IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS OF EDMUNDO RAMIREZ ATTORNEY ABDON A. ARRIBA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

The writ of habeas corpus was relied upon by a member of the
Philippine Bar, Abdon A. Arriba, as counsel for Edmundo Ramirez, on the ground
that the continued detention of his client, accused of attempted rape but
unable to post his bail bond even after two years and five months had elapsed
since the termination of the trial, was illegal.  On the day after the petition was filed, on
June 11, 1981, this Court issued the writ applied for, required respondent to
make a return on or before Friday July 3, 1981, and set the hearing of the
petition on Tuesday, July 7, 1981 at 11:00 o’clock in the morning.^[1]
The Court likewise dispensed with the
appearance in person of detainee Edmundo Ramirez, who, according to the
petition, was then confined in the provincial jail of Misamis Oriental.^[2] It further required the Solicitor General to
inquire as to “whether under the circumstances, release can be ordered
and, if so, inform the Court.”^[3] In a compliance filed on July 3,
1981, Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza^[4] stated the following:  “1. In its subject resolution, the
Solicitor General is required ‘to inquire as to whether under the
circumstances, release’ of the detainee, Edmundo Ramirez, ‘can be ordered, and,
if so, inform the Court.’ 2. Immediate­ly upon receipt of a copy of said
resolution on June 17, 1981, undersigned counsel dispatched separate tele­grams
to Judge Tago M. Bantuas of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
Branch VII, before whom the criminal case of attempted rape against the subject
detainee is pending, and to the respondent Provincial Warden of Misamis
Oriental for information regarding the status and the facts and circumstances
surrounding the detention in question. 
3. Per information relayed to the undersigned counsel through long distance
telephone by the Provincial Warden on July 1, 1981, detainee Edmundo Ramirez
had been released on June 29, 1981, by virtue of an order issued by Judge Tago
M. Bantuas who, on the same date, allegedly promulgated a decision in the
aforementioned criminal case acquitting Edmundo Ramirez of the charge of
attempted rape and that the foregoing is incorporated in the return which he
allegedly filed with this Honorable Court. 
4. In view of detainee’s release, the instant petition may now be
considered moot and academic.”^[5] A copy of the release order as well as the
decision was thereafter submitted to the Court.

The plea of the Solicitor
General to consider the petition moot and academic is warranted.  The release was ordered.  The writ of habeas corpus had thus served its
purpose as a means for securing the liberty of an individual whose continued
detention finds no support in law.

1.   Chief Justice Marshall correctly
characterized habeas corpus as “a high prerogative writ, known to the
common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause.”^[6]
Correctly then was it described by Justice Malcolm as having been “devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.”^[7]
Not so long ago this Court expressed a similar view:  “The fundamental issue, to repeat, is
the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances
disclosed.  Its latitudinarian scope to
assure that ille­gality of restraint and detention be avoided is one of the
truisms of the law.  It is not known as
the writ of liberty for nothing.  The
writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there
is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom.  Unless there be such a showing, the
confinement must thereby cease.  If there
be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period
provided for by law.  Any deviation from
the legal norms calls for the termination of the imprison­ment.”^[8]

2.   It can be said that the accused obtained
justice ultimately but at too high a cost. 
Had the case been terminated promptly as the law requires, he would have
been set free much sooner.  In the
traditional sense, the right to a speedy trial cannot be invoked after the
termination of the proceedings.  Nor is mandamus
the only appropriate remedy for a decision to be rendered if the statutory
period set forth by law had been exceeded. 
There could be cases where the writ of liberty would, in the language of
Justice Malcolm, “be the most efficacious remedy.” The judgment of
acquittal, long overdue, reinforces such an approach.

WHEREFORE, the writ of habeas corpus is dismissed for
being moot and academic.  Judge Tago M.
Bantuas is required to explain within fifteen (15) days the delay in rendering
the decision of this case.

Teehankee, Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., no part.

Abad Santos, J., on official
leave.

^[1]

^[2]
Ibid.

^[3]
Ibid.

^[4]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor
General Ramon A. Barcelona and Solicitor Franklin S. Farolan.

^[5]
Compliance, 1-2.

^[6]
Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (1830).

^[7]
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil.
778, 788 (1919).

^[8]
Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37
SCRA 420, 423.