PIO ESPIRITU, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MARIANO DESEO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
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Espiritu versus Deseo
The Case
This is an action for the recovery of possession of certain lands, together with damages, brought by Pio Espiritu against Mariano Deseo. Espiritu claims that he had been in possession of the lands as lessee of the Augustinian Friars from the year 1884 until the year 1898, when Deseo dispossessed him. The case matters to a reviewee because it shows, in the simplest possible setting, that a possessory remedy is anchored on possession and on time: once the former possessor sleeps on his right for more than a year, and once the lease on which he grounds his claim is not proven, the action cannot be maintained.
Procedural History
The action was commenced by Pio Espiritu against Mariano Deseo in the Court of First Instance on the twentieth of June, 1901. The trial court rendered judgment against the plaintiff, and the case was brought to the Supreme Court by appeal. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Cooper, affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, with costs against the plaintiff.
Facts
Pio Espiritu alleged that from the year 1884 to the year 1898 he held the lands in question as lessee of the Augustinian Friars, who owned them, and that in the year 1898 Mariano Deseo dispossessed him.
Deseo resisted the complaint on three grounds: that the alleged lease had not been proven by competent evidence; that the action properly available for the recovery of possession was the restitutory interdict, and that a possessory action belongs exclusively to the owner of the property; and that the plaintiff had lost the right of possession by the expiration of more than one year. Deseo further alleged that he had been in possession of the lands and of the lot in question for seventeen years, the former by composition with the State and the second by right of testamentary succession.
On examination of the record, the Court found no evidence of any contract of lease executed by the Augustinian Friars in favor of the plaintiff, nor any evidence from which a right on his part to the lands could be deduced. The receipts presented, showing payment of the annual ground rent for several years prior to the dispossession, did not demonstrate that the plaintiff held any subsisting contract of lease on the date the action was brought.
Issues
- Whether or not the plaintiff has proven the contract of lease upon which he grounds his right to the lands in question.
- Whether or not the plaintiff may maintain the action for recovery of possession despite the lapse of more than one year from the act of dispossession.
- Whether or not the plaintiff, not having possession or ownership of the lands or any apparent right with respect to them, can maintain the action.
Applicable Provisions
The decision invokes the Law of Civil Procedure on the summary action of restitutory interdict, articles 1634 and 1635, which the Court summarizes as follows:
The plaintiff might have brought the summary action of restitutory interdict if he had brought suit within a year from the time of the execution of the act alleged to constitute the dispossession, and which took place in 1898, founding his claim exclusively upon the possession of the property then enjoyed by him.
This one-year period bears directly on the case, because the dispossession took place in 1898 and the action was not brought until June of 1901, so that the summary remedy founded on former possession was no longer available.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the lease was not proven. It declared that after a careful examination of the record it had not been able to find any evidence of the existence of any contract of lease of the lands in question executed by the Augustinian Friars in favor of the plaintiff, or any evidence from which might be deduced the existence of any right on the part of the plaintiff to the lands. The receipts for annual ground rent paid for several years before the dispossession did not tend to demonstrate that the plaintiff had any subsisting contract of lease on the date the action was brought.
On the second issue, the Court held that the benefits of the plaintiff's former possession were lost by reason of the possession of the defendant for more than one year. The plaintiff might have brought the summary action of restitutory interdict had he sued within a year from the act of dispossession, founding his claim exclusively upon the possession then enjoyed by him, but he did not.
On the third issue, the Court held that, not having the possession or ownership of the lands in question or any apparent right with respect to the same, the action cannot be maintained. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a tenant can bring a possessory action, because the alleged lease had not been proven, and unnecessary to determine the true character of the action brought. It likewise found it unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff could maintain any action to recover the rents, issues, and profits or damages, inasmuch as the record did not disclose their amount.
Doctrine
First, a claim of lease over land must be established by competent evidence; receipts for ground rent paid in years prior to the dispossession do not prove a subsisting contract of lease at the time the action is brought.
Second, the summary action of restitutory interdict, founded exclusively on former possession, must be brought within one year from the act of dispossession; beyond that period the benefits of the former possession are lost by reason of the possession of the defendant for more than one year.
Third, an action for recovery of possession cannot be maintained by one who has neither the possession nor the ownership of the lands in question, nor any apparent right with respect to the same.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, with costs against the plaintiff, so that Mariano Deseo prevailed.
Remember This
The one line worth memorizing is that the benefits of former possession are lost by the possession of the defendant for more than one year, so the restitutory interdict must be brought within a year from the dispossession. Examiners use this case to test the one-year period of the possessory remedy and the requirement that the lease grounding a claim of possession be proven by competent evidence.