IRENEO TOBIAS, JESUS TOBIAS, CRISPINA TOBIAS, ANTONIO TOBIAS – GUARDIAN AD LITEM JESUS TOBIAS, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE TEMISTOCLES B. DIEZ (PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FI…

The controversy at bar is focused on whether the doctrine of res
judicata was properly appreciated by
the court a quo as
to completely foreclose the institution of the case for reconveyance by herein petitioners in view of the final disposition made by the same magistrate in a previous suit for partition involving the same subject matter.

Felisa Tobias, the mother of herein petitioners and of respondent
Capitolina Tobias, obtained the realty in dispute via purchase from
Manuela, Antonio and Lourdes Tarrius on September 19, 1958 to the extent of
three-fourths thereof (p. 28, Rollo) for which Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2248 was issued. Prior to her
demise on October 6, 1965, she sold the property through pacto de
retro to Enrique Ciacho and Roberto Uy Kim who later consolidated
ownership thereon when redemption was not effected (page 36, Rollo). After the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2248 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 5872 in favor of the vendees a retro, the property was again
sold in favor of Capitolina Tobias to whom Transfer Certificate of Title No.
5902 was issued on March 8, 1966. It
also appears from the record that a suit for partition was filed by Jesus
Tobias on June 6, 1967 against his brothers and sisters geared towards the
distribution among the heirs of the assets left behind by their mother but the
judgment in that case, which later became final, did not include the property
involved herein as part of the mass of assets which was adjudicated.

On the basis of these factual backdrop, herein petitioners
proceeded to assume that their sister, Capitolina Tobias, obtained her title in
breach of trust inasmuch as her
brothers and sister were fraudulently deprived of their share as primary
heirs over the lot in question. More
significantly, petitioners alleged in
the complaint for reconveyance filed on September 19, 1980 that Capitolina
Tobias’ so?called
exclusive dominion has no basis since no categorical pronouncement was made by
the Honorable Temistocles B. Diez of
Branch 9 of the then Court of First Instance stationed at Palo, Leyte
when the case for partition was disposed of. (paragraph 3, Complaint; page 17, Rollo).

In resisting the plea for restitution, separate motions to
dismiss grounded on bar by prior judgment and prescription were presented by
Capitolina Tobias, Roberto Uy Kim and Enrique Ciacho. The primary form of avoidance merited the approval of the
Honorable Temistocles B. Diez who observed in the process of directing the
extinction of petitioners’ application for reconveyance that:

“… It is not
disputed that the property subject of the present action which is the
‘residential and commercial land and building at San Ramon and San Agustin
Streets, Burauen, Leyte,’ is the same land and building which was sought to be
partitioned together with the other properties in Civil Case No. B-012 of this
Court. It is also not disputed that
except for the addition of Roberto Uy Kim and Enrique Ciacho in the present
action, the parties in the present case and in the previous case, Civil Case
No. B-012 are the same. There is no
dispute that the judgment in Civil Case No. B-012 has long been final and as a
matter of fact has already been executed. The matter as to whether the said ‘residential and commercial land and
building at San Ramon and San Agustin Streets, Burauen, Leyte’ was part of the
estate of Felisa Tobias or the land of Capitolina Tobias, was, with the
agreement or acquiescence of the parties themselves who presented evidence to
prove their respective positions actually and directly controverted, determined
and resolved by the Court in its decision in Civil Case No. B?012. The judgment on the merits in Civil Case No.
B-012 should therefore bar the present action considering that the present
action though denominated as “Conveyance of Title in Breach of Trust;
Cancellation of Certificate of Title and documents with damages, actually seeks
the partition of the same property, among them, the Tobias brothers and
sisters.” (p. 3, Order dated February 26, 1981; page 63, Rollo)

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was to no avail
(page 76, Rollo). Hence, the appeal
before Us which impugns the pronouncements of the court a quo,
particularly those with respect to the principle of res judicata.

The zeal and effort exerted by the judge below in holding that
the complaint is barred by prior judgment does not quite agree with his
disposition in the partition case where he declared:

“WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, it is hereby
adjudged and decreed:

1. That the respective interest of the plaintiff
and the defendants in the remaining unadjudicated properties as contained in
the Commissioners’ Report dated April 21, 1973 and found on pages 267 to 269 of
the Records are as follows: That
plaintiff Jesus Tobias is entitled to one?fifth (1/5), defendant
Capitolina Tobias one-fifth (1/5), defendant Ireneo Tobias (1/5), and defendant
Antonio Tobias one-fifth (1/5) of said properties consisting of the general
merchandise and equipment at the store located at San Ramon and San Agustin
Streets, Burauen, Leyte, and the piano in the possession of defendant
Capitolina Tobias, as owners.

