EUSEBIO BERNABE AND TERESITA P. BERNABE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XXXII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND JESUS GACUYA, RESPONDENTS.

Before Us is a Petition for
Certiorari assailing the order of the respondent Court dismissing the
complaint of the petitioners for “Recovery of Possession” on the ground that
this is an ejectment case within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.

In their complaint, plaintiffs (petitioners herein) allege that
they are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 199.4 square meters more
or less, located in Tondo, Manila; that defendant
(private respondent herein) constructed a house on said lot without plaintiffs’
permission; that on November 14, 1980, plaintiffs thru counsel made a written
demand for the removal of said house as well as for the recovery of damages for
the reasonable use and occupation thereof; and that defendant refused and failed
to comply despite repeated demands.

Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, respondent court issued the
following ruling:

“It is clear on the face of the complaint that at the time of the
filing of this case on February 19,
1981, the defendant was in possession, as tenant, of the
premises.  When plaintiffs’ counsel, therefore, sent a written
notice on November 4, 1980
requiring defendant to vacate the premises when this action was brought, the one
(1) year period after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession has
not yet set in.  It is clear that this is an ejectment case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City
Court of Manila.

“ACCORDINGLY, the complaint is hereby dismissed.

“SO ORDERED.”

Plaintiffs moved for a reconsideration contending that there
has never been any lessor-lessee relationship between
plaintiffs and defendant, that while defendant “has been a lessee of the
premises of the owner, Fejosera Investment, Inc. but
when the subject lot was sold to plaintiff Eusebio
Bernabe on December 7, 1973, the lessor-lessee relationship between them has automatically
been extinguished; and therefore from December 7, 1973, the occupancy of the
defendant of the lot by his house standing thereon had become illegal, and that
plaintiffs’ present action is for accion
publiciana, because the withholding of the lot in question by the
defendant had been without their permission and consent.”

Respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration, hence the
present petition on the following grounds:

I.    
The respondent court has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, with respect to the issue of lessor-lessee relationship.

II.   
The respondent court has decided this case in a way probably not in
accord with law.

Petitioners raise the issue of lessor-lessee relationship to determine whether the Court of
First Instance (now known as the Regional Trial Court) or the City Court of
Manila (now known as the Metropolitan Trial Court) has exclusive jurisdiction
over this case.  If there had been such a relationship, still the
issue boils down as to how long the private respondent had been unlawfully
withholding from petitioners the possession of the lot in question.

Respondent Court ruled that the unlawful withholding should
commence from the time the demand letter of November 14, 1980 was received by
private respondent and not from the time the petitioners bought the lot on
December 7, 1973, and that when the action was brought on February 19,
1981, the one-year period had not yet lapsed, therefore the City Court of Manila
had exclusive jurisdiction.

Petitioners argue that the unlawful withholding was for seven
years or for more than one year because when the property was sold the lease
contract between the former owners, Fejosera
Investment Incorporated and defendant was automatically extinguished, as the
right of the seller to lease the property has ceased to exist. 
Petitioners maintain that it is their prerogative as the new owners
whether or not to lease the property to the private respondent. 
Their inaction cannot be considered as their tacit approval or consent
for the private respondent to prolong his stay in the premises and even if it
can be so considered the non-payment of rentals has been for more
than a year.

We have noted that while petitioners allege in their complaint
that they are the owners of the lot on which the house of the private respondent
is constructed, their attached TCT shows that the lot is still in the name of
Fejosera Investment Incorporated. 
Private respondent and said company entered into a contract of lease in
1950 for the use and occupation of said lot.  Petitioners allegedly
bought the lot in question in 1973, and they must have been fully aware of the
occupancy of the private respondent of the premises in question. 
Yet, they did not take any action to remove the house of the private
respondent or to inform the respondent that they had become the new owners of
the lot in question.  It is clear therefore that the lease was
allowed to continue.

Parenthetically, petitioners are in error when they say that
because they are the buyers of the lot involved herein, they ipso facto have the right to terminate an
existing lease.  They can do so but only if the lease itself is not
recorded, and they, as buyers, are not aware of the lease’s existence and
duration, thus Art. 1676 of the Civil Code says:

“The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not
recorded in the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save
when there is a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of sale, or
when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.

“If the buyer makes use of this right, the lessee may demand that he
be allowed to gather the fruits of the harvest which corresponds to the current
agricultural year and that the vendor indemnify him for
damages suffered.

“If the sale is fictitious, for the purpose of extinguishing the
lease, the supposed vendee cannot make use of the right granted in the first
paragraph of this article.  The sale is presumed to be fictitious
if at the time the supposed vendee demands the termination of the lease, the
sale is not recorded in the Registry of Property. 
(1571a)”

In the present case, the lease is not recorded, and although
petitioner knew of its existence, there was no fixed period for its duration —
hence the lease was generally terminable at the will of
the buyers – petitioners.  But of course they had to make a demand
for its termination.  This demand, they actually made.^[1]

Consequently, the possession of private respondent
over the lot in question became illegal only on November 14, 1980, when the formal demand to pay and
vacate the premises was sent to him.  The case is clearly one of
illegal detainer which must be filed within one year
from the date of the last demand.  When the complaint against
private respondent was filed on February 19, 1981, the one year period had not yet
lapsed.  Such being the case the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case and the proper action should have been one of
Unlawful Detainer which necessarily falls within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

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^[1] Subject to Art. 1687 of the Civil
Code with respect to yearly, monthly or weekly payment of
merits.