G.R. No. 58164. September 02, 1983
JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA GUERRERO, MAGDALENA GUERRERO ESPIRITU, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND CANDIDO ESPIRITU, GREGORLO GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. ST. CLARE’S REA…
VASQUEZ, J.:
In their petition for review by certiorari, petitioners
are seeking a reversal of the decision of the former Court of Appeals (now the
Intermediate Appellate Court) dated April
30, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 57597-R, and its resolution dated September 3, 1981 which denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration thereof. Our resolution of May 25, 1983 gave due course to the petition.
The action initiated by the petitioners in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal prayed for a judgment:
“1. Declaring the inexistence of the ‘Deed of Sale
of Lands’, Annex ‘A’ hereof, and ‘Deeds of Absolute Sale’, Annexes ‘B’ and ‘C’,
as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 4591 and Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 339629 and 340842 of the Registry of Deeds, null and void;
2.
Declaring the plaintiffs (now petitioners) the
owners in fee simple of the aforedescribed property,
pro-indiviso;
3.
Ordering the private defendants (now private
respondents) to reconvey to the plaintiffs the
afore-described lot;
4.
Declaring the ‘Joint Venture Agreement’ executed
by the defendant partnership and the defendant corporation null and void and
ineffective insofar as the plaintiffs are concerned;
5.
Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue a new transfer certificate of title in favor
of the plaintiffs over the said lot;
6.
Condemning the defendants, except the defendant
Register of Deeds, to pay the plaintiffs, actual and exemplary damages, the
amounts of which they will prove during the hearing of the instant case on the
merit;
7.
Condemning the defendants, except the defendant
Register of Deeds, to pay to the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00; plus costs of suit.” (Printed Record on
Appeal, pp. 116-118.)
Petitioners’ original and amended complaints alleged that during
their lifetime the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed
property, which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio,
Parañaque, Rizal, with an
area of 42,299 square meters, more or less.
The spouses had six children, named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona,
Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero.
Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro
Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained that the questioned
lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his share in the
inheritance, the other children having been assigned other lots. Accordingly, upon the death of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the
lot and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador
Ramirez, who earned a 50% share in the net produce, the other 50% being
retained by Andres Guerrero who defrayed the cultivation expenses and real
estate taxes on the property. Shortly
after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the
land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property
cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the harvests. The arrangement between brother and sister
was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land and
enjoyment of the owner’s share in the produce for as long as she needed the property. Dominador Ramirez
continued his tenancy until shortly before the death of Andres Guerrero.
Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their
children, who are the petitioners in this case.
Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero.
The complaints further alleged that as early as December 10, 1957, the land was
surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as Lot
No. 4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No. 229 of the Parañaque Cadastre.
Sometime during the latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced
themselves as agents or buyers of the land approached some of the plaintiffs
in order to secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs were informed that the land
was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered the
following: that Manuel Guerrero was able
to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a ‘Deed of Sale of Land’
dated April 24, 1948 purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that he caused
the lot to be surveyed in his name as Lot No. 4752 and he was issued advance
Plan No. AP-10008 on February 28, 1962; that in the advance plan issued to him,
it was duly noted that Lot No. 4752 had been previously surveyed for Andres
Guerrero; that in 1963, Manuel Guerrero, assisted by Felicisimo
Guerrero, father of the defendants Guerreros, filed
an application for registration of land with the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of
Cristina Guerrero, the court ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that
despite oppositors‘ appeal to a higher court, the
Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 4591 to the
applicant; that on September 14, 1971, there was filed with the Register of
Deeds of Rizal a “Deed of Absolute Sale”
purportedly executed by Manuel Guerrero in favor of the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to
the registration of that deed, cancelled OCT No. 4591 and was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 339629 in its stead; that on the same day that the
deed of sale was registered, the defendants Guerreros
caused to be notarized an “Articles of Partnership” of St. Clare’s Realty
Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September 28, 1971,
the defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a
“Deed of Absolute Sale” to the St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd.;
that by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 340842 in the name
of said realty company.
