RAMON MITRA, JR., NAPOLEON RAMA, EMMANUEL T. SANTOS, ERNIE RONDON, ANTONIO MARTINEZ, JEJOMAR BINAY, RODRIGO H. MELCHOR, JOAQUIN (TITONG) ROCES, RAFAEL YAP, AND MEL LOPEZ, PETITI…

In essence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition is
not dissimilar from the prohibition proceedings just dismissed filed
respectively by former delegates Samuel C. Occena and
Ramon A. Gonzales.^[1]
All three suits proceed on the assumption that the present Constitution is not
in force and effect.  There is this variation.  In the last two paragraphs of this petition,
the plea is made for the holding of a plebiscite so that the people may vote on
the ratification of the Constitution, now in force, but as to them still in the
stage of proposal.  In the event it is
rejected, so their thinking goes, then the 1935 Constitution, which in the view
of petitioners was suspended by the establishment of an authoritarian regime by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces after the proclamation of martial
law, could be once more operative with the lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981.  As in the Occena
and Gonzales petitions, there is what was therein referred to as a “rather
unorthodox aspect” in “the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is
not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.”^[2]
This excerpt from the opinion is, therefore, fully applicable:  “To put it at its mildest, such an
approach has the arresting charm of novelty – but nothing else.  It is in fact self-defeating, for if such
were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong forum.  We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and
apply that Constitution.  To contend otherwise
as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility.”^[3]

A similar judgment is thus indicated.  The petition must be dismissed.  If there is a further expression of view on
the part of the Court, it is to clear the misapprehension that seems to be
current in certain legal quarters about the import of the Javellana
decision^[4]
and the role of the President as Commander-in-Chief during the period of
martial law.

1.     
What is the ruling in Javellana
v. Executive Secretary?^[5]
Rightfully, it is ranked by eminent jurists and academicians abroad as one of
the most significant manifestations of the exercise of the function of judicial
review.  Apparently, this awesome and
delicate power has implications still not adequately grasped.  By virtue of this prerogative, the Supreme
Court either checks or legitimates the acts of a coordinate department,
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. 
The decision rendered then, whether one of approval or of rejection, of validity
or of unconstitutionality, is controlling. 
To go bock to Javellana v. Executive
Secretary.  The ruling cannot be any
clearer.  The dispositive
portion reads:  “[Accordingly], by
virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting
votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar,
Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases
are hereby dismissed.  This being the
vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect.”^[6]
As far as there being “no further judicial obstacle” to the operative
character of the 1973 Constitution, there can be no doubt that such is the view
of eight of the ten members of the Court. 
Petitioners apparently did not take note of the immediately preceding
paragraph of the opinion of the then Chief Justice Concepcion,
who, while one of the dissenters, spoke for the Court on the voting:  “On the fifth question of whether the
new Constitution of 1973 is in force: 
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; Four (4)
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon
on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted
the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there
are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in
force.”^[7]
Both the statements of “there being no further judicial obstacle” as well
as the negative form in which mention is made of there being “not enough
votes to declare that the new Constitution” is not in force reflect the
traditional mode in which constitutional issues are passed upon in accordance
with the American concept of judicial review. 
The function of judicial review, as observed by Justice Laurel in the
leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission,^[8]
reflects the adoption of the American type of constitutional government
“where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial department.”^[9]
In the event therefore that the decision rendered may give rise to doubts and
perplexities, there is comfort and assurance in the thought expressed by the
same eminent jurist in another leading case of Villena
v. Secretary of Interior:^[10]
“Familiarity with the essential background of the type of government
established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known
principles and practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary
explanation.”^[11]
One of such practices is the manner in which the dispositive
portion of a decision in a suit contesting the validity of a legislative or
executive act is worded.  It was noted
that Justice Holmes had a penchant for the double negative.  A favorite phrase of his was that the statute
“was not unconstitutional.” That is of the essence of judicial
review.  For one of its basic postulates
is the presumption of validity.  The
burden of proof is thus on the person assailing the action taken by a
coordinate branch.  There is no need
therefore of an affirmative finding as to its being constitutional.  It suffices that it has not been shown to be
otherwise.  It is likewise by virtue of
such presumption that Justice Malcolm correctly asserted:  “To doubt is to sustain.”^[12]
Scholars in the field of constitutional law have even gone further.  They maintain that when the Supreme Court or
some members thereof whose votes are crucial deem the question raised as a political^[13]
and not judicial resulting in the dismissal action, there was, even then, a
manifestation of power of judicial review at work.  The Court, by ruling that it was without
jurisdiction, allowed the political branches to have their way.  In that sense, to use a favorite phrase of
Thomas Reed Powell, the Court was silently vocal and not silently silent.  In Javellana, the
Court assumed jurisdiction, but only two of the ten members then were of the
view and so voted that the 1973 Constitution is not in force.  There is no affront to logic, it would seem,
for us to dismiss the petitions and accordingly rule that “there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect.” As was pointed out in the joint decision in the Occena and Gonzales petitions:  “That is the meaning of the concluding
statement in Javellana.  Since then, this Court has invariably applied
the present Constitution.  The latest
case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely
two weeks ago.  During the first year
alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution,
at least ten cases may be cited.”^[14]

