NEGROS DISTRICT CONFERENCE, INC., REVEREND LEUMIN ALONSO, AS MODERATOR OF THE CONFERENCE, REVEREND ARTURO JASON, AS MODERATOR OF THE 1972 CONFERENCE AND SPOUSES WINSTON MAYPA AN…

The United Church of Christ in the Philippines has a church
building erected on two unregistered parcels of land with an area of 571
square meters situated at the corner of the provincial road and General Luna
Street near Iglesia Evangelica
in the poblacion of Bayawan,
Negros Oriental.

The executive committee of the Negros
District Conference, Inc. voted on November
20, 1971 to approve the request of the “Bayawan Church”
to exchange the site of its church building for the lot of the Maypa spouses (p. 44, Record on Appeal).

On November 15, 1972,
the Dumaguete District Conference, Inc., through its
moderator, Reverend Arturo Jason, sold the said parcels of land for P6,000 to the spouses Winston F. Maypa and Clarita Derequito.  In the opening statement of the deed the
vendor is designated as the Negros District
Conference of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. which is
apparently an alter ego of the Dumaguete
District Conference, Inc.

Sometime before that sale was consummated, or, on September 25,
1972, the Maypa spouses sold for P3,000 to the Dumaguete District Conference, Inc. (also represented by
Moderator Jason) a parcel of unregistered land with an area of 1,045 square
meters located at Zamora Street in the poblacion of Bayawan.  A new
church building was cons­tructed on that lot. 
The congregation of the United Church of Christ was supposed to transfer
to that new church on July 9, 1979. 
There is an allegation that the transfer was already effected
in September, 1978 (pp. 5 and 11, Record on Appeal).

Reverend Lamberto Vaño, the pastor of the
United Church of Christ in Bayawan, was
opposed to the transfer to the new church. 
In view of his opposition, the executive committee of the Negros District Conference removed him and named a new
pastor in his place.  Vaño
was informed of his removal in a letter
dated June 26, 1978
signed by Moderator Leumin P. Alonso of the Negros District Conference.  He was replaced by Reverend Samuel Raterta in spite of the fact that the judicial commission
of the Negros District Conference restrained the
executive committee from removing Vaño (pp. 18 and
27, Record on Appeal).

Vaño claims that his removal was an act
of harassment and that his term as pastor was in fact extended to 1981 by the
church congregation in Bayawan.

On August 9, 1978,
Vaño and fifteen adherents of the United Church of
Christ in Bayawan (composed of the chairman,
secretary, treasurer, auditor, financial secretary and ten members of the local church council) filed a class suit in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental against the Negros District Conference, Inc. and the Maypa spouses (Civil Case No. 7049).

The objectives of the suit are to annul the said sales and to
restore Vaño to his position as pastor.  The plaintiffs alleged that the two parcels
of land, allegedly valued at P100,000, were sold to
the Maypa spouses for the grossly inadequate price of
P6,000 while the land purchased from the Maypa spouses
had a fair market value of only P20,000. 
Moreover, the sale to the Maypa spouses was
not approved by the congregation of the local church of Bayawan.

The Maypa spouses filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of
action, prescription and estoppel.

The Negros District Conference, Inc., a
religious corporation, also filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action (the plaintiffs allegedly did not
exhaust their remedies within the church) and on the additional ground that the
plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue because
they cannot represent the sect known as the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines.

The trial court in its order of April 27, 1979 dismissed the complaint.  It held that the plaintiffs, not being
parties to the two contracts, could not impugn the same.

Seven of the sixteen plaintiffs filed a motion dated August 29, 1979, withdrawing from the
case because they had ceased to be members of the church.

The heirs of Felix Pioquinto, the
alleged original owner of the 321-square-meter land where the old church
stands, filed a complaint in intervention dated August 23, 1979 wherein they prayed that the sale of the
land to the Maypa spouses be annulled.  They alleged that the said land was donated
in 1917 by Felix Pioquinto to the United Church of
Christ on condition that it would be used solely as the site of a church
building and that the sale of the land to the Maypa
spouses was a violation of that condition.

The lower court did not allow the intervention because the case
had already been decided.  The plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of
Appeals.  It took their lawyer eighty-six days (an original period of sixty days
and three extensions) to submit their 107-page mimeographed record on appeal which has no subject-index.

For the filing of appellants’ brief, appellants’ lawyer was given
an original period of forty-five days and an extension of ninety
days (April 21 to
September 3, 1980).  However, contrary to
the policy and practice of the Court of Appeals,
as embodied in its Banc
resolution of March 21, 1971, 67 O.G. 2578, the
resolution granting the ninety-day
extension did not contain “the warning that upon failure to file
the brief within this period the appeal will either be
dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief” or given due course
without appellee’s brief for failure to file it.