According to the original and amended complaints, the Deed of
Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero was fraudulent, simulated and falsified for
the reason, among others, that Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land
at the time she purportedly sold it; that Manuel Guerrero obtained OCT No. 4591
in fraud of the plaintiffs; that the Deeds of Sale to the defendants Guerreros and St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. and the
transfer certificates of title in their favor are fraudulent and simulated, and
ineffective against the plaintiffs for the reason, among others, that at the
time of execution of the Deeds of Sale, the defendants Guerreros
knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero; that long after the complaint
in the present case has been filed, the plaintiffs came to know that the St.
Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. executed a “Joint Venture Agreement”
with the United Housing Corporation under which the latter bound itself to
develop the property into a residential subdivision; and that the said
agreement was entered into in gross and evident bad faith.
Separate answers were filed by the defendants Guerreros,
St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. and United Housing Corporation. The defendants Guerreros
alleged that Cristina Guerrero was the absolute owner of the property; that the
action of the plaintiffs had prescribed and they are guilty of laches. St. Clare’s
Realty Company, Ltd. averred that its contract with United Housing Corporation
was made in good faith. United Housing Corporation averred that there is no privity of interest between plaintiffs and this defendant
considering that the plaintiffs are not parties to the Joint Venture Agreement.
Issues having been joined; the case proceeded to trial.
Frisco Cervantes, grandson of Cristina Guerrero, testified as a
witness of the plaintiffs that having had previous information that the
disputed lot was borrowed from Andres Guerrero and that Cristina Guerrero
merely mortgaged it to Manuel Guerrero, he went to the house of Manuel Guerrero
in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque,
Rizal, in 1968 at the behest of the plaintiffs, to
inquire about the mortgage; that in reply, Manuel Guerrero stated that the land
had been sold but it would be changed with another lot of the same area; that
in 1970, Sotero Cervantes and Laura Cervantes,
children of Cristina Guerrero, and he went to see Manuel Guerrero at the Sta.
Rita Church in Parañaque; that Sotero
and Laura asked if they could get the land back; that Manuel Guerrero answered
that it were better to change the disputed lot with another parcel of the same
area and value; that as he was not satisfied with the answer, Frisco Cervantes
went to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasig,
Rizal, where he obtained a copy of a Deed of Sale in
favor of Manuel Guerrero which he delivered to the children of Andres Guerrero.
Roman Mataverde, Chief Geodetic
Engineer of the Bureau of Lands designated as Officer-In-Charge of the Surveys
Division, testified for the plaintiffs that in the Bureau’s Lot Data
Computation Book showing the list of claimants for Lot
4752, Case 4, Cadastre 299, Parañaque, Rizal, (Exhibit A), which was surveyed on December 10, 1957, Andres Guerrero
is listed as claimant. The records of
the Bureau of Lands from 1957 (when Lot 4752 was cadastrally surveyed for Andres Guerrero) until 1962 show
no claimant to the property except Andres Guerrero. In 1962, the Bureau of Lands received a
letter with an affidavit attached to it from Manuel Guerrero requesting that
an advance plan be made. Advance Plan
No. 10008 was made without Andres Guerrero being notified. But in the advance plan, the Bureau of Lands
listed Andres Guerrero as original claimant so that he would, not be prejudiced
when a case comes to trial.
Dominador Ramirez testified that during
the rainy season of 1936, Andres Guerrero asked him to work on his land located
at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque,
Rizal, with an area of four (4) hectares, more or
less. As tenant, his agreement with
Andres Guerrero was that he would till the land in consideration of 50% of the
harvests with Andres Guerrero shouldering the cultivation expenses. From 1936, to about 1941 or 1942, he worked
on the land and gave 50% of the produce to Andres Guerrero who went personally
to the field to get the same. In 1941 or
1942, he stopped working on the land because war had broken out.
On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her mother,
Cristina Guerrero, had been sick for a long time before she died at the age of
80 years in 1948; and that her mother could walk only inside their house in Parañaque; that the money spent for the illness of her
mother came from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her children, Cristina
Guerrero could ask money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that Andres
Guerrero had lent to her.
After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the
defendants Guerreros objected to the line of
questioning on the ground that the said witness was testifying “on matters
which are prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court.” The trial court having ruled that the witness
“may answer”, defendants’ counsel registered
a continuing objection. The court
allowed the witness to continue her testimony subject to such objection. (TSN, pp. 9-20, October 19,
1973.)
