G.R. No. 56385. May 19, 1984
RENATO U. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ERNESTO LIWANAG, RESPONDENTS.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
and setting aside the resolution of respondent Commission disqualifying
petitioner to become a candidate and cancelling his certificate of
candidacy for the position of municipal mayor of Bongabon, Oriental
Mindoro. As it was issued, however, on February 7, 1980 although the
petition for disqualification was filed on January 25, 1980, he was
voted for the position of municipal mayor in the election held on
January 30 and was certified as having obtained more votes than his
opponent, Jose A. Enriquez. The February 7 resolution of the Commission
on Elections led to the Board of Canvassers declaring Enriquez as
mayor-elect of Bongabon. Such proclamation was likewise nullified and
set aside by this Court. This Court in the same decision granted the
writ of mandamus ordering respondent Board of Canvassers of
Bongabon to proclaim in accordance with the canvass already terminated
petitioner Reyes as mayor-elect. The basis for the decision was the
absence of procedural due process, petitioner not having been heard on
the question of his being disqualified for having changed his party
within the six-month period contrary to a constitutional provision.
Characterizing the ban on a change of party affiliation as “both
innovative and mandatory,”[2]
this Court likewise ordered: “Thereafter, the case is referred to the
respondent Commission on Elections so that it could proceed to pass on
the question of the disqualification of petitioner Renato U. Reyes after
a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the cardinal requireÂments
of procedural due process.”[3]
Accordingly, respondent Commission set anew for hearing the
disqualification case against petitioner. Thereafter, he filed a motion
to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction of respondent Commission on
the ground that it had previously given due course to his certificate of
candidacy and that he was thereafter voted for, with a majority of the
votes being cast in his favor.[4]
Another ground mentioned is that there is an election protest against
the petitioner, one of the issues raised being the change of his
political party affiliation.[5]
In the Order denying such motion to dismiss, respondent Commission
stated: “Things were held in abeyance until May 19, 1980 upon notice of
the Decision dated May 15, 1980 of the Supreme Court in the above-cited
case, wherein it was directed, among others, that the cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy of Reyes and the proclamation of Enriquez
as mayor-elect were nullified; the proclamation of Reyes as mayor-elect
was ordered; and the case was returned to the Commission for a hearing
on the question of the disqualification of Reyes.”[6]
It is then quite clear why as set forth at the beginning of this opinion, the decision in the first Reyes case is controlling.
1. The doctrine of “the law of the case” identified as the
opinion delivered in the former appeal is an insurmountable obstacle to
this petition being granted. “More specifically,” according to People v.
Pinuila,[7] “it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule
of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be
the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the Court.”[8] To the same effect is this holding in Kabigting v. Director of Prisons,[9]
the opinion coming from the then Justice, later Chief Justice, now
Speaker Makalintal: “It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being
the Court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions
properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case
constitutes the law of that particular case.”[10] Nowhere is there a more emphatic statement of such a principle than in the ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in People v. Olarte.[11] Thus: “Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027, rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and even if erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago.”[12] The all-embracing scope of such a principle was duly noted in the latest case in point, Festin v. Faderanga[13]
in these words: “What is express as well as what is implied in a
decision is included, to be implemented faithfully, no circumvention or
evasion being allowed.”[14]2. Petitioner, however, seeks to escape from the imperative
character of such a principle. His reliance is on what was said in
Arcenas v. Commission on Elections:[15]
“It is now the prevailing doctrine that after an election duly held and
a proclamation thereafter made, a pre-proclamation controversy should
no longer be viable.”[16] Such reliance is misplaced. Arcenas and the cases cited therein[17]
dealt with petitions filed with this Court, not previously decided.
