confession(s).

On February 21, 1978,
the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the
accused Ernesto Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of rape
with homicide, as charged, and
hereby sentences him to death.  He is
further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of TWELVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), Philippine Currency, in
concept of moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs; without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.^[22]

It can not be over-emphasized that no eyewitness report was
submitted to the court.  The only
eyewitness, as it appears, was the victim herself, the lamented Jesusa Maning, whose death has
muted all possible eyewitness accounts.

In convicting the accused, the trial court relied on first,
circumstantial evidence, and second, the former’s extrajudicial confession.

It is the opinion of this Court that in so holding, the trial
court erred and hence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

We do not believe that the fourfold circumstances
invoked by the lower court, as follows:

The circumstances were:  (1)
he was the last person seen with the victim alive, by two person
– by prosecution witness Juanito Estella, and by Pilo, the information given by Pilo
was testified to by Felicisimo Maning.  As stated above, the testimony of Felicisimo Maning that Pilo informed him that he saw the daughter, Jesusa Maning, together with
Ernesto Flores in the afternoon of October 4, 1972, was not objected to even if
it is hearsay; therefore, this information is admitted and considered as
evidence for the prosecution.  Furthermore, this information given by Pilo
tallies with the testimony of Juanito Estella.  Pilo’s information
that he saw Jesusa Maning
following the accused in a cornfield is, therefore, corroborated by the
testimony of Juanito Estella.

This information of Pilo and this
testimony of Juanito Estella contradict the
uncorroborated testimony of the accused that in the whole afternoon of October 4, 1972, he was harvesting
corn in Upper Valley.

(2) The circumstances that the accused was with the victim in a
cornfield as indicated by the information of Pilo and
the testimony of Juanito Estella is further
corroborated by the fact that the dead body of Jesusa
Maning was found in the cornfield pointed by Pilo and Juanito Estella.

(3) The circumstances that Pilo and Juanito Estella saw the accused on the afternoon of October 4, 1972 with the victim in
the cornfield is not denied directly by the accused.  All that accused said was that he did not
know Juanito Estella and that he was harvesting corn
in the afternoon of October 4, 1972, and that he left the cornfield at 6:00
p.m. and reached his house at 7:00 and from 7:00 pm. of October 4, 1972 to 2:00 a.m. October 5, 1972, when he was
picked by military men he had been in his house.  Neither the wife nor the brother-in-law, Vivencio Munar, nor the brother, Leopoldo Flores, came to Court to corroborate the claims of
accused, Ernesto Flores.  As shown by the
records and by the orders copied above, the accused was given all the chances
to present his witnesses.  Why even his
own brother and his own wife, not to mention his brother-in-law, did not
testify for the accused has never been explained.  The court could have issued the warrant of
arrest for the witnesses of the accused considering the constitutional right of
the accused “to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf “; but the accused
did not avail of this right and did not ask for the compulsory process in spite
of the offer of the court to do so, the moment it was asked for.  At once [sic] instance, counsel for the
accused wanted the Court to have the witnesses come at government expenses, but
counsel did not submit evidence to show that the witnesses are entitled to that
privilege; and, as
may be seen on page 40 of this judgment, counsel said that while he was
aware of the constitutional right of the accused he would not like to avail
thereof, if possible, because of his past sad experiences.

As testified by the prosecution witness Arturo Molino, the accused
Ernesto Flores during the investigation in the SEMP admitted that he raped and
killed the victim.  (4) As testified by
prosecution witness Arturo Molino, the accused had to admit because he was seen
to have scratches on his face during the investigation at the SEMP.^[23]

are sufficient
under the Rules of Court^[24]
to justify a conviction.  With regard to
the first, that is, that the accused was the last person seen with the victim
alive, our opinion is that it does not reasonably lead to the conclusion that
ergo, the accused forcibly took the victim, ravished her, and later killed
her.  All that “Pilo”
and Estella said that the accused and the victim were together when the former
was last seen alive.

“Pilo”‘s and Estella’s
accounts, in our view, do not establish in any rational manner a connection
with the offense of rape with homicide. 
Moreover, the lower court itself found that “Ernesto Flores was
about 4 or 5 meters ahead of Jesusa Maning.”^[25]
They can not be said therefore to have been “together”.

Moreover, “Pilo” was never
presented in court although obviously, he was a “star” witness for
the prosecution.  Albeit the defense
registered no objection to the witness, Felicisimo Maning’s, version of what “Pilo”
told him, thereby making it admissible in evidence, it
is nonetheless insufficient to prove the accused’s
liability.  It would have been different
had “Pilo“, assuming he exists, seen the
accused taking the victim to the scene of the crime, which would have brought
about the fair inference (though debatable) that the accused shortly raped and
killed her there, but to see them near there is not enough to give rise to this
inference.

