G.R. No. 55999. August 24, 1984
SPOUSES SALVACION SERRANO LADANGA AND AGUSTIN S. LADANGA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BERNARDO S. ASENETA, AS GUARDIAN OF THE INCOMPETENT CLEMENCIA A. ASENETA, RESPOND…
AQUINO, J.:
from the decision of the Court of Appeals (affirming the decision of the
Manila Court of First Instance), declaring void the sale to Salvacion
by her aunt, Clemencia A. Aseneta, of the 166-square-meter lot with a
house located at 1238 Sison Street, Paco, Manila for nonpayment of the
price of P26,000. It ordered the register of deeds of Manila to issue a
new title to Clemencia.
The said spouses were further ordered to pay to Clemencia’s estate
P21,000 as moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and to render
to Bernardo an accounting of the rentals of the property from April 6,
1974.
The Appellate Court and Judge Jose C. Colayco found that Clemencia, a
spinster who retired as division superintendent of public schools at 65
in 1961, had a nephew named Bernardo S. Aseneta, the child of her sister
Gloria, and a niece named Salvacion, the daughter of her sister Flora.
She legally adopted Bernardo in 1961 (Exh. B).
On a single date, April 6, 1974 (when Clemencia was about 78 years old), she signed nine deeds of sale in favor of Salvacion,
for various real properties. One deed of sale concerned the said Paco
property (administered by the Ladanga spouses) which purportedly was
sold to Salvacion for P26,000 (Exh. C). The total price involved in the
nine deeds of sale and in the tenth sale executed on November 8, 1974
was P92,200.
On the witness stand, Clemencia denied having “received even one
centavo” of the price of P26,000 (15, 16, 32 tsn August 16, 1976), much
less the P92,000. She considered the allegation that she received the
price as a lie, exclaiming on the witness stand: “Susmaryosep!
P92,000!” (15, 28-30 tsn August 16, 1976). This testimony was
corroborated by Soledad L. Maninang, 69, a dentist with whom Clemencia
had lived for more than thirty years in Kamuning, Quezon City.
The notary testified that the deed of sale for the Paco property was
signed in the office of the Quezon City registry of deeds. He did not
see Salvacion giving any money to Clemencia.
In May, 1975, Bernardo, as guardian of Clemencia, filed an action for
reconveyance of the Paco property, accounting of the rentals and
damages. Clemencia was not mentally incompetent but she was placed
under guardianship because she was an easy prey for exploitation and
deceit.
Parenthetically, it should be stated that she died on May 21, 1977 at
the age of 80. She allegedly bequeathed her properties in a holographic
will dated November 23, 1973 to Doctor Maninang. In that will she disinherited Bernardo. The will was presented for probate (Exh. 22-A and 22-C).
The testate case was consolidated with the intestate proceeding
filed by Bernardo in the sala of Judge Ricardo L. Pronove at Pasig,
Rizal. He dismissed the testate case. He appointed Bernardo as
administrator in the intestate case (p. 23, Bernardo’s brief).
As already stated, in the instant case, the trial court and the
Appellate Court declared void the sale of the Paco property. The
Ladanga spouses contend that the Appellate Court disregarded the rule on
burden of proof. This contention is devoid of merit because Clemencia
herself testified that the price of P26,000 was not paid to her. The
burden of the evidence shifted to the Ladanga spouses. They were not
able to prove the payment of that amount. The sale was fictitious.
The Ladanga spouses argue that the Appellate Court erred in not
considering that inadequacy of price may indicate a donation or some
other contract; in disregarding the presumption that the sale was fair
and regular and for a sufficient consideration; in overlooking important
facts and in not holding that Bernardo had no right to file a complaint
to annul the sale.
As a rule, only important legal issues, as contemplated in section 4,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, may be raised in a review of the
Appellate Court’s decision. This case does not fall within any of the
exceptions to that rule (2 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979
Ed. p. 475; Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 125 Phil. 701).
The questions ventilated by the Ladangas in their briefs and in their
comment of April 3, 1984 may be reduced to the issue of the validity of
the sale which the vendor Clemencia herself assailed in her testimony on
August 16 and December 3, 1976 when she was eighty years old. Her
testimony and that of the notary leave no doubt that the price of
P26,000 was never paid.
A contract of sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever where the
price, which appears therein as paid, has in fact never been paid by the
purchaser to the vendor (Meneses Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina
Roque, L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88; Mapalo vs. Mapalo,
123 Phil. 979, 987; Syllabus, Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs. Flores and Bas,
40 Phil. 921).
Such a sale is inexistent and cannot be considered consummated (Borromeo
vs. Borromeo, 98 Phil. 432; Cruzado vs. Bustos and Escaler, 34 Phil.
17; Garanciang vs. Garanciang, L-22351, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 229).
It was not shown that Clemencia intended to donate the Paco property to
the Ladangas. Her testimony and the notary’s testimony destroyed any
presumption that the sale was fair and regular and for a true
consideration.
Judge Colayco concluded that the Ladangas abused Clemencia’s confidence
and defrauded her of properties with a market value of P393,559.25 when
she was already 78 years old.
The contention that Bernardo had no right to institute the instant
action because he was not a compulsory heir of Clemencia cannot be
sustained. Bernardo was Clemencia’s adopted son. Moreover, Clemencia,
by testifying in this case, tacitly approved the action brought in her
behalf.
But the moral damages awarded by the trial court is not sanctioned by
articles 2217 to 2220 of the Civil Code. Clemencia’s own signature in
the deed brought about the mess within which she was entangled.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed with the
modification that the adjudication for moral and exemplary damages is
discarded. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., (Chairman), no part.
Abad Santos, J., reserves his vote.