G.R. No. 57483. February 20, 1984
ZOSIMO J. PAREDES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL CHAIRMAN OF THE KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN (KBL) FOR THE PROVINCE OF IFUGAO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSE G…
FERNANDO, C.J.:
concerning any “decision, order, or ruling of the Commission [on
Elections]” turns out to be an insuperable obstacle to the granting of
this petition.
The statement of the case as set forth in the decision sought to be
reviewed follows: “This petition seeks the disqualification of
respondents Jose Guyguyon, Ricardo Sakai, Pascual Bulayungan, Dominga
Bilibli and Paulina Bulahao as candidates for the positions of Mayor,
Vice-Mayor and Members of Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, in the
Municipality of Kiangan, Province of Ifugao, in the January 30, 1980
local election on the ground of turncoatism. The respondents were
official candidates of the Nacionalista Party (NP) in the aforesaid
election. On January 25, 1980, the petitioner filed the instant
petition. But before the resolution thereof by this Commission, the
local election was held on January 30, 1980 and the respondents garnered
the majority of the votes cast for the positions for which they
respectively ran. Subsequently, the respondents were proclaimed by the
Kiangan Board of Canvassers, ‘without prejudice, however, to the hearing
and ruling hereafter* * * involving the question of respondents’
disqualification,’ pursuant to Item No. 9309 of the Minutes of the
Session of the Commission held on February 26, 1980. On February 16,
1981, the parties submitted the case for resolution upon filing of their
respective memoranda. During the hearing on said date, the counsel for
respondents informed this Commission about the recent death of
respondent Bulahao.”[1]
Then came the finding of facts: “Considering, appreciating and
evaluating the pleadings filed by parties, the evidence and memoranda
submitted by them and their submissions, We find the following facts
duly established: On November 26, 1979, an organizational meeting of
the KBL precinct and barangay committees was held in Kiangan, Ifugao.
Respondent Guyguyon, who at that time was an Adult Education Supervisor
under the Ministry of Education and Culture, upon invitation of Jose
Bait, Bureau of Agricultural Extension Provincial Officer, attended said
meeting. On the precinct level, he was elected Chairman of Precinct
No. 27, and on the barangay level, he was elected Barangay Committeeman.
He was not then aware that the meeting was a KBL organizational
meeting and he was then of the impression that said meeting was only for
the purpose of organizing committees that will conduct an information
drive in connection with a referendum that may be held in the future.
The next day, upon learning that the meeting was a KBL organizational
meeting, he immediately wrote a letter (Exhibit 1) to Barangay Chairman
Eduardo Sakai, declining his nomination as KBL Chairman of Precinct No.
27, in view of his being in the government service as Adult Education
Supervisor under the Ministry of Education and Culture. The latter
acknowledged receipt of said letter and expressed his regret for
respondent Guyguyon’s not joining the KBL party (Exhibit 2). Prior to
the meeting on November 26, 1979, he was not a member of any political
party. On an unspecified date, respondent Bulayungan, upon invitation
of Glory Dait, wife of the above-named Jose Dait, attended a meeting for
the purpose of electing a Chairman of Precinct No. 17 for some future
purpose that would effectuate the parliamentary system down to the grass
roots level. Those who attended that meeting were not required to make
known their political party affiliations. Respondent Bulayungan was
elected Chairman of Precinct No. 17 during said meeting. Like
respondent Guyguyon, he also attended the KBL organizational meeting on
November 26, 1979 and was elected Barangay Committeeman. On November
27, 1979, an organizational meeting of the KBL municipal committee of
Kiangan was held. Respondents Sakai, Bilibli and Bulahao, in their
capacity as Sangguniang Bayan Members, attended said meeting, in
compliance with a written notice from then Mayor Julian Dulawan
requiring all Sangguniang Bayan Members to attend. They were not
informed about the nature of said meeting. Upon request of Mayor
Dulawan, respondent Sakai presided over the meeting. He inquired from
the Mayor what the meeting was about and the latter replied that it was
for a movement of the KBL to inform the people of a possible election or
referendum that may be held in the near future.”[2]
This finding in the decision under review was considered by respondent
Commission decisive: “In all the aforementioned meetings, the
respondents did not take an oath of affiliation as members of the KBL.
They have been long standing NP members prior to said meetings, except
respondent Guyguyon who was not then a member of any political party.”[3]
The petition as well as the Reply stressed strongly what it termed the
arbitrary character of the decision under review. From a study of the
record as well as of the Comment of Solicitor General, Estelito P.
Mendoza,[4] it cannot be said that such a charge was warranted. The petition must fail.
1. Petitioner in seeking a reversal apparently relied on the
authoritative doctrine of this Court last given expression in Sidro v.
Commission on Elections[5] in
these words: “Thus it was in the first leading case on the matter under
the 1935 Constitution, Sotto v. Commission on Elections. The opinion of
Justice Feria, after setting forth the applicable constitutional
provisions and the Rules of Court, stated: ‘In accordance with the
provision of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, this Court can not,
therefore, review the rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on
Elections.’ A caveat is in order. Such rulings or findings of fact of
the Commission on Elections must be lacking in arbitrariness to be
conclusive on this Court.”[6]2. The above doctrine, of course, is only applicable under facts
that would show arbitrariness. As is quite manifest from a reading of
the Comment of the Solicitor General, the decision certainly was not
tainted by arbitrariness. To that extent, it is free from the infirmity
of lack of due process. As was stressed in such Comment, it was
supported by substantial evidence. Thus: “Private respondents testified
that, although they admittedly attended certain meetings of the KBL,
they did so on the belief that these were intended for the organization
of civic committees that would disseminate information regarding future
plebiscites and elections. There is no reason to think otherwise.