The fact that Jesusa’s dead body was
later found in the cornfield (circumstance no. two) neither satisfies our rule
on the appreciation of circumstantial evidence. 
In the first place, it is by itself an inference that since the victim’s
body was found in the cornfield, the accused must have brought her there simply
because the accused, moments before, was seen near it.  The legal theorem, however, is that one can
not draw an inference from another inference.  If so, and in Moran’s words “we would be
entering upon a sea of inferences with no rudder or compass to control the direction.”^[26]

The trial court’s attack (circumstance no. three) on the weakness
of the defense is not well-taken.  Again,
the legal rule is that the prosecution can not rely on the vulnerability of the
defense evidence but on the strength of its own proofs.^[27]

The fact, finally, that the accused was seen with scratches on
his face at the time he was picked up for questioning (circumstance no. four)
can not by any means be taken against him as evidence of guilt.  The prosecution has not demonstrated the link
with the accused’s injuries and the offenses
charged.  It is plain conjecture to say
the accused must have been guilty of rape with homicide because he had
scratches in his face.

Under the Rules of Court:

SEC. 5. 
Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a)          There is more
than one circumstance;

(b)          The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c)          The combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.^[28]

According to Moran further, “the circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion,”^[29]
that is, that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.  In other words, the circumstances themselves,
or a combination thereof, should point to overt acts of the accused that would
logically point to the conclusion, and no other, that he is guilty of the crime
charged.  In this case, the fact that the
accused was seen with the victim (it can not indeed be said that he was
“with” the victim because he was walking four or five meters ahead of
her), and no more, does not remotely point to this conclusion.

It must also be noted that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused
must be shown “beyond reasonable doubt.”^[30]
In the absence of such a showing, the Constitution presumes him to be innocent.^[31]
The chain of circumstances above, in our opinion, has not overthrown this
presumption.

We come to the accused’s alleged extra-judicial
confession(s).  In his statement given to
the police, he supposedly said:

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

Q  – Will you narrate in
brief detail as to how rape and killed Jesusa Maning?

A   – Yesterday sir at
about 4:30 in the afternoon of October 4, 1972 while I was standing near the
House of Mr. Estela, Jesusa
Maning passed by, then I followed her until we reach
the corn field.  While I was follow­ing
her I asked her where she would go, then she answered that she is looking for a
mushrooms.  While she was still in the
cornfield, I force her to lie down. 
While she was lying I ride on her, but when she shouted I place a soil
in the mouth, then I squeeze her neck.  That when that girl did not
shout I already started my purpose on raping her until I succeed.^[32]

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

In his statement given at the army
headquarters, however, he allegedly declared:

9. 
Q – Will you relate to us the unusual incident?

A –
Yes sir, at around 5:15 in the
afternoon while I was on my way to my house, it so happened that I followed Jesusa Maning who came from
Dado.  I was following Jesusa Maning and while we were
in the middle of the route, a corn planted area, Jesusa
stopped and waited for me.  When I
reached the place where she stopped she told me “Ondang
usa
ta nang magpahulay
una ta” meaning,
“We will stop first nong, we will rest for
a-while”.  She added “Ondang usa
ta nong kay
mangihe una ko“, meaning, “We will stopped nong because I am going to urinate”.  I answered “Sige
lang kay maghulat ko“, meaning,
“Go ahead and I’ll just wait”. 
She went to the corn field right at trail around 15 yards from the
way.  I waited for about 5 minutes then I
heard her calling for me.  She said
“Dali na nong”
meaning “come over here,” I went to her and saw her lying with her
panty on her cover thigh and her shirt raised just
below her breast.  Beefe
I went to her I lowered my pants and underwear just above my knees.  From there I laid on
top of her and tried to insert my penis on her vagina.  I also fondled and kissed her.  When she felt the pain, she resisted by
pushing me but I held both of her hand, embraced and kissed her.  When the head of my penis entered her vagina,
she shouted and cried but I placed soil into her mouth.  She was not able to shout anymore and when I
was through with the sexual intercourse I raised her panty and left her in the
corn field.  She was unconscious when I
left her.  Then I went directly to my
home.^[33]

The lower court ruled that the above confession(s) was (were)
conclusive against him.  It also admitted
it although there was no information thereon that he was advised of his rights
to remain silent and to counsel.

We have held that the provisions of the 1973 Constitution
requiring law enforcers to apprise the accused of his
constitutional rights during custody have only prospective application.^[34]
Confessions extracted prior to January
17, 1973, the date the 1973 Charter was ratified, so we have held,
are not covered by these provisions.^[35]
The confession at bar having been taken on October 6, 1972, is beyond the ambit of the Constitution
of 1973.