2.     
Nor is this all. 
The scholarly opinion of then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
while in dissent, acknowledged that even without valid ratification, a new
constitution could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the
people, referring in particular to the leading case of Taylor
v. Commonwealth.^[15]
Other cases may be cited.^[16]
There is this excerpt in a separate opinion in Javellana:  “Independently of the lack of validity
of the ratification of the new Constitution, if it be accepted by the people,
in whom sovereignty resides according to the Constitution, then his Court
cannot refuse to yield assent to such a political decision of the utmost
gravity, conclusive in its effect.  Such a
fundamental principle is meaningless if it does not imply, to follow Laski, that the nation as a whole constitutes the ‘single
center of ultimate reference,’ necessarily the possessor of that ‘power that is
able to resolve disputes by saying the last word.’ If the origins of the
democratic polity enshrined in the 1935 Constitution with the declaration that
the Philippines is a republican state could be traced back to Athens and to
Rome, it is no doubt true, as McIver pointed out, that only with the recognition
of the nation as the separate political unit in public law is there the
juridical recognition of the people composing it ‘as the source of political
authority.’ From them, as Corwin did stress, emanate ‘the highest possible
embodiment of human will,’ which is supreme and must be obeyed.  To avoid any confusion and in the interest of
clarity, it should be expressed in the manner ordained by law.  Even if such were not the case, however, once
it is manifested, it is to be accepted as final and authoritative.  The government which is merely an agency to
register its commands has no choice but to submit.  Its officials must act accordingly.  No agency is exempt from such a duty, not
even this Court.  In that sense, the lack
of regularity in the method employed to register its wishes is not fatal in its
consequences.  Once the fact of
acceptance by the people of a new fundamental law is made evident, the
judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it recognition.  The obligation to render obeisance falls on
the courts as well.”^[17]
Even petitioners must be aware that aside from the referendum that led to the
ratification of the present Constitution, there was a second one held on July
27 and 28 in 1973,^[18]
and another on February 27 and 28 in 1975.^[19]
The 1976 amendments to the Constitution were adopted in the referendum held on
October 16 and 17 of that year.^[20]
Then on December 17, 1977,
there was again held a referendum.^[21]
The fact that the people went to the polls would be indicative of their
acquiescence in the present Constitution. 
Nor could petitioners be unaware that two elections have been held under
the present Constitution, one for members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa on April 7, 1978 and the other for local
government officials on January 30,
1980.  In the face of the
above clearly-manifested recognition of the force and effect of the present
Constitution, by the people, including those in the opposition, it would seem
that any argument to the contrary should be consigned to a well-merited limbo.