Respondents Guyguyon, et al. did not perform any affirmative act clearly
establishing their affiliation with the KBL as bona fide members.
There is no evidence that they applied for membership or were conferred
such status by the appropriate authority in that political party. When
they attended the meetings in question, they were not required to
establish their credentials. Section 1, article 1 of the Rules of the
KBL provides in part that ‘Membership is conferred by a majority vote of
the Municipal or City Committee or the Central Committee, and is
evidenced by a certificate of affiliation issued by the Secretary
General of the Party.’ There is no evidence that the committees
mentioned conferred membership upon any of the private respondents or
that the latter have been issued certificates of affiliation by the
Secretary General of the KBL.”[7]
The probabilities as set forth in the Comment are against the
contention of petitioner. Thus: “Moreover, it is not likely that civil
service employees like respondent Guyguyon and the others with him would
have attended and participated in the meetings in question if they knew
that these had a political complexion. Indeed, the evidence shows that
immediately upon learning that it was to the position of KBL chairman
of Precinct No. 27 that he was elected, respondent Guyguyon wrote the
barangay captain declining said position on the ground that he was
barred from accepting it, being a civil service employee.”[8]3. Then the Comment proceeded to demonstrate that the Gabatan doctrine,[9]
cited in support of the petition, can readily be distinguished. Thus:
“In that case, both Gabatan and Trinidad attended the convention of the
KBL held on December 20, 1979 at Pagsanjan, Laguna. They were nominated
to run for the positions of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of
Pagsanjan and they accepted the nomination. Gabatan even attested the
minutes of the meeting in his capacity as Chairman of the KBL, Pagsanjan
Chapter. In concluding that Gabatan and Trinidad were members of the
KBL, the Comelec found that the circumstances indicate that they were
completely aware that the KBL meeting or convention was intended to
choose the KBL candidate in the forthcoming election. The present case
differs from the case of Gabatan because here the evidence shows that
private respondents were not aware that the meetings they attended were
KBL organizational meetings. In the Gabatan case, the convention
precisely chose the KBL candidates for the local election whereas, here,
there was no clear political act done by those who attended the Kiangan
meetings. The organization of the barangay and precinct level
committees of the KBL could have, at least in appearance, passed for the
kind of meetings which the private respondents claimed they attended.
Petitioner makes capital of the fact that the names of respondents
Guyguyon and Bulayungan appeared on the list of those elected to serve
in the precinct and barangay committees submitted by the Barangay
Captain to the governing bodies of the KBL. But this list can not be
considered binding on respondents Guyguyon and Bulayungan who do not
appear to have participated in the preparation of the list.”[10]4. Reyes v. Commission on Elections[11]
was cited. The prohibited change of party affiliations by an elective
official during his term of office and by a candidate for such office
within six months immediately preceding or following an election was
characterized in such decision as both innovative and mandatory.[12]
Once the fact of turncoatism – as the practice became popularly known –
had been shown, the disqualification becomes unavoidable. Nothing said
in Reyes, however, or in subsequent cases for that matter, can be so
interpreted as to call for the application of such provision unless
there be clear and satisfactory proof of either the elective officer or
the candidate for an elective public office having committed the
prohibited act. As in ordinary litigation, it is the trier of facts
that is vested with broad discretionary authority in the appraisal of
the evidence offered. In election controversies, where disqualification
is an issue prior to the election, as did happen in this case, although
the actual trial took place after the election, it is the respondent
Commission. As shown in the preceding pages, it held after a careful
study of the evidence of record that there was no cause for
disqualification based on turncoatism. There being then no taint of
arbitrariness in the conclusion arrived at, its finding, being supported
by substantial evidence, is entitled to be accorded full respect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., no part.
[1] Decision, Annex A to Petition, 1.
[2] Ibid, 2. In the meanwhile respondent Paulino Bulahao died.
[3] Ibid, 3.
[4] He was assisted by
Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno, Assistant Solicitor General
Roberto E. Soberano and Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.
[5] G.R. No. 64033, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 759.
[6] Ibid, 762. The
Sotto decision, promulgated in 1946, is reported in 76 Phil. 516 (1946).
Eleven cases under the present Constitution were cited starting from
Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, L-49705-09, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA
251 to Mangca v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 58309-10, February
25, 1982, 112 SCRA 273.
[7] Comment, 7-8.
[8] Ibid, 9.
[9] Gabatan v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 52381, January 26, 1980.
[10] Comment, 9-11.
[11] No. 52699, May 15, 1980, 97 SCRA 500.
[12] Ibid, 504.
According to Article XII, C, Section 10 of the Constitution: “No
elective public officer may change his political affiliation during his
term of office, and no candidate for any elective office may change his
political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or
following an election, unless otherwise provided by law.”