To be sure, the counsel de oficio, in
her well-written brief for the accused, urges us to reexamine Magtoto, but the Court sees no need for it.  Since its promulgation, Magtoto
seems to have firmly settled as correct
jurisprudence.^[36]

It does not follow, however, that since the alleged confession
was taken prior to January 17, 1973,
it is, hence, admissible.  The right
against self-incrimination, by way of an extrajudicial confession, is
nevertheless subject to the condition sine qua non that the confession had been
given voluntarily and freely.  As early as 1913, we have rejected involuntary
confessions and proclaimed them worthless as a piece of evidence.^[37]
Thus:

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

x x x Involuntary
confessions are rejected by all courts–by some on the ground that a confession
so obtained is unreliable; and by some on the grounds of humanitarian
principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness toward the accused in
criminal proceedings.  But either theory
arrives at the same goal.  Such a confession is not legal evidence
and must be rejected.  If the accused
satisfactorily shows that it was made involuntarily, the confession stands
discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which never existed.  It was therefore error to reject the
testimony of the accused in the present case because it was in conflict with
her confession.  The admissibility of
that confession should have been first deci­ded.  If admissible as evidence, it is unnecessary
to further consider the evi­dence of record, as it is virtually equivalent to a
plea of guilty in open court.  But if not
admissible as evidence, the prosecution must rely on other evidence to sustain
a conviction.^[38]

In the present case, the Court finds evidence that the accused
has been forced to sign his “confession(s)”.  The following circumstances convince the
Court:  (1) the accused was picked up by armed soldiers at two o’clock in
the morning of October 5, 1972; (2) the
arrest was supported by no warrant of arrest; (3) he was later surrendered to
the custody of the police; he was not informed why he was being taken; (4) on the same day, he
supposedly signed his confessions; and (5) the confessions were taken under
questionable circumstances:  (a) the
confession at the army camp was preceded by a questioning in English, translated into Chavacano,
a dialect with which the accused has not been shown to be conversant; (b) the
confession taken by the police on the other hand was in plain English, a language not shown to be known to
the accused.

The accused also said that while in army custody, he was
allegedly maltreated and
hurt.  While we can not accept this
testimony at face value because it is likely a story, the fact alone that the
accused was taken by armed men (in the small hours of the morning) is to us, a
kind of compulsion that indeed makes men do things they would not voluntarily
do.  It does not moreover appear disputed
that the accused was not told why he was being arrested or being held for
questioning.  Assuming
that he was not physically abused as he claimed, the circumstances surrounding
his arrest, to our mind, are enough mental torture that would taint any
subsequent confession.

We have ruled that compulsion is not always to be understood as a violent
act.^[39]
Compulsion may also be mental, in which
by mere overpowering of the will one is made to perform an act not truly his
own.

It must be stressed that the accused was arrested with no
warrant.  This makes, so we hold, the
arrest invalid, and his subsequent two-day interment, under duress.  We can not likewise discount the fact that
martial law had just been proclaimed, and truth to tell, martial law signified
the power of the gun.^[40]
We hold that, under such circumstances, the accused could not have validly made
a voluntary confession.

The haste in which the accused was furthermore made to
“confess” has not eluded the Court. 
It is noteworthy that the accused was picked up for interrogation at two o’clock in the morning.  He was investigated there, and though the
time of the investigation is hazy (his army confession indicates a time of
“0550M”), the Court presumes that it was done in the early hours of October 5, 1972, since at or about 3:20 P.M., he was at the office of the station
commander.  The Court finds it indeed
strange that this episode was not recounted in the decision, and much more,
with respect to the army confession which was not taken up at the trial.

It is also strange that the accused made two confessions, when
obviously, one would have sufficed. 
There was no point in executing the police admission, when evidently, the accused’s military
captors could have turned over his (the accused’s)
army confession to the police when he himself was bodily surrendered to the
station commander.  There is no explanation
in the records for what we find to be suspicious conduct on the part of the
military and/or police.  It likewise
reinforces our belief that the twin confessions did not come from the lips of
the accused.

For the same reason, we equally condemn the precipitousness
of Judge Reyno. 
He admitted in open court that he was “in a hurry” to
terminate the investigation at first, because “the life of the accused was
in danger because of the gravity
of the offense”–whatever that meant– but later, because “the
relatives might go to jail.”^[41]
There was no basis for this alleged apprehension because the accused was under
military custody.  Secondly, it was no
reason at all to terminate the proceedings (although the accused allegedly
insisted that his “confession” be admitted forthwith); His Honor
should have nonetheless satisfied himself that the accused was not making, as it were, an improvident
plea of “guilty”.

