IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF H. G. SMITH FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

Smith versus Ducat

The Case

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by H. G. Smith against Lieutenant Colonel Arthur C. Ducat, the commanding officer of the Cuartel de España in Manila. Smith claims he is being held without legal authority, while the respondent asserts that Smith is a soldier of the United States Army awaiting trial for desertion. The case matters because it defines the boundary between civil courts and military authority: when a commanding general certifies that a prisoner is held as a member of the Army, that certification is a conclusive answer to a habeas corpus petition, and the civil courts lose the power to inquire further.

Procedural History

Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on September 7, 1909. The Court issued an order requiring the commanding officer of the Cuartel de España to show cause why the writ should not issue. On the return day, the commanding officer appeared and made his return, attaching a certificate from the commanding general of the Department of Luzon. The Court then resolved the matter in this decision.

Facts

On September 7, 1909, a petition was presented to the Supreme Court on behalf of H. G. Smith, praying that a writ of habeas corpus issue, directed to the commanding officer of the Cuartel de España, requiring him to bring Smith's body into court. The petition stated that Smith was imprisoned and restrained of his personal liberty in the guardhouse of the Cuartel de España by Colonel Ducat, without warrant or authority of law. The cause of the detention was that Smith was held pending investigation of the military offense of desertion from the United States Army. The petition alleged that Smith was not and never had been a soldier in the United States Army.

The commanding officer made a return stating that he held Smith by authority of the United States as a soldier in the United States Army. According to the return, Smith was duly enlisted at Columbus Barracks, Ohio, on December 18, 1906, under the name of Joseph C. McCartney, for a term of three years. He deserted that service at Pasay Camp near Manila on January 10, 1908, and remained absent in desertion until he was apprehended at Manila on or about September 1, 1909, by the civil authorities, and was thereupon committed to the custody of the respondent. The return further stated that Smith was held in confinement charged with desertion and would be brought to trial as soon as practicable before a court-martial.

Accompanying the return was a certificate of Brigadier General William H. Carter, commanding the Department of Luzon, to the effect that Joseph C. McCartney, also known as H. G. Smith, is held in the custody of the United States by Lieutenant Colonel Ducat as a member of the Army of the United States, to wit, as a private in Battery D, Fourth Field Artillery.

Issues

• Whether or not the certificate of the commanding general that the prisoner is held as a member of the Army is a conclusive answer to the writ of habeas corpus, depriving the civil courts of jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the contention that a literal construction of the statute would render it invalid has merit.
• Whether or not the civil court can determine, upon evidence taken at this time, whether the petitioner is in fact the person referred to in the return who enlisted in the United States Army.

Applicable Provisions

Act Number 272, enacted October 21, 1901, provides:

It shall be a conclusive answer to a writ of habeas corpus against a military officer or soldier, and a sufficient excuse for not producing the prisoner, if the commanding general, or any general officer in command of the department or district, shall certify that the prisoner is held by him either as a prisoner of war; or as a member of the Army, a civilian employee thereof, or a camp follower and subject to its discipline.

This provision is the core of the decision: it makes the commanding general's certificate conclusive, ending the civil court's power to issue the writ or discharge the prisoner.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the certificate is conclusive. Courts-martial are established by Congress under the constitutional authority to raise armies and make rules for their government and discipline. Persons who enter the military service surrender their rights to be tried by the civil courts. It follows that civil courts cannot, through the writ of habeas corpus, deprive the proper military authorities of the right to hear and determine charges against persons in the military service. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Mekin versus Wolfe:

The certificate of the commanding officer is in strict compliance with the provisions of the law, and was a conclusive return to the writ of habeas corpus. The power of the court to either issue the writ or discharge the prisoner is ended when such return has been made, and the proceedings must there end.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the argument that a literal construction would render the statute invalid. The legislature had the power to determine what evidence should be required to establish a particular jurisdictional fact, and to determine that the fact when thus established should deprive the civil courts of the power to issue the writ. The certificate is not made conclusive upon the prisoner at his trial, and he will have ample opportunity in the proper tribunal to present his own evidence in contravention thereof.

On the third issue, the Court held that whether the petitioner is in fact the person referred to in the return who enlisted in the United States Army cannot be determined by the civil court upon evidence taken at this time, as that is one of the material issues which must be determined by the court-martial when the prisoner is brought to trial.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the writ of habeas corpus is extended to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, except in cases expressly provided by law. Second, persons properly in the charge of military authorities are excepted from the privileges of the writ. Third, under Act Number 272, the certificate of the commanding general or any general officer in command of the department or district that the prisoner is held as a member of the Army is a conclusive answer to a writ of habeas corpus against a military officer or soldier, and the civil court's power to issue the writ or discharge the prisoner is ended when such return is made. Fourth, the legislature may determine what evidence shall establish a jurisdictional fact and that such fact, when established, deprives civil courts of the power to issue the writ. Fifth, the certificate is not conclusive upon the prisoner at his trial, where he may present evidence in contravention thereof.

Disposition

The Court discharged the order to show cause and denied the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, leaving Smith in the custody of the military authorities for trial by court-martial.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: the certificate of the commanding general that the prisoner is held as a member of the Army is a conclusive answer to a writ of habeas corpus, and the civil court's power to issue the writ or discharge the prisoner is ended when such return is made. Examiners like to use this case to test the limits of civil court jurisdiction over persons in the military service and the conclusiveness of the statutory certificate under Act Number 272.