Resuming her testimony, Laura Cervantes stated that the land was
lent by Andres Guerrero to Cristina Guerrero; that Manuel Guerrero loaned money
to Cristina Guerrero for quite some time; that shortly after the death of
Cristina Guerrero, Manuel Guerrero went to their house, accompanied by Felicisimo Guerrero, and summed up the loans he had
extended to Cristina Guerrero in the total amount of P1,900.00; and that Felicisimo Guerrero asked Laura Cervantes to sign a piece
of paper to attest to the fact that a certain amount of money had been borrowed
from Manuel Guerrero.
On October 24, 1973,
the defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to
disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule
130, of the New Rules of Court. The motion
was opposed by the plaintiffs. On November 16, 1973, the trial court
granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as
other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify in the case.
On February 12, 1974,
plaintiffs filed a “Motion For The Honorable Presiding
Judge Of This Honorable Court To Inhibit Himself And/Or To Transfer Case To
Another Branch.” Oppositions to the said motion were filed. On April
26, 1974, the trial court denied the motion.
At the continuation of the trial on June 14, 1974, plaintiffs and their counsel failed to
appear despite due notice and repeated previous warnings to their lawyer. Instead of appearing in court, plaintiffs,
thru counsel, filed an urgent motion to reset the hearing, which was opposed by
the defendants. On even date, the, court
issued an order as follows:
“In view of the non-appearance of the plaintiffs as well as
their counsel for today’s hearing, they are deemed to have waived their right
to further present or formally offer their evidence in court, and on motion of
defendants’ counsels, the Clerk of Court, Atty. Juan A. Carambas,
is hereby authorized and commissioned to receive the evidence for the
defendants. After the defendants have
closed their case, they are given 10 days within which to file their respective
memoranda and the case is deemed submitted for decision after receipt of the
complete transcript of stenographic notes.” (Record on
Appeal, p. 212.)
On June 22, 1974, plaintiffs filed a “Manifestation” to
the effect that they did not waive their rights to present further evidence,
to cross-examine defendants witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence; and
that they were reserving the exercise of those rights upon the finality of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Presiding Judge of the trial court,
which they were then preparing to file.
Indeed, on June 25, 1974,
plaintiffs instituted the said special civil action, which was docketed in the
Court of Appeals as its CA-G.R. No. SF-03120. The action sought the disqualification of the
trial judge from continuing with the hearing of the case. On June
27, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the petition outright. Copy of the resolution was received by the
plaintiffs on July 2, 1974. They filed a motion for reconsideration on July 17, 1974.
On the same date, July
17, 1974, the trial court rendered its decision with the following dispositive part:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants (and) against the plaintiffs:
1.
Dismissing the complaint and Amended Complaint;
2.
Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the private
defendant Guerreros the amount of P20,000.00 for
actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees;
3.
Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant St.
Clare’s Realty Co. Ltd., the amount of P1,923,000.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
4.
Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant
United Housing Corporation the amount of P90,500.00 as actual damages;
P100,000.00 for loss of goodwill and business reputation, P80,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as lawyer’s fees; and
5.
To pay the cost of suit.
The Register of Deeds of Rizal is hereby
directed to cancel the Lis Pendens
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 340842 in the name of the St. Clare’s
Realty Co., Ltd., Book T-1971.
Meanwhile, the defendant United Housing Corporation is ordered to
proceed and continue with its commitments under the Memorandum Agreement dated
October 12, 1971.” (Record on Appeal, pp. 259-261.)
On July 20, 1974, or three (3) days before plaintiffs received
the decision, they filed with the trial court a “Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela” praying
that should the Court of Appeals render an adverse resolution in CA-G.R. No.
SF-03120, the lower court should set aside its order of June 14, 1974 and allow plaintiffs to present
other evidence, cross-examine witnesses of the defendants, and present rebuttal
evidence.
On August 21, 1974,
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which they
received on July 23, 1974.