3.     
There is an even graver misapprehension of the
significance of the President being the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
and the restricted concept of martial law as known to American jurisprudence
well-nigh authoritative in this jurisdiction. 
The provision of the 1935 Constitution by virtue of which martial law
was declared reads as follows:  “The
President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion.  In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety
requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or
place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law.”^[22]
The commander-in-chief clause is traceable to the United States Constitution,^[23]
which however does not empower the American President to declare martial
law.  It is quite apparent that the
framers of the 1935 Constitution, including some of the greatest legal
luminaries of the Philippines, all devoted to the concept of civilian
supremacy, expanded the commander-in-chief clause on the assumption that the
President, as the highest civilian authority, should not be bereft of
competence to deal with any danger to the State whether posed by external
aggression or internal subversion.  He
was thus empowered to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to
declare martial law.  At any rate, there
was nothing novel in such a provision as far as the Philippines
is concerned. 
It owed its origin to the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, more
popularly known as the Jones Law,^[24]
which was in turn based on the Organic Act of Hawaii of 1899.^[25]
State Constitutions of Massachusetts,^[26] New
Hampshire,^[27] Rhode
Island,^[28] Vermont,^[29] Maine,^[30] Maryland,^[31] Tennessee,^[32] West
Virginia,^[33]
and Alaska^[34]
likewise contain martial law provisions. 
Neither the Colorado nor
the Texas Constitutions has a provision of that character, in the former the
privilege of the writ could be suspended^[35] and in the latter a statute was enacted to enable its
Governor to do so.^[36]
As interpreted by the American Supreme Court in the leading cases of Moyer v.
Peabody,^[37]
the opinion coming from Justices Holmes, and Sterling v. Constantin,^[38]
with Chief Justice Hughes as ponente, these
two decisions along with that of Duncan v. Kahanamoku,^[39]
made clear that martial law as understood in American jurisprudence is subject
to judicial scrutiny and thus far from being all-encompassing.  To be more specific, martial law, according
to Willoughby, “goes no further than to warn citizens that the military
powers have been called upon by the executive to assist him in the maintenance
of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must upon pain of
arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more
difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law.”^[40]
Burdick,^[41]
Willis,^[42]
and Schwartz^[43]
wrote in the same vein.  Parenthetically,
it may be observed that President Ferdinand E. Marcos announced in a speech in Hawaii
on April 22, 1980 that the Philippines
is partial to the Willoughby
approach.^[44]
There is this modification though as announced in the ponencia
of Justice Makasiar in Aquino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections:^[45]
“We affirm the proposition that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or
administrator of martial law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can
promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of Martial Law
essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of
the political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of
reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or
the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession,
inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including
highly developed countries.”^[46]
That is the extent of the influence exerted by the view of Rossiter.^[47]
There is thus adherence to the pronouncement of Justice Black in the
above-cited Duncan v. Kahanamoku,^[48]
a case of Hawaiian origin: 
“Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American
institutions; they are indispensable to our government.”^[49]
The Interim Batasang Pambansa
was provided for in the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution, the opening
sentence of its first section reading: 
“There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly,
an interim Batasang Pambansa.”^[50]
The judiciary, during the period of martial law from September 21, 1972 to January 17, 1981, performed its functions and
discharged its responsibility as a separate branch of the government.  It never ceased all the while to exercise the
power of judicial review.  The validity
of the proclamation of martial law was challenged and unanimously upheld in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections.^[51]
Mention had already been made of Javellana v.
Executive Secretary^[52]
where, as noted, the transcendental issue posed was whether or not the 1973
Constitution was in force and effect, with the Court dismissing the petitions
by a vote of six to four and ruling by a vote of eight to two that there was
“no further judicial obstacle to the New Constitution being considered in
force and effect,” and Aquino, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections,^[53]
where the question raised was as to the competence of the President to issue
orders and decrees having the force and effect of law, with the Court ruling
that he could do so, the ratio decidendi
being the aforesaid excerpt quoted from the ponencia
of Justice Makasiar.^[54]
There are two other decisions equally signifying that this Court had never been
hesitant to assume jurisdiction in cases assailing the validity of Presidential
acts.  The first is Aquino
Jr v. Military Commission,^[55]
where the power of the President to create a military commission with
jurisdiction to try civilians for certain specified offences connected with the
rebellion, was sustained, the opinion being penned by Justice Antonio.^[56]
The other is Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,^[57]
where the authority of the President to propose amendments to the Constitution,
the interim National Assembly not having been convened, was sanctioned.^[58]
It is not to be lost sight of either that in Dumlao
v. Commission on Elections,^[59]
decided on January 22, 1980, while martial law was still in force, this Court
nullified a portion of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which would consider the filing of charges
for the commission of any crime arising from acts of disloyalty or amounting to
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, before the Civil Court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation as prima facie evidence
of such fact.  Justice Melencio-Herrera was the ponente.^[60]