2. That defendant Capitolina Tobias is hereby
ordered to give and deliver to her co-heirs and co-owners the value of their
respective interests therein corresponding to P2,228.00 for Jesus Tobias,
P2,228.00 for Crispina Tobias, P2,228.00 for Ireneo Tobias, P2,228.00 for
Antonio Tobias and P2,228.00 as her share, this, upon the basis of the
appraisal made by the Commissioners as shown in their Report dated April 21,
1973, found on pages 267 to 269 of the Records;

3. That should defendant Capitolina Tobias
refuse and fail to give and deliver to her co-heirs and co-owners the value of
their respective interests in the said properties, the Commissioners of this
Court namely Atty. Severino Trocino, Fiscal Manuel C. Tutaan and Engineer
Benedicto Enerlan are hereby authorized to sell the said properties mentioned
within thirty days from the finality of this judgment and to partition and
divide the proceeds of said sale after deduction the costs of this suit, of the
sale and their fees as Commissioner, equally among the parties plaintiff and
defendants.

4. That plaintiff recover from the defendant
Capitolina Tobias the filing fee in the sum of P150.00 and the sum of P300.00
for the publication of the Complaint which plaintiff incurred by reason of this
action.”

(pages 20-21,
Decision in Civil Case No. 4051 B-012 dated June 3, 1975; pages 96-97, Rollo)

and in the process, missing to respond
squarely to the primordial query raised in the action for partition as to:

“a) Who owns
the properties mentioned and listed in the complaint which are disputed, and
those which are listed as undisputed properties of Felisa Tobias in the motion
for partial judgment;”

(page 9, Decision in
Civil Case No. 4051 B-012 dated June 3, 1975; page 85, Rollo)

There is, therefore, no categorical pronouncement in the
partition case concerning Capitolina Tobias’ ownership which she can utilize to
her advantage in the subsequent case for reconveyance.

While the trial court in the suit for partition may have tackled
the aspect of Capitolina Tobias’ dominion over said pieces of realty, the fallo
of the decision rendered on June 3, 1975 was completely mute on the so-called
proprietary right of Capitolina Tobias. Indeed, the significant question in passing upon the plea of res judicata
is whether the Court decided the controverted point specifically as to remove the necessity to look
for extraneous matters to fill the hiatus (Lamb vs. Wahlenmaier,
144 Cal. 91; 77 Pac. Rep. 765; Choteau vs. Gibson 76 Mo.
38), and tested by this shibboleth, We believe that the trial court did not so
react in the particular fashion and in the manner that Capitolina Tobias would
want to impress upon Us.

There being no specific and unequivocal pronouncement of
Capitolina Tobias’ ownership in the dispositive portion of the judgment of
distribution, although such claim was touched upon in the text of the decision,
the presumption of res judicata cannot be inferred therefrom (Arcbishop
of Manila vs. Director of Lands, 35
Phil. 339; 351) since it is the decretal portion and not the expressions made
in the body of the decision that controls (Siari Valley Estates,
Inc. vs. Lucasan and Honorable Judge Ortega,
102 Phil. 390; 393; Government of the Philippines vs.
Jose Ramon y Vasquez, 73 Phil. 669; 670; cited by Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Annotated and Commented, Volume 2,
1966 edition, page 855; Espiritu vs. Court of First
Instance of Cavite, 166 SCRA 394; 399; Medello vs.
Gorospe 159 SCRA 248; 253). Verily, the obiter dictum which was relied upon by
Capitolina Tobias cannot be considered binding for the purpose of establishing
a precedent (Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume 2, 1990 edition, page 209
citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition, page 967).

Perhaps, Capitolina Tobias and her counsel were satisfied with
the statements uttered by the magistrate in the action for partition with
reference to the sufficiency of Capitolina Tobias’ claim of ownership, such
that they failed to realize that a vacuum existed in the dispositive portion of
the judgment. For this serious
deficiency, which could have been rectified by a motion for clarification or an
appeal therefrom, Capitolina Tobias must realize and concede that she may not
now claim that the present action is barred by prior judgment, absent as there
is a categorical adjudication of ownership in her favor over the disputed
property (Edwards, et al. vs. Arce, et
al., 98 Phil 689; 692; 693). Of
course, We are not unmindful of the principle in adjective law and statutory
construction that the findings of the court can be considered in the
interpretation of the judgment like what this Court did in Aguirre v.
Aguirre, (58 SCRA 461). But, We
are not prepared to accord a similar treatment to the issue at hand for the
simple reason that the principle adverted to is premised on an ambiguity in the
fallo, which saving circumstance is glaringly wanting in the situation
now obtaining.

Neither can We assume that the alleged ownership of Capitolina
Tobias had been settled authoritatively as to call for the application of the
other tenet in procedural law on
“conclusiveness of judgment” since, to repeat, there was really no
final adjudication of such right in her favor, apart from the fact that the
grievance raised by petitioners herein relative to the alleged fraudulent
acquisition by Capitolina Tobias had not been presented and actually disposed
of in the first case for partition (Penalosa vs. Tuason,
22 Phil. 303; 312; Philippine National Bank vs. Barreto, 52 Phil.
818; 824; Namarco vs. Judge Macadaeg, 52 O.G. 182;
cited by Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume 2, 1970 edition,
page 322).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The order appealed from dismissing the case
for reconveyance due to res judicata is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is ordered REMANDED to
the court of origin for further proceedings. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado,
and Nocon, JJ., concur.