Early in 1975, Judge Arsenio Alcantara who rendered the decision was replaced by Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome. In her order of February 13, 1975, Judge Castro-Bartolome
resolved that:
“1) The
plaintiffs’ ‘Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela‘
dated July 18, 1974, having been passed upon by Judge Arsenio
B. Alcantara by the rendition of the Decision dated
July 17, 1974, is deemed to have been clearly denied by the Honorable Judge who
penned the said decision;
2) The plaintiffs
‘Motion for Reconsideration’ dated August
21, 1974 and ‘Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration’ dated August 22, 1974, have
to be as they are hereby, denied;
x x x x x x x x x
5) The plaintiffs’
Motion for Reconsideration’ and ‘Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration’ are
not pro-forma and have suspended the running of the period of appeal.”
On February 21, 1975,
plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the Court of Appeals where the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57597-R. On April 20, 1981, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision as follows:
“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with modification in regard to damages as
follows: (a) for the defendants Guerreros, P50,000.00 moral
damages, and P10,000.00 exemplary damages; (b) for the defendant St. Clare’s
Realty Co., Ltd., P10,000.00 exemplary damages; (c) for the defendant United
Housing Corporation, P40,000.00 for loss of goodwill and business reputation
and P10,000.00 exemplary damages. The
actual damages and attorney’s fees ‘are hereby maintained.”
On May 27, 1981,
the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition for review by certiorari.
In their instant petition for review, petitioners have raised
substantive and procedural points on which the lower tribunals have allegedly
erred. The substantive issues refer to
the lack of basis for the grant of actual, moral and exemplary damages in the
huge amount of over two million pesos; and the error of ruling that the action
was barred by prescription and laches. Petitioners underscore the procedural errors
they attribute to the lower courts which resulted in the deprivation of their
full opportunity to ventilate their case and prove the validity of their
claim. They assail the ruling that their
witnesses Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes” and others similarly
situated” are disqualified to testify; and that they waived the right to
present their evidence when they failed to appear at a hearing set by the trial
judge during the pendency of proceedings taken by the
petitioners to disqualify him due to alleged hostility manifested by the latter
towards the petitioners.
At this instance, We consider it
unnecessary to discuss the substantive merits of the petitioners’ cause of
action. The record reveals that they
have not yet completed the presentation of their evidence. Whatever evidence they had previously presented
were apparently not considered in the rendition of the questioned decisions for
not having been “formally offered.”
It does not strike Us as fair and just that the
petitioners would be made answerable for damages in such a huge amount for
having filed an allegedly baseless and unfounded action without affording them
the full opportunity of establishing the merit of their claim. On the face of the record, We
are convinced that they had been denied that chance due to some mistaken and
capricious application of pertinent procedural rules.
The first question of importance that engages the attention of
this Court is whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes
were correctly disqualified from testifying in the case and their testimonies
excluded on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, which
provides as follows:
“Section 20. Disqualification
by reason of interest or relationship. – The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person
of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such
became of unsound mind.”
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded
that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
were made in error. The plain truth is
that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case,
and neither are they assignors of the parties nor
“persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.” They are mere
witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was
not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the
time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not
really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.
“Following this rule of construction, it may be said that incompetency to testify established in the provision above
quoted, affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no others, that is, only
parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are
neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the
prohibition.” (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., Vol. 5, p. 166.)
By excluding the testimonies of the two
witnesses and by barring them from further testifying, upon reasoning that
unduly strained the meaning of the provisions of the Rules of Court relied
upon, the trial court deprived itself of the opportunity of knowing the truth
in this case.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the
estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero.
The defendants Guerreros are not the executors
or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership
in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel
Guerrero. Hence, the
inapplicability of the dead man’s rule.
“It has been held that statutes providing that a party in
interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane,
must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective
of their spirit. The law uses the word
‘against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person.’ It should be noted ‘that after the mention of an executor or
administrator the words or other representative follows, which means that the
word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the executor or
administrator, are sued n their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using
the words ‘against the estate of such deceased persons’, which convey the idea
of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought
and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and
defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal
rights of such representative.” (Moran, ibid., pp. 169-171.)