4.     
There can be no justification then for the
reckless assertion that upon the proclamation of martial law and while it was
in force, constitutionalism, in terms of the exercise of the power of judicial
review and respect for individual rights, no longer held sway in the
Philippines.  It was Justice Lionel Keith
Murphy, of the High Court of Australia, whose advocacy of a written bill of
rights for his country has won him an international reputation as a devoted and
eloquent champion of human rights who was the Second Comparative Law Lecturer
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.  In that lecture, he appraised the role of
this Court during martial law thus: 
“The judicial system in the Philippines had undergone difficult
times, and much stress has been placed on it by the necessity to resolve great
issues arising in a series of cases:  The
Anti-Subversion, The Plebiscite, The Ratification, The Martial Law, the
Referendum, The Right to Counsel and the Military Tribunal Cases.”^[61]
He said further:  “Throughout these
cases, one can observe with admiration, the concern of the judiciary to
maintain the fundamental liberties of the people even under the most difficult
conditions.”^[62]
He continued his appraisal of the work of the Supreme Court during martial law
thus:  “Violations of human rights
have occurred and do occur in the Philippines.  Violations of human rights have occurred and
do occur in Australia.  I will mention some shortly.  They occur in the United
States and elsewhere.  But the Philippines
and the United States
have courts which are able to enforce mandatory provisions in the Bill of
Rights.  Your Supreme Court does so
daily, openly and in reasoned decision given by your Justices.”^[63]
To paraphrase a recognized authority in American Constitutional law and one of
the most respected American legal scholars, Professor Paul A.  Freund, it is not too much to expect of any
counsel appearing before the Supreme Court that there should be on his part a
certain degree of awareness of the pitfalls and delusions of certitude in view
of the complexity of the strands in the web of constitutionalism which the
Court must disentangle.^[64]
There is still much to be said of this aphorism of Justice Holmes:  “Certitude is not the test of
certainty.” In the field of constitutional law, the need for reexamining
the continuing validity of doctrines in the light of changing circumstances
cannot be denied.  Familiarity with such
doctrines, to refer anew to what was stated by Justice Laurel, is, however, a
prime requisite.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Barredo, Makasiar,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.

Abad Santos, J., on official leave.

^[1] G.R. No. 56350, Occena v. The Commission on Elections and G.R. No. 56404, Gonzales v.
The National Treasurer and the Commission on Elections.  A joint decision was promulgated on the two
above petitions two days ago.

^[2] Ibid, 2.

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Javellana v. Executive Secretary, L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.

^[5] 50 SCRA 30.

^[6] Ibid, 141.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

^[9] Ibid, 160.

^[10] 67 Phil. 451 (1939).

^[11] Ibid, 464. 
Justice Laurel was speaking of such lack of familiarity as of 1937.  The situation has not improved at all.  It may have grown worse.  One explanation is that after 1946, American
constitutional law appears to be a neglected subject except in the University
of the Philippines College of Law and two or three other leading law schools.