The practice of granting the ninety-day extension with that
warning was intended “to save time, money and effort and to attain greater
efficiency in the operation of the Court” of Appeals.

Yet, in the instant case, no warning was given.  Appellants’ lawyer filed motions dated July 3
and August 29, asking for second and third extensions of fifteen days and thirty
days, respectively.  The Fifth Division
of the Court of Appeals in its resolution of September 30, 1980 granted the
appellants a second extension of thirty days (in addition to the ninety days),
or up to October 2 within which to file their brief.

Although the appellants had been granted already 165 days or five
and a half months within which to file their brief (April 21 to October 3),
they were not able to file it within that period.  Their lawyer asked for another extension of
fifteen days from October 1, then an extension of ten days from October 15 and lastly an extension up to November 3, 1980 within which
to file his brief.

Flabbergasted by the long extension, defendants-appellees filed an urgent motion dated October 21, 1980 and a supplemental motion dated
November 11, 1980 for the dismissal of the appeal.  The Fifth Division in its resolution of November 28, 1980 granted the fifth
extension (without acting on the motions
for third and fourth extensions)
“provided that the brief would
be filed on or before October 25,
1980” (p. 48, CA Rollo).  The Court deferred the action on the motion
to dismiss the appeal which admittedly contained “plausible reasons”.

Appellants asked for a sixth extension or up to November 7 within
which to file their brief.  It was not
acted upon by the Court of Appeals.

They mailed their brief on November 7 and it was received in the Court of Appeals on
November 19.  It contained ten pages.  Two hundred days were required by the
appellants to prepare their ten-page brief.

The Court of Appeals in its resolution of December 18, 1980 denied appellees‘
motion to dismiss the appeal and after considering appellants’ sixth motion for
an extension to file their brief on or before November 7, admitted their brief
and gave appellees forty-five days from notice to
file their brief.

The appellees in their motions of
December 17 and 29, 1980 asked for the suspension of the period within which to
file their brief and again moved for the dismissal of the appeal.  They also filed a motion dated February 23, 1981 for the reconsideration
of the resolution denying their motion to dismiss the appeal.

The Court of Appeals in its resolution of May 13, 1981
denied that motion for reconsideration, gave the Maypa
spouses, as appellees, an extension of ninety days
within which to file their brief but without the warning required in its 1971
resolution, and granted appellee Negros
District Conference, Inc. 45 days within which to file its brief.  The appellees filed
their brief on June 5, 1981.

On July 2, 1981,
the appellees filed in this Court the instant
petition for review (in reality a special civil action of certiorari)
wherein they assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals admitting appellants’
brief and denying their mo­tion to dismiss the appeal.

The issue is whether the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse
of discretion in not dismissing private respondents’ appeal.

The Court of Appeals did not adhere to the rule that
“extension of time for the filing of briefs will not be allowed, except
for good and sufficient cause” (Sec. 15, Rule 46, Rules
of Court).  It was unduly liberal in
granting extensions.  It ignored its 1971 Banc resolution
regarding the ninety-day extension which is reaffirmed in Article VI, paragraph
(D)(1)(b) of the Court of Appeals’ Internal Operating
Procedures ap­proved in the Banc’s Resolution No. 163 dated April
30, 1979.

It allowed appellants’ counsel to trifle with the Court and to
make a mockery of appellate practice. 
The Division clerk of court, who should be
aware of the 1971 resolution regarding the ninety-day extension, should at
least have called the Court’s attention to the necessity of complying with it.

Nevertheless, since appellees‘ brief
had already been filed and the case has been submitted for decision, the ends
of justice would be better served if this case is decided on the merits as soon
as possible.  This Court in its
resolution of October 5, 1981 advised the parties that because the appeal
involves a question of law, it is within this Court’s exclusive appellate
jurisdiction and that, eventually, it would be certified by the Appellate Court to this Court pursuant
to section 31 of the Judiciary Law and section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.  The record has already been elevated to
us.  So, the case should be decided now
by this Court.

The question is whether the trial court erred in dis­missing
appellants’ complaint.  An examination of
the order of dismissal shows that it is a confusing and cockeyed order and that
the trial court was not careful in preparing it.  The trial court said:

“The issues at bar are:

1.    whether or not the deed of sale executed by the defendants Maypas in favor of the Negros
District Conference, Inc. and the deed of sale executed by the Negros District Conference, Inc. in favor of the Maypas (are) valid on its (sic) face;

2.    whether the Negros District Conference, Inc. has the authority to enter
into a contract;

3.    whether the
plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of the transactions entered by the
defendants, and

4.    whether one who is
not a party to the two contracts subject matter of the present complaint for
annulment can assail the contracts.

