G.R. No. 57735. March 19, 1982
LUIS ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) AND DESIGNS LIGNA INCORPORATED, RESPONDENTS.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Solicitor General, sets aside the questioned decision of May 14, 1981 of
respondent commission which dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the basis of a
mere technicality (of petitioner’s failure to furnish respondent-employer with a
copy of his memorandum of appeal), and reinstates its earlier decision of March
10, 1981 for reinstatement of petitioner-employee to his position with
respondent-employer.
Respondent commission’s original decision of March 10, 1981 reversed the
labor arbiter’s decision of March 6, 1980 which granted respondent-employer’s
application for clearance to dismiss petitioner from his employment of about
seven (7) years tenure as a “finisher” of furniture (for alleged “chronic
tardiness”), solely on the basis of petitioner’s alleged “wanton apathy and
indifference to his cause” notwithstanding said labor arbiter’s own finding that
the employer’s evidence “is weak and the facts of the case do not justify
dismissal.” Respondent commission ordered respondent-employer “to reinstate
oppositor to his former or substantially equivalent position without backwages
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision,” ruling as follows:
“The appeal is grounded on 1) grave abuse of discretion and 2) the decision
is not supported by law and evidence. In arguing his case, oppositor alleges
that the Labor Arbiter below erred in granting the clearance to terminate his
services solely on alleged indifference and wanton apathy attendant in the
prosecution of his case. Oppositor maintains that his failure to attend the
hearings was due to the negligence of the counsel provided by the Union; that in
several occasions he waited for a long time to talk to his counsel but to no
avail; that he was not informed of the scheduled hearings; and that it is unfair
to grant the clearance to terminate oppositor’s services because of the failure
of the counsel to attend the hearings.“We have gone carefully over the records of this case and we rule for the
reversal of the decision appealed from.“We quote hereunder the uncontroverted findings of the Labor Arbiter below,
and consider the same as our own:‘We find Luis Estrada’s tardiness not a sufficient cause for dismissal. He
was only late or tardy for six (6) times on May 5 and 15, 1979; on June 5, 26,
27 and June 30, 1979. Certainly such tardiness is not chronic and on the
hypothesis that it is chronic, the same does not merit the supreme penalty of
dismissal considering that Estrada has been in the service for 7 years.’
Indeed we rule that the penalty of dismissal for the tardiness committed is
too harsh. We find suspension a more appropriate penalty considering the facts
attendant to this case and we vote for reinstatement without backwages, the
period by which oppositor is out of service be considered as penalty of
suspension for his tardiness.
“WHEREFORE, decision appealed from is hereby Reversed and the application
for clearance Denied.”
On respondent-employer’s motion for reconsideration, however, respondent
commission rendered another decision under date of May 14, 1981 (setting aside
its original decision of March 10, 1981 for petitioner’s reinstatement) and
without discussing the merits of the case, it sustained the sole ground of
procedural technicality raised of the employer’s not having been furnished with
copy of petitioner’s memorandum of appeal (contrary to the requirements of
Article 223 of the New Labor Code and section 9, Rule XIII of its implementing
Rules and Regulations) and dismissed petitioner’s appeal “for failure to meet
the requirement of a perfected appeal” – notwithstanding the commission’s own
finding of the lack of sufficient cause to justify petitioner’s dismissal from
employment in its original decision of March 10, 1981.
We find the Solicitor General’s stand in their comment to be well-taken and
in accordance with the constitutional injunction to afford protection to labor
and the workers’ right of security of tenure,[1]as follows:
“Considering that there is no basis for the dismissal of petitioner, it would
be inconsistent with the requirement of social justice to terminate his
employment on mere grounds of technicality.x x x
Neither can private respondent validly complain that it has been denied its
right to due process by having been allegedly deprived of the opportunity to
answer petitioner’s appeal on account of the latter’s failure to furnish the
former with a copy of his memorandum of appeal. Since the entire record of the
case on appeal is open for review by the NLRC, the absence of an answer or
opposition to the appeal would not really have a significant bearing on the
adjudication of the case, as would otherwise perhaps constitute a denial of
private respondent’s right to due process. Besides, private respondent had
already the opportunity to answer petitioner’s appeal when he filed a motion
for reconsideration of the earlier decision of the NLRC. Significantly,
however, said respondent never touched on the merits of the case in his
aforementioned motion for reconsideration. Instead, it relied solely on
technicality to oppose petitioner’s appeal which thereby reasonably creates the
impression that its case is weak as in fact it is.”[2]
As stated by the Chief Justice for the Court in Meracap vs. International
Ceramics Mfg. Co., Inc., “for the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be
too strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary
Justice, that where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment rather
than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded their due
weight. Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann, should be
not only secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.”[3]
In Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc.,[4] the Court through Mr. Justice
Makasiar stressed the dominance and superiority of constitutional rights over
statutes and subordinate implementing rules and regulations, thus: ”(D)oes the
mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat
the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does
the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail
over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is
not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations,
but also does violence to natural reason and logic.”
Respondent commission’s original decision of March 10, 1981, which is hereby
reinstated as the correct decision, ordered the reinstatement within ten (10)
days of petitioner to his former position without backwages, with the said
period (of almost two years from June 11, 1979 to March 10, 1981) when he was
out of employment considered as penalty for his tardiness.” Even this penalty of
suspension may be considered as quite harsh, amounting to several months pay
lost per day that petitioner was tardy. Petitioner, at the very least, should
therefore be entitled to backwages from the date of promulgation of said
decision on March 10, 1981 until his actual reinstatement.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent commission’s decision of May 14,
1981 is hereby set aside and its earlier decision of March 10, 1981 is hereby
reinstated and affirmed, with the clarification that respondent-employer is
ordered to reinstate petitioner to his former or substantially equivalent
position without loss of seniority and other privileges within ten (10) days
from notice hereof and to pay petitioner backwages from March 10, 1981 until his
actual reinstatement. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero,
Melencio-Herrera, and Plana, JJ.,concur.
[*] Composed of Commissioners Ricardo C.
Castro, presiding, and Cecilio T. Seno and Federico O. Borromeo.
[1] Article III, section 9, 1973
Constitution.
[2] Comment dated November 19, 1981
filed by Asst. Solicitors General Reynato S. Puno and Ramon A. Barcelona and
Solicitor Franklin S. Farolan.
[3] 92 SCRA 412, 417 (1979).
[4] 51 SCRA 189 (1973).