The records also show that aside from the admission, there was no
hard evidence against the accused before the judge.^[42]
It was therefore incumbent upon Judge Reyno to
content himself that the accused was prima facie guilty by further
investigation.

Under the premises, we can not say that the accused was given his
day in court.  We have no choice but to
overturn his conviction.

It is true that in a number of cases, we sustained confessions
based on replete details only the accused could have
known.^[43]
We can not, however, apply this teaching in this case, first and last, because
at the time the accused signed his alleged confession(s), the circumstances
behind the victim’s death were already well-known, on the strength of the
report of Dr. Castronuevo and the open disclosures of
the corpus delicti a day before.

It is not necessary to dwell on the other errors assigned by the
defense, notably, the trial court’s failure to compel the attendance of
witnesses on behalf of the accused.  We
find that based on the very evidence for the prosecution, conviction is not warranted.

On April 25, 1989, the Court received a “motion to withdraw
appeal” signed by the accused alleging that “his appeal efforts [are]
fruitless … and [that] to pursue [it] … is tantamount to delaying the execution of his sentence.”^[44]
On June 19, 1989, the Court
directed the accused’s counsel de oficio
to verify the genuineness of the accused’s signature
on the motion and the voluntariness of the
withdrawal.  On October 23, 1989, the counsel for the accused
filed a manifestation informing the Court that the accused did sign the motion
after “he learned about the demise of his father and believing that nobody
cares for him anymore, including his counsel who seems to have abandoned his
case.”^[45]

At this point, the Court genuinely commiserates with accused for
what indeed boils down to delay in the administration of justice through no
fault of his own (or the Court’s either) but on account simply of the slow wheels of justice in the country.  Let him not be misled, however, that
“nobody cares for him anymore” because if nobody else is indeed left,
he can count on the Supreme Court.  If it
is any consolation, let the accused be reminded that if his labors were an
uphill battle, they were not a bad fight, and perhaps the price we all pay for
freedom.

WHEREFORE, the accused is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), see attached dissent.

---

^[1]
Original Record, 19.

^[2]
Id., 5.  Jesusa’s father is referred to therein as “Teodoro Maning”.

^[3]
Id., 6-7.

^[4]
Rollo, 28.

^[5]
Id.

^[6]
Id., 31.

^[7]
Record, id., 13-14.

^[8]
Id., 13.

^[9]
Id., 29.

^[10]
Id.

^[11]
Record, id., 9.

^[12]
Rollo, id., 44.

^[13]
Id., 45.

^[14]
Id.

^[15]
Id.

^[16]
Id.

^[17]
Id.

^[18]
Id., 46.

^[19]
Id.

^[20]
Id.  Subsequently, however, he admitted that Judge
Reyno inquired about his alleged injuries.

^[21]
Id., 59.

^[22]
Id., 69.

^[23]
Id., 66-68.

^[24]
RULES OF COURT (Revised Rules on Evidence), Rule 133, sec. 5.

^[25]
Rollo, id., 36.

^[26]
VI MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 164 (1980 ed.).

^[27]
People v. Saavedra, No.
L-48738, May 18, 1987, 149 SCRA 610,
636, and cases cited there.

^[28]
RULES OF COURT, supra, Rule 133, sec. 5.

^[29]
MORAN, id., 165.

^[30]
RULES OF COURT, supra, Rule 133, sec. 2.

^[31]
CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 14(2);
CONST. (1935), art. IV, sec. 1(17).

^[32]
Record, id., 4.

^[33]
Id., 13.

^[34]
Magtoto v.
Manguera, Nos. L-37201-02,
37424, 38929, March
3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4. See CONST.
(1973), art. IV, sec. 20.

^[35]
Supra.

^[36]
See People v. Decierdo, No. L-46956,
May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 496, 502, and cases cited there.

^[37]
U.S. v. De los Santos, 24 Phil.
34 (1913).

^[38]
Supra, 359. See also People v. Decierdo, supra, and cases cited there; also U.S.
v. Navarro, 3 Phil. 140 (1904).

^[39]
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663,
679; People v. Olvis, No. 71092, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 513.

^[40]
See Javellana v. Executive Secretary, Nos. L-36142, 36164, 36165, 36236, 36283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 132, Concepcion, C.J.

^[41]
T.s.n., Session of August 26, 1975, 50.

^[42]
Id., 53-54.

^[43]
See, e.g., People v. Ribajado,
No. L-40294, July 11, 1986,
142 SCRA 637.

^[44]
Rollo, id., 212.

^[45]
Id., 223.

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