This is not the situation here. This is the second time for petitioner
to come to this Court. He was successful the first time he sought
relief. The decision in his favor ordered precisely what should be done
by respondent Commission. Now that it is performing such a task
hearing the evidence to satisfy the demands of procedural due process on
the question of whether or not, he should be disqualified, petitioner
files a new action to stop it from going ahead. It is hardly in
consonance with equity to indulge him in his change of mind. That is an
affront to reason. It is offensive to fairness, which is the essence
of due process. Considering the difference in the environmental
circumstances between this case and Arcenas, petitioner cannot be heard
to argue that there was a modification of the doctrine announced in the
first Reyes decision. Even if there were, however, petitioner is still
not entitled to the remedy now sought. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the same
Olarte opinion cannot be any more categorical: “A subsequent
reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but certainly
not to an old one finally and conclusively determined.”[18]3. The other ground alleged by petitioner for the dismissal of the
proceedings in respondent. Commission is that there is another action
pending in Court for the same cause.[19]
It is alleged in his petition: “In March 1980, Jose A. Enriquez, the
losing candidate, filed with the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro an election protest against the election of petitioner, docketed
as Election Case No. R-8, which to date is still pending.”[20]
Clearly, such a ground is unavailing. Petitioner pleaded and succeeded
in his first case to get a favorable decision on May 15, 1980. That
was two months after the filing of the election protest against him. He
was quite content with the result. He knew then that the matter was
referred back to respondent Commission. He did not seek any change or
modification. What other conÂclusion can there be then except full
awareness and recogÂnition on his part that according to law, respondent
Commission is precisely the agency to receive evidence on the question
of whether or not he ought to be disÂqualified. Now he would assert
lack of jurisdiction on the ground of another action pending in Court
for the same cause. In the first place, the principle of the law of the
case is, as set forth previously, an insurmountable obstacle. Even in
the absence of such a principle, petition still is doomed to fail. The
Election Code mandates: “The Commission shall be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies and any of its deciÂsions, orders, and
rulings shall be final and executory.”[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Aquino, J., see attached concurrence.
Abad Santos, J., see dissenting opinion.
[1] G. R. No. 52699, May 15, 1980, 97 SCRA 500.
[2] Ibid, 504.
[3] Ibid, 510.
[4] Petition, Annex “C”.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid, Annex “D”.
[7] 103 Phil. 992 (1958).
[8] Ibid, 999.
[9] 116 Phil. 589 (1962).
[10] Ibid, 594.
[11] L-22465, Feb. 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 494.
[12] Ibid, 498. The
Olarte opinion finds support in Fernando v. Crisostomo, 90 Phil. 585
(1951); Padilla v. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884 (1953); Samahang Magsasaka,
Inc. v. Chua Guan, 96 Phil. 974 (1955); People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992
(1958) and Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, 107 Phil. 50 (1960). Cf.
Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-26932, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 490.
[13] G.R. No.57351, Jan. 16, 1982, 111 SCRA 1.
[14] Ibid, 7. The
following cases were cited: Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45
SCRA 17; Palad v. Governor of Quezon Province, L-24302, Aug. 18, 1972,
46 SCRA 354; Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, L-35386, Sept. 28, 1972,
47 SCRA 153; Mangayao v. de Guzman, L-24787, Feb. 22, 1974, 55 SCRA 540;
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. CIR, L-31852, June 28, 1974,
57 SCRA 642; Cosmos Foundry Ship Workers Union v. Lo Bu, L-40136, March
25, 1975, 63 SCRA 313; National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna,
L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607; Villanueva v. WCC, L-44108, July
31, 1978, 84 SCRA 423; Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, L-45911, April 11, 1979, 89 SCRA 336; Bueno Industrial and
Development Corporation v. R.C. Aquino Timber and Plywood Co., Inc.,
L-25747, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 109.
[15] G.R. No. 54039, November 28, 1980, 101 SCRA 437.
[16] Ibid, 440.
[17] Venezuela v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 53522, July 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 790; Villegas v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52563, Sept. 1980, 99 SCRA 595. The
rather broad statement in Arcenas has been made more precise in Sande
Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 53953, January 5, 1981,
102 SCRA 1.
[18] People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, 498.
[19] Petition, par. 7.
[20] Ibid, par. 6.
[21] Section 175, 1978 Election Code.
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The judgment in Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52699, May 15, 1980, 97 SCRA 500, 510 states:
“WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the
resolution of respondent ComÂmission on Elections of February 7, 1980
declaring petitioner Renato U. Reyes and the proclamation of respondent
Board of Canvassers declaring Jose A. Enriquez as Mayor-elect of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, are hereby nullified, set aside and
declared to be without force and effect. The writ of mandamus is
granted and respondent Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro, is commanded to proclaim, in accordance with the canvass
already terminated, petitioner Renato U. Reyes as Mayor-elect.