“As a rule, a contract
cannot be assailed by one who is not a party thereto (Singson vs. Saldajeno, G.R. No. L-27343).

“Going over the grounds of the defendants in their motion
(sic) to dismiss, sustain the view that the answers to the questions asked for are all in the affirmative.

“Wherefore, finding the motion (sic) to dismiss well-founded
and meritorious, and the opposition thereto not justifiable, as plaintiffs have
not even bothered to present the Constitution and By-laws of the United Church
of Christ, on who can enter into a contract and bind the United Church of
Christ, said motions to dismiss are hereby granted and the complaint for annulment
of contract filed by the plaintiffs is hereby
dismissed without costs” (p. 34, Record on Appeal).

The plaintiffs submitted to the court the church’s constitution and by-laws and then moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissal order. 
Their motion was denied in the trial court’s minute order of August 8, 1979.

The dismissal order, with its
incorrect grammar and syntax, gives the impression that it was hurriedly
prepared, that it was not the fruit of conscientious study and that the trial
court simply wanted to terminate the case then and there.

The trial court said that after going over the grounds of the
motions to dismiss, its “answers to the questions asked” or to the
issues which it had stated “are all in the affirmative”.  If that were so, then the trial court
admitted that the plaintiffs suffered damages as a consequence of those sales
and that they could assail the sales even if they are not parties thereto.

To sustain that dismissal order would be to sanction its
contradictory implications.  Moreover,
the trial court overlooked that plaintiffs’ action is not confined to the annulment
of the two sales but includes the restoration of Vaño
to his position as pastor.

Without prejudging the case and considering the rule that in a
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action the defendant hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations of the complaint, we hold that the
plaintiffs’ action is not totally unmeritorious and that it should not have
been dismissed outright.  The trial court
should have deferred the resolution thereof until the trial, a procedure
allowed under section 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

The plaintiffs contend in their complaint that the power to
dispose of the two parcels of land on which the old church of the United Church
of Christ in Bayawan stands belongs to the local
congregation.  Their theory is that the
local church council of Bayawan (whose members are
the plaintiffs in this case), acting as a board of trustees, is empowered by
section 16, Article I of the by-laws of
the United Church of Christ “to undertake all transactions involving the
real properties of the church, such as acquisition, purchase, lease, mortgage, sale,
donations and the like, and present recommendations on the same to the Church
Council.  Final action
on the disposition, conveyance, lease, mortgage, or alienation of
said properties resides in the congregation” (p. 67, Record on
Appeal).

The appellees in their brief have not
invoked any pro­vision of the constitution and by-laws to sustain their contention
that the Negros District Conference, Inc. is vested
with authority to sell the church site to the Maypas.  The deed of sale was signed in behalf of the Dumaguete District Conference, Inc.  It has not been clarified whether the Dumaguete District Conference, Inc. is the same as
the Negros District Conference, Inc.

There is no showing that the said land was owned by the United
Church of Christ and could be alienated by the Negros
District Conference, Inc. or whether it was actually owned by the local church of Bayawan.  The
complaint in intervention of the heirs of Felix Pioquinto
shows that part of the land was ceded to the local church and not to the Negros District Conference, Inc. or to the national church.

The precipitate dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint in an order
that is plainly deficient in cogency and plausibility shows that the plaintiffs
were not accorded their full day in court.

Civil courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a
religious organization except for the protection of civil or property
rights.  Those rights “may be the
subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to de­termine
controverted claims to the title, use, or possession
of church property” (76 C.J.S. 874-5).

“Where a civil right depends upon matters of an ecclesiastical
nature, the civil tribunal tries the civil right and nothing more, taking the
ecclesiastical decision out of which the civil right arises as it is found, and
accepting such decision as a matter adjudicated by another jurisdiction.” (Syllabus, Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 55
Phil. 307, 321; Gonzalez vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil.
420, 434).

With respect to the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiffs
cannot assail the two sales because they are not parties thereto, it suffices
to state that the defendants hypothetically admitted that the plaintiffs have
instituted a class suit and that they have proceeded on the assumption that the
sale of the church site was not authorized or was undertaken by the wrong
party, in which case the sale would be an un­enforceable contract (Arts. 1317
and 1403, Civil Code).

WHEREFORE, the trial court’s order of dismissal is set
aside.  The defendants should answer the
complaint as well as the complaint in intervention of the heirs of Felix Pioquinto.  The trial
court should thereafter hold a pre-trial and explore the avenues for an
amicable settlement of the case.  If no
compromise can be reached, then it should try the case on the merits.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.