G.R. No. 55938. June 26, 1981
JORY F. FADERANGA, NORBERTA RIOS, ANTOLIN FRUELDA, FILEMON MARTINQUILLA, AVELINO FABONAN, ERNESTO FERRANCULLO, ELMER FABAYOS, PEDRO FADEROGAO, REYNALDO FETALVERO, AND RADIGONES …
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The resolution assailed in this certiorari and mandamus
proceeding was issued on December 29, 1980.
The petition gains force and persuasiveness considering the principle
consistently adhered to by this Court from Venezuela v. Commission on
Elections,[1]
decided as far back as July 25, 1980. We
do so again.
The case arose from a petition filed on January 18, 1980 by
private respondents with respondent Commission on Elections seeking the
disqualification of petitioners from being candidates respectively for mayor,
vice mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Banton, Romblon. It was alleged that they changed their party
affiliation from KBL to NP within six
(6) months before the local election.
On the date of the election, such petition was still undecided. Petitioners won and on January 31, 1980 were
proclaimed duly elected respectively as mayor, vice mayor and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Banton, Romblon.
Petitioners were informed that respondent Commission on Elections sent a
telegram to the Registrar of Banton, Romblon to suspend the proclamation of the
petitioners. It was, however, received
only late in the same day of January 31, 1980 after the proclamation. It was not until February 28, 1980 that such
petition for disqualification was resolved.
It was denied for lack of sufficient evidence. Accordingly, on March 3, 1980, the Registrar
of Banton, Romblon, advised petitioners that all winning candidates would be
proclaimed anew on the afternoon of that day.
Thus, for the second time, on March 3, 1980, petitioners were proclaimed. Only then did petitioners take their oaths of
office. There was a motion for
reconsideration by private respondents with respondent Commission on March 19,
1980. An opposition was filed by
petitioners on April 17, 1980. It was
their contention that no new issues, grounds or facts were raised therein. For them, the proclamation having attained
the stage of finality, to reopen the proceedings would be tantamount to
annulling it contrary to the 1978 Election Code. The motion for reconsideration was heard and
submitted for resolution on September 29, 1980.
Then, three months to the day, on December 29, 1980, as noted at the
outset, respondent Commission reversed itself.
Hence this certiorari and mandamus petition filed on
January 19, 1981. A temporary
restraining order was issued on January 20, 1981.
In the aforecited case of Venezuela v. Commission on Elections,
as well as in the succeeding cases of Villegas v. Commission on Elections,[2]
and Potencion v. Commission on Elections,[3]
the two latter cases decided as early
as September 4, 1980, the attempt to prolong a pre-proclamation controversy
even after the duly elected officials had been proclaimed and had
assumed office did not prosper. This
Court applied the doctrine, earlier noted, that such a stage having been
reached, the proper remedy would be an election contest or a quo warranto
petition as the case may be. In the
language of Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections:[4]
“Since Venezuela v. Commission on Elections, this Court has invariably
adhered to the principle that after the holding of the January 30, 1980
election, and a proclamation thereafter made, a petition to disqualify a
candidate based on a change of political party affiliation within six months
immediately preceding or following an election, filed with this Court after January
30, 1980, arising from a pre-proclamation controversy, should be dismissed
without prejudice to such ground being passed upon in a proper election protest
or quo warranto proceeding. Where,
however, such constitutional provision had been seasonably invoked prior to
that date with the Commission on Elections having acted on it and the matter
then elevated to this Court before such election, the issue thus presented
should be resolved.”[5]
As a matter of fact, in Arcenas v. Commission on Elections,[6]
when petitioner, the defeated mayoralty candidate for Hermosa, Bataan
instituted a certiorari proceeding alleging a grave abuse of discretion
as respondent Commission motu proprio dismissed an action
for disqualification of private respondent, the victor in such election, this
Court found nothing objectionable in what was done. The Commission was sustained. That decision of this Court, rendered a month
before the assailed resolution, ought to have furnished guidance. Respondent Commission should have denied the
motion considering that as far back as March 3, 1980, petitioners were
proclaimed and thereafter held and continue to hold the offices in
question. That is not merely to abide by
the authoritative pronouncements of this Court.
It would be likewise in consonance with what the realities of the
situation dictate. Even disregarding
the first pronouncement, the Commission, apparently after considerable thought,
had affirmed that as the victors in the election, petitioners had earned the
right to be proclaimed. To upset the
existing conditions in Banton, Romblon under the circumstances would not be
conducive to stability. On the other
hand, to follow the authoritative pronouncement of this Court and thus put an
end to the pre-proclamation controversy, reserving the right to private
respondents to pursue the matter in the appropriate election protest or quo
warranto petition as the case may be, would be more in keeping with the orderly
ways of the law. This is not to impugn
the good faith of respondent Commission.
It is merely to stress that in a choice of alternatives, what should
guide its final disposition of a pre-proclamation controversy after the lapse
of a considerable period is to accord respect to a proclamation made after due
deliberation but, as noted above, without prejudice to a protest or quo
warranto action to be filed, if the losing party chooses to pursue such remedy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The order of December 29, 1980 is nullified
and set aside, amounting as it does to a grave abuse of discretion. The right of petitioners as duly elected
officials in the various positions in question to continue as such is affirmed,
subject, however, to private respondents, if so minded, instituting an election
protest or a quo warranto proceeding, as the case may be. For that purpose, they are given a period of
fifteen (15) days after receipt of this decision. The restraining order of January 20, 1981 is
hereby made permanent. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.
Teehankee, Barredo, Fernandez, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., and
Guerrero, JJ., on leave.
Aquino, J., no part.
[1] G.R. No. 53532.
[2]
G.R. No. 52463.
[3]
G.R. No. 52527.
[4] G.R. No. 53953, January 5, 1981.
[5] Ibid, 2. Cf. The two latter cases of Laguda v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 53747, February 20, 1981 and Agcaoili v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52791, February 26, 1981 are equally
relevant.
[6] G.R. No. 54039, November 28, 1980.