Thereafter, the case is referred to the respondent Commission on
Elections so that it could proceed to pass on the question of the
disqualification of petitioner Renato U. Reyes after a hearing to be
conducted in accordance with the cardinal requirements of procedural due
process.”
I gave my assent to the judgment but after thinking more about it, I am
now prepared to withdraw my assent to the last sentence thereof which
refers to the Commission on Elections the question of the
disqualification of Reyes with the injunction that procedural due
process should be followed. My reasons are:
1. The status of political parties during the regime of martial
law and thereafter up to January 30, 1980, when elections for local
offices were held was so uncertain and nebulous that one could not
really say whether or not there was “turncoatism” by any candidate. The
vagueÂness of the situation made the concept of “turncoatism”
constitutionally infirm.2. Reyes obtained more votes than Enriquez, his rival. Considering
that provisions of the Election Code are mandatory before but directory
after the election, the only suit to which Reyes should be exposed is
that of an election protest. An inquiry whether he was disqualified
because of turncoatism should no longer be viable.
In the light of the foregoing, I vote to grant the petition.
CONCURRING OPINION
AQUINO, J.:
In G. R. No. 52699, May 15, 1980, Reyes vs. Comelec, 97 SCRA
500, this Court directed the Comelec to nullify the proclamation of Jose
A. Enriquez as mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro and, instead, to
proclaim Renato U. Reyes and to hold a hearing on the pending
disqualification case against Reyes filed by Ernesto Liwanag, identified
as Comelec Case PP No. 374.
When the case was returned to the Comelec, Reyes, instead of proceeding
with the disqualification case against him, moved to dismiss it on the
ground that there was pending in the Court of First Instance an election
protest filed by Enriquez against Reyes in March, 1980 and docketed as
Election Case No. R-8.
The Comelec denied Reyes’ motion to dismiss. Reyes filed on March 11, 1981 in this Court the instant case, G. R. No. 56385, insisting that the Comelec should dismiss the disqualification case.
The petition is without merit because, as pointed out by the Chief
Justice, the ruling in the 1980 case is the law of the case. The
disqualification case is a pre-proclamation controversy. It can
co-exist with the electoral protest case because the issues are
different.
As the matter involves the 1980 elections, there is a pressing urgency for the early resolution of the two cases.
DISSENTING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
As stated in my separate opinion in the earlier decision in Reyes vs. Commission on Elections (97 SCRA 500, 511-516):
“I have previously urged that all such pre-election cases seeking
to disqualify the winner on the ground of alleged turncoatism should be
ordered dismissed after the elections, subject to the filing of an
appropriate quo warranto action or election protest against the winner
in the appropriate forum (the Comelec for provincial and city officials
and the proper Court of First Instance for municipal officials). This
coincides with the President’s own view as he was reported in the
February 27, 1980 newspapers ‘to have ordered the lawyers of the KBL
[Kilusang Bagong Lipunan] to withdraw all disqualification charges to
allow already proclaimed opposition candidates involved in such cases to
assume office,’ reservÂing the right to file an election protest
(although such Presidential orders seem to have been ignored since I am
not aware of any of the numerous disqualification cases before us that
have been so withdrawn).”
For the reasons and considerations set forth in my said opinion, as well
as in the separate dissenting opinion filed by Mr. Justice Abad Santos,
I am constrained to dissent from the majority judgment that would allow
the continuance – at this late stage – of the disqualification case
against petitioner “as a pre-proclamation controversy,” when petitioner
has all this time been proclaimed and assumed office as the duly elected
mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. To continue with the
pre-proclamation controversy is to go against the reality that his
opponent, the losing candidate Jose A. Enriquez, had since March 1980,
within the reglementary period, filed an election protest against the
election of petitioner, which to date is still pending and unacted upon –
and which by all standards is the proper recourse of said losing
candidate. (See majority opinion at pp. 3-6).
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petition.