^[12] Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).

^[13]
In Javellana, the votes of then Justices Makalintal and Castro, while counted as among those who
held the view that the amendments were not ratified in the manner­ prescribed
by the Constitution, reflected in reality their conviction that the 1973
Constitution was a new one and therefore outside judicial competence.

^[14]
G. R. No. 56350 and G. R. No. 56404, April
12, 1981.  Sola, G. R. Nos. 56158-64, was
promulgated March 17, 1981.  Of the ten cases cited, the first, Garcia v.
Domingo, L-30104, July 25, 1973, is reported in 52 SCRA 155 and the last, Asian
Surety and Insurance Co. v. Herrera, L-25232, December 20, 1973, is
reported in 54 SCRA 312.  It was also
noted that the first of such cases, Garcia, was promulgated on July 25, 1973 with the writer of this
opinion as ponente and the next case, Buendia, also on the same date, with Justice Teehankee as ponente, both
of whom were dissenters in Javellana, but who felt
bound to abide by the majority decision.

^[15] 101 Va. 529, 44 SE 754 (1903).

^[16] Cf. Miller v.
Johnson, 92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522 (1892); Arie v.
State, 23 Okl. 166, 100 P.
23 (1909) and Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 SE 479 (1911).

^[17] Ibid,
327-328.  The quotations from Laski may be found in his Grammar of Politics, 4th ed., 34
(1937); McIver in his The Web of Government 84 (1947); and Corwin in his article,
The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law in 1 Selected Essays 3
(1938).

^[18] P.D. No. 229 (1973).

^[19] Proclamation No. 1366 as amended by Proclamation No. 1366-A (1975).

^[20] P.D. 991 (1976).

^[21] P.D. 1229 (1977).

^[22]
Article VII, Section 10, par. (2) of the 1935
Constitution.

^[23]
According to Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution:  “The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may
require the Opinion, in writing, of the Principal Officer in each of the
Executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves or Pardons for
Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” As is
obvious, no mention is made either of the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus but President Lincoln did so in the American Civil War.

^[24]
Section 21 of the Philippine Autonomy Act reads as follows:  “[The Governor-General] may, in case of
rebellion or invasion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety
requires it, suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Islands
or any part thereof under martial law.  *
* *.”

^[25] Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act vesting such power in the
then Territorial Governor.

^[26]
Art. XXVIII.

^[27] Arts. 34 and 51.

^[28]
Art. I, Sec. 18.

^[29]
Art. 17.

^[30]
Art. I, Sec. 14.

^[31]
Art. 32.

^[32]
Art. I, Sec. 25.

^[33]
Art. III, Sec. 12.

^[34]
Art. III, Sec. 20.

^[35]
Article II, Section 21.

^[36] Revised Civil Statutes, Articles 5778, 5834 and 5889.

^[37]
212 US 78 (1909).

^[38]
287 US 378 (1932).

^[39]
327 US 304 (1946).

^[40] 3 Willoughby on the Constitution, 2nd ed., 1951 (1929).

^[41] Burdick,
The Law of the American Constitution 261 (1922).

^[42] Willis on Constitutional Law, 449 (1936).

^[43]
II Schwartz, The Powers of Government 244 (1963).

^[44]
The Third World Alternatives (Speech delivered before
the American Newspaper Publishers Association.

^[45] L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.

^[46] Ibid, 298.

^[47] Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 7.  303 (1918) was cited.

^[48]
327 US 304 (1946).

^[49] Ibid, 323.

^[50] 1976 Amendments to the Constitution, 1.  The Interim National Assembly under
the 1973 Constitution was never convened.

^[51] L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA
183.  The Court spoke through the
then Chief Justice Makalintal.  The writer of this opinion dissented insofar
as the Court would consider moot and academic a habeas corpus petition if the
detention ceased but with the physical freedom of the erstwhile detainees still
restricted under the terms of release.

^[52] 50 SCRA 30.

^[53] 62 SCRA 275.

