SOUTHERN FOOD SALES CORPORATION AND ROBERT JAMES SIAO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH VIII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU AND RAUL G. LAUR…

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking the nullification of the
orders issued by the respondent Judge Bernardo Ll. Salas, in his capacity as
the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, 14th Judicial
District, Branch VIII, Cebu City in Civil Case No. R-18431 entitled “Raul
G. Laurente v. Southern Food Sales Corp. and Robert James Siao” dated
February 28, 1980 deferring the determination of the motion to dismiss until
after trial and November 6, 1980 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The facts which gave rise to the controversy at bar are as
follows:

Petitioner Southern Food Sales Corporation (corporation) is a
domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
while co-petitioner Robert James Siao is an office manager of the petitioner
corporation. Public respondent Bernardo
Ll. Salas is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, 14th Judicial District, Branch VIII, Cebu
City, while private respondent Raul G. Laurente was formerly the sales
supervisor of the petitioner corporation.

Private respondent Raul G. Laurente was employed as sales
supervisor of petitioner Southern Food Sales Corporation from August 15, 1977
to June 29, 1979.

On July 5, 1979, private respondent Laurente was notified and
advised of his immediate termination for gross neglect of duty and/or dishonesty arising from the following
acts, namely: (1) for the dismissal of
four (4) salesmen whose anomalies and irregularities were tolerated by private
respondent despite his actual knowledge;
(2) for falsifying his meal receipts; (3) for failing to submit proof of his
income tax receipt for 1978; and (4) for misrepresenting his itinerary of
travel. (see Rollo, p. 15)

On August 27, 1979, private respondent instituted a civil action
for damages against petitioner corporation and petitioner Siao with the Court
of First Instance of Cebu docketed as Civil Case No. R-18481.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner corporation with the Ministry of Labor (now Department of Labor and
Employment) for illegal dismissal, reinstatement with backwages, quarterly
commissions, incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.

On November 20, 1979, the labor case was assigned for compulsory
arbitration with the Regional Office No. X and docketed as ROX Arbitration Case
No. 469-79.

On January 7, 1980, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on
Civil Case No. R-18481, claiming that jurisdiction should be vested with the
National Labor Relations Commission. (see Rollo, p. 25)

In the meantime, the Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso G. Agbuya
rendered a decision on February 5, 1980 finding that the termination of
complainant was for a just and valid cause, the dispositive portion of which
provides as follows:

“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby rule
and order the termination of the petitioner is for just and valid cause. Further, the respondent, Souther(n) Food
Sales Corporation, is hereby ordered to pay the petitioner, Raul Laurente his
commission and 5 days Service Incentive Leave Pay subject for computation and
the following:

1) Unpaid wages from June 16-30, 1979 ———     P750.00

2) 13th Month Pay for 1979  ————————-     P750.00

SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 16)

Hence, the private respondent interposed an appeal to the
National Labor Relations Commission alleging the sole ground, to wit:

“Serious errors were committed in the findings of fact which
would cause grave and irreparable damage and injury to the complainant.”
(Rollo, p. 17)

On February 28, 1980, after finding that the grounds in the
motion to dismiss did not appear to be indubitable, the court in Civil Case No.
R-18481 deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until after trial.

Such order prompted the petitioners to file a motion for
reconsideration.

However, the respondent judge issued an order dated November 6,
1980 denying the motion for reconsideration and setting the case for further
proceedings.

Hence, this petition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

The petitioners maintain that private respondent’s labor
complaint docketed as ROX Arbitration Case No. 496-79 is a prejudicial question
which must take precedence before the civil action for damages may be
instituted. In addition, the
petitioners stress that it is procedurally absurd for private respondent to
seek remedies in two (2) tribunals of competent jurisdiction for that would have
the effect of splitting a single cause of action.

On the contrary, private respondent argues that there can be no
prejudicial question involved much less is there a splitting of a single cause
of action. Although the two (2) cases
filed by private respondent are apparently related to each other, nevertheless,
each case has a different subject matter. The labor case involves the legality of the private respondent’s
termination or dismissal, while the civil case involves the manner of dismissal
or how the petitioners carried out the dismissal.

Petitioners claim that the failure of the private respondent to
await for the resolution of the NLRC is equivalent to non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Furthermore,
they stress that unless the process of administrative adjudication has been
completed, the case is not ready for judicial intervention.

On this point, the private respondent notes that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable. The private respondent alleges that the
filing of Civil Case No. R-18481 is not in any way dependent upon the outcome
of the labor case considering that the two cases, as previously discussed, are
distinct from each other, each having a different subject matter.

The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not
the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred the
determination or resolution of the motion to dismiss questioning the
jurisdiction of the court over claims for damages.

We already held in the case of National Union Fire Insurance
Company of Pittsburg v. Stolt-Nielsen Philippines, Inc. (G.R. No. 87958, April
26, 1990, 184 SCRA 682, 686) that “(w)hile a Court Order deferring action
on a motion to dismiss until the trial is interlocutory and cannot be
challenged until final a judgment, still, where it clearly appears that the
trial Judge or court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction,
the remedy of prohibition (or certiorari) would lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings.” In the case at bar,
however, the trial judge did not proceed in excess of his jurisdiction when he
issued the order deferring the resolution of the motion to dismiss until after
trial, in order for certiorari to lie.

Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6715 clearly provides that the labor arbiter shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from an employer-employee
relationship. However, when the civil
case for damages was instituted in 1979, the applicable law then was Article
217 (a) (3) of the Labor Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1367 (May
1, 1978), the pertinent portions of which provide as follows:

“Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. – (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non­-agricultural:

“x x x

“(3) All other
cases arising from employer-employee relations duly endorsed by the Regional
Directors in accordance with the provisions of this Code; Provided, that the
Regional Directors shall not endorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain
claims for moral or other forms of damages.

“x x x.”

Time and again, We stress that “(t)he rule is that where a
court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy,
its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal. The exception to the
rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect
that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of
a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was
pending prior to the enactment of the statute.” (Bengzon v. Inciong, G.R.
Nos. L-48706-07, 91 SCRA 248, 256). We
find the aforementioned principle applicable to the case at bar. To require the private respondent to file a
single suit combining his actions for illegal dismissal and damages in the NLRC
would be to sanction the retroactivity of Republic Act No. 6715 which took
effect on March 21, 1989, where the same law does not expressly so provide, or
does not intend to operate as to actions pending before its enactment, hence
prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the lower court, acting in accordance with the law
then prevailing, has jurisdiction over the claim of damages of the private
respondent.

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the act of
the respondent judge in deferring the determination of the motion to dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of the court until after trial does not amount to
grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and
Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.