APOLINARIA TAÑIDO, AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE CHINAMAN JOSE MARTINEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIA JUMAUAN ET AL., DEFENDANTS. – ANTONIA JUMAUAN…

Tañido versus Jumauan

The Case

This is Tañido versus Jumauan, a decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands rendered in November 1910. Apolinaria Tañido, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Jose Martinez, sued Antonia Jumauan and two other defendants to recover several parcels of land, a house, and a fishery that the defendants were said to be withholding. The case matters because it shows how the Court reads the intention of contracting parties from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts, and how a promise made to induce a signature, later fulfilled, is a condition and not a donation. It is a compact lesson on the interpretation of contracts and on the renunciation of a part of a credit.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis. After trial, that court rendered judgment ordering Antonia Jumauan to return to the plaintiff the properties described in the complaint as numbers one through eight, and absolving Calixto Velez and Isidra Caroro as to the properties respectively held by them. Counsel for Antonia Jumauan excepted and moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law and to the evidence. The motion was overruled, exception was taken, and a bill of exceptions was duly filed, admitted, and forwarded to the Supreme Court together with the transcript of the evidence and the original documents. The case thus reached the Supreme Court by appeal.

Facts

During his lifetime, and during his marriage with Antonia Jumauan, Prudencio Velez owed Jose Martinez a sum of money. After Velez died, a settlement was had in July 1901 between the creditor Martinez on one side and Mariano Velez, the father of the deceased, and Antonia Jumauan, the widow, on the other, as the sole heirs. In payment of the debt, the two heirs deeded to Martinez all the property that had belonged to the deceased debtor, including several coconut lands, a fishery, and the house and lot in which the widow was then living.

The evidence showed that the widow at first refused to sign the instrument of conveyance. She said, between sobs, that she would be left without means of support, deprived of all the lands left by her husband and even of the house she was living in. Moved perhaps to compassion, Martinez promised that he would return some of the properties if she would sign. Under that promise she signed. Within a month, Martinez fulfilled his promise by executing a second instrument, dated August 2, 1901, drawn in the Visayan dialect, by which he returned some of the lands together with the house and the fishery. That instrument was signed by Martinez, by the widow, and by witnesses, and was presented before two councilors of the town who certified to its truth and to the authenticity of the signatures.

The administratrix later sued to recover the properties still withheld, alleging illegal detention and claiming damages. The defendants denied the allegations. The trial court ordered the return of the properties claimed from the widow but absolved the other two defendants.

Issues

• Whether or not the second instrument, by which the creditor returned part of the property, was a donation rather than the fulfillment of a condition agreed upon for the signing of the deed.
• Whether or not Antonia Jumauan is entitled to retain, as owner, the house, lands, and fishery described in that second instrument.
• Whether or not the plaintiff established her claim against Calixto Velez and Isidra Caroro over the properties they respectively held.

Applicable Provisions

Article 1282 of the Civil Code provides:

In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, attention must principally be paid to their acts, contemporaneous with and subsequent to the contract.

This governs the Court's reading of the two instruments, since the return of the property must be judged by what the parties did at and after the signing.

Article 1255 of the Civil Code provides:

The contracting parties may make the agreement and establish the clauses and conditions which they may deem advisable, provided they are not in contravention of law, morals, or public order.

This sustains the promise made by the creditor as a valid condition for the perfection of the conveyance.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the return of the property was not a gift. The creditor returned part of what he had received in payment, not out of mere liberality, but in compliance with the condition under which the widow had agreed to the transfer and signed the instrument. Applying Article 1282, the Court looked to the acts of the parties at and after the contract and found that the second instrument expressed the fulfillment of the promise made when the first was signed. The Court also held that the promise was a valid condition under Article 1255, not contrary to law, morals, or public order.

On the second issue, the Court held that the widow is entitled to hold, as owner, the house, the five parcels of land, and the fishery site described in the second instrument, because the creditor renounced his right to collect that part of his credit. The Court reversed so much of the judgment as conflicted with this ruling and absolved her from the complaint as to those properties. It nevertheless sentenced her to return the lands designated as numbers seven and eight, which were not included in that instrument.

On the third issue, the Court affirmed the absolution of Calixto Velez and Isidra Caroro, since the plaintiff did not succeed in establishing the propriety of her claim against them.

Doctrine

First, to judge the intention of the contracting parties, attention must principally be paid to their acts contemporaneous with and subsequent to the contract. Second, the contracting parties may establish such clauses and conditions as they deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, or public order. Third, a promise made by a creditor to return part of the property received in payment, given as the condition for the debtor's widow to sign the deed, and later fulfilled, is not a donation but the performance of a condition and a renunciation of part of the credit. A bar candidate should tie each rule to the quoted articles and state the holding as a rule: fulfillment of a stipulated condition is not liberality.

Disposition

The Court reversed the judgment insofar as it conflicted with its ruling, absolved Antonia Jumauan from the complaint as to the house, lands, and fishery described in the August 2, 1901 instrument, ordered her to return the lands designated as numbers seven and eight, and affirmed the absolution of Calixto Velez and Isidra Caroro, without special finding as to costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the fulfillment of a promise made as a condition for signing a deed is not a gift but a compliance with the condition, judged by the parties' contemporaneous and subsequent acts. Examiners use this case to test the interpretation of contracts under Article 1282 and the validity of conditions under Article 1255.