^[54]
Justice Teehankee concurred and dissented, confining
such power legislative in character “to the law of necessity of the
preservation of the state which gave rise to the proclamation (including
appropriations for operations of the government and its agencies and
instrumentalities.)” At 316-317. 
The writer of this opinion, who in his work as a co-author with Senator
Lorenzo M. Tanada on the 1935 Constitution, the
fourth edition of which came out in 1953, is of the view that Willoughby’s
formulation is controlling.  So he had
occasion to state anew in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Ponce Enrile,
59 SCRA 184, 303. 
In this second Aquino Jr. decision, he did not
feel it necessary to express any opinion on the power of the President to issue
decrees with the force and effect of law in conformity with such stand.  Nonetheless, as the ponencia
of Justice Makasiar represented the plurality
opinion, accuracy and respect for the now prevailing view of the Court call for
his words reflecting the more expansive concept of the martial law powers of
the President being quoted in full.  For
his part, and not as ponente
in this case, the writer of this opinion adheres to his view.

^[55] L-37364, May 9, 1975, 63 SCRA 546.

^[56]
Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma, now retired,
dissented.  The writer dissented on due
process ground but admitted that under the Transitory Provisions of the 1973
Constitution, Article XVII, Section 3, par. (2), all
“proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the
land, ***.” The ruling of this case as well as of Javellana
and the two previous Aquino Jr. cases was relied upon
in Gumaua v. Espino,
L-36188, 37586, February 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 402 with Justice Makasiar
as ponente. 
There was a concurrence from the writer of this opinion and a dissent from
Justice Teehankee.

^[57] L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333.

^[58]
Justice Martin wrote the principal opinion but in view of his adoption of well-nigh
plenary powers of the Executive under martial law as advocated by Rossiter spoke only for himself.  The late Chief Justice Castro and Justices Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion
Jr. wrote concurring opinions.  The
writer of this opinion expressly dissented from the stand of Justice Martin but
concurred in the result.  Justice Aquino limited himself to such a concurrence.  Justices Teehankee
and Munoz Palma dissented.  Justice Makasiar concurred but dissented insofar as the Court held
that the proposal to amend the Constitution is a judicial, rather than a
political question.  In Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, L-47771, March
11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30, the Supreme Court rejected the contention
that Presidential Decree No. 1296, The 1978 Election Code, was tainted by
unconstitutionality in some of its provisions. 
The writer of this opinion concurred and dissented.  Justices Teehankee
and Munoz Palma dissented.

^[59] L-52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392.

^[60]
Justices Barredo, Abad
Santos and the writer of this opinion had separate concurrences.  Justice Teehankee
filed a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on the candidacy of
petitioner Dumlao, declining to rule on the
invalidity of the first part of Section 4 of the Act in question, and
concurring with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima
facie cause for disqualification is void.

^[61]
Murphy, Human Rights and the Judiciary: 
Reflections on the Australian and Philippine Experience, Second
Comparative Law Lecture, March 17, 1981, 5. 
The challenge against the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act failed,
the decision of the Court being announced in People v. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382, with
the then Justice, later Chief Justice Castro, as ponente.  The writer of this opinion dissented.  In the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, reported in 56 SCRA 793, Justice Teehankee
concurred and dissented in a separate opinion. 
The writer of this opinion stood fast in his dissent.

^[62] Ibid.

^[63] Ibid,
5-6.  There is relevance to the
compliment paid by Dr. Akinola Aguda,
on eminent authority in comparative legal institutions, in his comprehensive
monograph submitted to the Second International Conference of Appellate Judges
held in Sydney and Canberra,
Australia, May 19-26, 1980.  He singled out for high praise the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia, L-33964, December 11, 1971, reported
in 42 SCRA 448, with the then Chief Justice Concepcion
as ponente, that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a judicial and not a political
question.  For him such a ruling is
unique and unprecedented in countries that have adopted the Anglo-American
legal system.

^[64] Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 18 (1950).

Clean

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