G.R. No. 57844. September 30, 1987
STELLA ZABLAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AND SPOUSES AUGUSTO & REMEDIOS LEONARDO, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The very crux of the instant petition for review is the determination of whether or not the period of the verbal lease agreement between the petitioner and the private
respondents has expired within the meaning of Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 25. In line with our pronouncements in Baens vs. Court of Appeals[1]
and in Rivera vs. Florendo,[2]
we rule in the affirmative.
The private respondents-spouses are owners of a five- door
residential apartment bearing numbers 317-A to 317-E, inclusive, located at Mayon Street, Quezon
City. Since
1969 and up to the present, the petitioner has been leasing apartment unit
317-B on a month-to-month basis
at the rate of P200.00 a month.
On February 19, 1979, the private respondents wrote the
petitioner asking her to vacate, on or before May 31, 1979, the premises
occupied by her for the reason that their son would be getting married and
would need the said premises for his family’s residential use.
The petitioner replied in a letter dated April 2, 1979 stating that she was not in a
position to vacate the subject apartment unit for lack of some other place to
transfer to.
Subsequently, the private respondents’ son did get married so
that on May 22, 1979, the
private respondents again demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the subject apartment unit on or before May 31,
1979. The continued refusal of the petitioner to
comply with the demand compelled the private respondents to
institute an action for unlawful detainer against her
in the City Court of Quezon City on June 18,
1979. The said court decided
against the plaintiffs-lessors, private respondents
herein. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the complaint is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
As to the defendants’ counterclaim, the bad faith of plaintiffs
proven by evidence under the above premises, judgment is hereby rendered in the
counterclaim in favor of the defendant and against plaintiffs who are hereby
ordered to pay the defendant the amount of P3,000.00 as moral damages; the
amount of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost.[3]
xxx xxx xxx
Whereupon, the petitioner
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City), which, in a decision dated April 27, 1981,
reversed the decision of the city court.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the
Court of First Instance states:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, and finding that
Plaintiffs have adduced competent evidence in support of their complaint by a
clear preponderance, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and
judgment is accordingly rendered in favor
of plaintiffs and against defendant, as follows:
(a) Defendant and all persons claiming under her
are ordered to vacate that apartment unit designated as 317-B Mayon Street, Quezon City
forthwith, and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs and/or the proposed
occupant thereof in the person of Jose Basilio
Leonardo conformably with the recitals of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 25;
(b) Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P200.00 a month as may have accrued or shall hereafter accrue as and by way of reasonable
compensation for continued occupancy of the subject premises, until she shall
have vacated the same;
(c) Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P1,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of suit.[4]
xxx xxx xxx
The defendant-lessee then
filed a Petition for Review in the respondent Court
of Appeals and in a decision dated July 21, 1981 that court affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance.[5] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The private respondents
anchor their right to eject the
petitioner on Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 which states:
SEC. 5. Grounds for
Judicial Ejectment. – Ejectment
shall be allowed on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for the
use of any immediate member of
his family as a residential
unit, such owner or immediate member not being the owner of any other available
residential unit: Provided, however,
That the period of lease has expired:
Provided, further, That the lessor has given
the lessee notice three months in advance of the lessor’s
intention to repossess the property; and Provided, finally, That the owner/lessor or immediate member stays in the residential unit
for at least one year, except for justifiable cause.
xxx xxx xxx
The sole issue in this
case is whether or not the abovequoted proviso: “Provided, however, That the period of
lease has expired,” applies to a verbal contract of
lease on a month-to-month basis. The respondent Court of Appeals, affirmed the
ruling of the Court of First Instance.
It held that pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code, a contract of
lease on a month-to-month basis is terminable at the end of any month. Applying this to the instant case, therefore,
the verbal contract between the petitioner and the private respondents had
expired upon the lapse of the three-month notice to vacate the subject
premises. We agree.
Article 1687, under which
the lease period in the case at bar finds its basis, reads:
ART. 1687. If the period for
the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the
rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily. However, even though a monthly
rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the
lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may
likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for
over six months. In case of daily rent, the
courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place
for over one month.
The petitioner, on the
other hand, argues that the said contract could not have expired for the reason
that Section 6 of Batas Pambnsa Blg.
25 has suspended the provisions of Article 1673, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code
and as a direct consequence thereof, Art. 1687 is likewise suspended.
Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 states:
Sec. 6. Application of the Civil Code and the Rules
of Court of the Philippines. – Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of
paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as
they refer to residential units covered by this Act shall be suspended during
the effectivity of this Act, but other provisions of
the Civil Code and the Rules of Court on lease contracts, insofar as they are
not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shall apply.
while Article 1673, par. 1 provides, as follows:
ART. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the
following causes:
(1) When the period agreed
upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases
under articles 1682 and 1687, has expired.
We have already settled this matter in Rivera vs. Florendo,[6]
where we ruled that:
xxx xxx xxx
What is suspended under the aforequoted
provision of law (Sec. 6, BP Blg. 25) is Article 1673
of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and not Article 1687 of the same Code.
The effect of said suspension is that independently of the grounds for ejectment enumerated in
Batas Pambansa Blg.
25, the owner/lessor cannot eject the tenant by reason of the expiration of the period of
lease as fixed or determined under Article
1687. It does not mean that the provisions of Article 1687 itself had been suspended. Thus, the determination of the period of a lease
agreement can still be made in accordance with
said Article 1687.
xxx xxx xxx
As in Rivera, admittedly
no definite period for the lease was agreed upon between the petitioner and the
private respondents.
However, as the rent was paid monthly, so the period of lease
is considered to be from month to month in accordance with Article 1687. Thus when the private respondents gave the
petitioner notice to vacate the premises on or before May 31,
1979, the contract
of lease was deemed to have expired as of the end of the said month. As
we have ruled in Baens vs.
Court of Appeals,[7]
“even if the month to month
arrangement is on a verbal basis, if it is shown that the lessor
needs the property for his own use or for the use of an immediate member of the
family or for any of the other statutory grounds to eject under Section 5 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25,
which happens to be applicable, then the lease is considered terminated as of
the end of the month, after proper notice or demand to vacate has been
given. [See Crisostomo
v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 199).”
Therefore, the private
respondents are correct in asserting their right under Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. If we were to accept the construction given
by the petitioner, then the above law would be rendered illusory in cases where
the lease agreement is verbal and for an indefinite period. In such a case, the owner/lessor,
notwithstanding his pressing need for the premises, could never successfully
eject the tenant because the period of lease would never expire during the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25.[8]
In view of subsequent cases[9]
with facts more analogous to the
instant case, there no longer appears to be any need nor reason to rely solely
on our ruling in Rantael v. Court of Appeals,[10] which the petitioner argued very extensively in
her brief as inapplicable.
With respect to the other
assignments of error discussed by the petitioner in her brief, we find
them to be untenable. Thus, the
petitioner’s allegation that the private respondents have not complied with the
other requirements necessary for judicial ejectment
under Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 involves questions of fact which cannot be raised,
much less reviewed, in the instant petition.
The findings of the respondent Court of Appeals on this matter are
therefore final and conclusive.
The question of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
petitioner’s failure to file a notice
of appeal was fatal to her cause is deemed irrelevant considering that the respondent Court
of Appeals rendered its decision on the basis of the evidence on
record and not solely on technical rules of procedure.
The instant case, which
is summary in nature, had dragged on for over eight years. To obviate further delay, the decision
rendered herein is immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and
Padilla, JJ., concur.
[1]
No. L-57091, November 23, 1983;
125 SCRA 634 (1983).
[2]
No. L-60066, July 31, 1986;
143 SCRA 278.
[3]
Civil Case No. 35586, City Court of Quezon
City, Branch VIII; Rollo,
71.
[4]
Penned by Judge Ricardo P. Tensuan, CFI of Rizal, Branch IV-Quezon City;
Decision, 5; Rollo, 75.
[5]
Penned by J. Villaluz, with the concurrence of J. De
la Fuente & J. Coquia,
Fifth Division; Decision, 5; Rollo, 33.
[6]
Supra.
[7]
Supra.
[8]
Rivera vs. Florendo, supra.
[9]
Baens vs. Court of Appeals, supra;
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-60210, March
27, 1984, 128 SCRA 428;
Rivera vs. Florendo, supra; Velez vs. Avelino,
No. L-48448, February 20, 1984; 127 SCRA 602; Dionio
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-63698, January
12, 1987, 147 SCRA
243.
[10]
Rantael vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-47519, April 30,
1980; 97 SCRA 453.