The next question that requires attention is whether or not the
exclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further
proof was correctly sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. Prior to the issuance of the court’s order of
June 14, 1974, by which the plaintiffs were “deemed to have waived their
right to further present or formally offer their evidence”, the following
had testified as witnesses of the plaintiffs, namely: Alfredo Zamora, Roman Mataverde,
Moises Javillonar, Dominador Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong, Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes and Jose
Cervantes. It was error to hold that the
testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such
offer, such evidence was waived. The
offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling
the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon
appropriate questions. (Moran, Comments on the Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 ed.,
p. 122.)
Notwithstanding rigid cross-examination conducted by the lawyers
of the defendants, the witnesses discovered the following facts: In the 1930’s Andres Guerrero physically
possessed the disputed lot, paid the real estate taxes for it, had the same
cultivated through a tenant, defrayed the cultivation expenses, and exclusively
enjoyed the owner’s share in the harvests.
Andres Guerrero loaned the lot to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, before
he died. Cristina Guerrero became ill
prior to the year 1948. She could walk
only inside her house in Parañaque, Rizal. The money
spent for her illness was borrowed from Manuel Guerrero. After the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel
Guerrero and Felicisimo Guerrero came to her house
and the money loaned to her was totalled in the
amount of P1,900.00.
On December 10, 1957,
the questioned lot was cadastrally surveyed and
denominated as Lot 4752 of the Parañaque
Cadastre. Andres Guerrero was the lone
claimant. Until 1962, no other person
claimed the lot.
The foregoing proofs bear materially on the questions raised by
the plaintiffs as to whether or not: (1)
Cristina Guerrero or Andres Guerrero owned the lot when the former purportedly
sold it to Manuel Guerrero in 1948; (2) Cristina Guerrero really sold or merely
mortgaged the land to Manuel Guerrero; (3) Manuel Guerrero and, after him, the
defendants Guerreros were buyers in good faith. Instead of insulating itself from evidence
that could lead it to the truth, the trial court should have addressed itself
to the questions why: (1) if it is true
that Cristina Guerrero was the owner of the disputed lot in 1948, the cadastral
surveyors who actually repaired to the field listed Andres Guerrero as the sole
claimant of the property; (2) until 1962, no other person except Andres Guerrero
claimed the lot as his own; (3) notwithstanding the purported deed of sale by
Cristina Guerrero to Manuel Guerrero was executed on April 24, 1948, it was
presented for registration with the Register of Deeds almost ten (10) years
later only on February 27, 1958 (TSN, p. 15, January 9, 1974); (4) in the deed
of sale to Manuel Guerrero, it is stated that he appeared in Parañaque, Rizal, before Atty.
Jose D. Villena who was a notary public in Makati, Rizal; (5) the area of
the land bought by Manuel Guerrero was 33,090 square meters whereas the area of
the land sold by him to the defendants Guerreros was
42,299 square meters. The court also ought
rather to have noticed the fact that, in the deed of sale in favor of Manuel
Guerrero, it is stated that the subject parcel of land “is surrounded by
mud-dikes besides the stone monuments that visibly marked all its
boundaries”, which clearly indicate a previous survey and which may in
turn lead to the question if the deed of sale to Manuel Guerrero “might
have been made after the cadastral survey in 1957 and not in 1948.
The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of the
defendants’ evidence and without regard to the proofs that the plaintiffs had
presented on July 17, 1974
before the Court of Appeals could finally resolve plaintiffs’ petition to
disqualify the trial judge. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the decision
sentences the plaintiffs to pay damages and attorney’s fees, apart from the
costs of suit, in the staggering amount of Two Million One Hundred Eighty Three
Thousand and Five Hundred (P2,183,500.00) Pesos,
without plaintiffs having been given the chance to complete their evidence, to
cross-examine the witnesses of the defense, and to present rebuttal
evidence. The way the trial court and
the Court of Appeals proceeded in this case,
litigation became more a game of technicalities than a proceeding to search the
truth and mete justice. No other fairer
course of action is demanded but for this Court to remand the case for further
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby set aside. Let the records of
the case be remanded to the court of origin with instruction to the trial court
to allow the plaintiffs to complete their evidence, to cross-examine the
defendants’ witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence if they so desire, and
thereafter to decide the case anew.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova, and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), no part.