ESPERANZA BORILLO, IN HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF HER CHILDREN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CATALINA BORILLO, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed on 24 November 1980, petitioner urges this Court to
review and reverse the decision^[1] of
the Court of Appeals (Thirds Division) in C.A.-G.R. No. 64536-R, promulgated on
3 September 1980, which reversed
and set aside the 3 June 1978 decision of Branch II of the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Abra in Civil Case No. 1043.

On 10 February 1977, petitioner, for herself and on behalf of her
children, filed before the abovementioned trial court a complaint against
private respondent and Marcos Borillo for the recovery of several parcels of
land located at Bugbuguis, Quillat, Langiden, Abra particularly described in
said complaint, under the first cause of action, as follows:

“(a)   A
parcel of land (Riceland unirr. and pastureland) x x x with an area of 1231 sq. m.; with assessed value in the
sum of P40.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6319 in the name of Esperanza
Borillo, et al.,

(b)      
A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) x x x with an area of 980 sq. m.; with an assessed value in the
sum of P40.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6320 in the name of Esperanza
Borillo, et al.,

(c)      
A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) x x x with an area of 698
sq. m.; with assessed value in the sum of P20.00; under Tax Declaration
No. 6321 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et al.,

(d)      
A parcel of land (Cornland) x x x with an area of 570 sq. m.; with an assessed value of P20.00;
under Tax Declaration No. 6322 in he name of Esperanza Borillo, et al.^[2]

and one-fifth (1/5) undivided portion of
two (2) parcels of land, also located in the same place as the above four (4)
parcels, particularly described under the second cause of action, thus:

“(e)   A
parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) x x x with an area f 1440 sq. m.; with an
assessed value of P60.00; under Tax Declaration No. 1745 in the name of
Venancio Borillo.

(f)     A parcel of land (Cornland) x x x with an area of 684 sq. m.; with an
assessed value of P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 0746 in the name of
Venancio Borillo.”^[3]

The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1043.

In the complaint, petitioner alleges that the abovementioned
parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d) were originally owned by her late husband,
Elpidio Borillo, with whom she had four (4) children, namely: Patricia, Melecio, Bonifacia and
Quirino. Although said parcels of land
were unregistered, they were declared in 1948 in the name of Elpidio under Tax
Declaration Nos. 0731, 0732, 0733 and 0734, respectively.^[4]
Elpidio had been in peaceful, public, continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof in concept of owner even before his marriage to petitioner and until
his death in 1970. After his death,
petitioner continued to possess and cultivate said parcels of land and enjoy
the fruits thereof until sometime in 1971-1972 when private respondent and
Marcos Borillo, Elpidio’s siblings, forcibly and unlawfully dispossessed her of
the property. Despite repeated demands,
Marcos and the private respondent refused to return the property to the petitioner
and her children. In 1974, new Tax
Declarations, namely Nos. 6319, 6320, 6321 and 6322^[5] for
parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d), respectively, were issued in her name. Upon the other hand, parcels (e) and (f),
also unregistered, were inherited by Elpidio, his brother Marcos and sisters
Catalina, Aurelia and Rosita, from their father, Venancio Borillo. Elpidio’s 1/5 pro-indiviso share
therein was unlawfully taken by private respondent sometime in 1971; the latter
refused to return it to petitioner and her children, who are Elpidio’s heirs,
despite repeated demands.

Petitioner, then prays that judgment be rendered declaring her
and her children owners of parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d), as well as the 1/5 pro-indiviso
portion of parcels (e) and (f), and ordering the private respondent and
Marcos Borillo to pay actual and moral damages-plus costs.

In their Answer filed on 14 March 1977, private respondent claims
that parcels (a), (c) and (d) were sold to
her by her late brother Elpidio in 1935, while Marcos Borillo claims
that parcel (b) was sold to him by Elpidio sometime in 1937, long before
Elpidio’s marriage to petitioner. Although they did not declare these parcels for taxation purposes in their respective names,
they immediately took possession and occupied the same as owners thereof. Private respondent had been paying the
realty taxes on parcels (a), (c) and
(d) since 1948^[6]
and explains her failure to secure in her name tax declarations for said
parcels during Elpidio’s lifetime by alleging that she trusted him because he
was her brother and he had assured her that she could transfer in her favor the
title thereto anytime. After the Second
World War, Elpidio and Rosita, another sibling, sold to her their respective
undivided shares in parcels (e) and (f).

On 15 March 1977, private respondent alone filed an Amended
Answer. On the other hand, on 5 April
1977, Patricia and Melencio Borillo filed a motion to withdraw as co-plaintiffs
on the ground that they did not authorize their inclusion as such and that the
private respondent is the true and lawful owner of the land in question.^[7]

At the trial, private respondent relied heavily on Exhibit
“3”, a private document purportedly showing that Elpidio sold to her all
his property for P40.00,
and Exhibit “4”, which she claims to be a deed of sale of parcels
(a), (c) and (d) allegedly executed by Elpidio Borillo in 1935. Upon the other hand, Marcos Borillo claimed
that the deed of sale evidencing the sale to him of parcel (b) was lost during
the Second World War. Both parties
claim actual possession of the property. Private respondent and Marcos Borillo even claimed possession for more
than thirty (30) years.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered on 3 June 1978 a decision in favor of herein
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the plaintiffs as the true owners of parcels A, B, C and D
described in par. 4 of the complaint and as co-owners of parcels E and F
described in par. 6 of the complaint with Rosita Borillo, Aurelia Borillo and
the defendants Catalina Borillo and Marcos Borillo. With costs against the defendants.”^[8]

The trial court arrived at this decision on the basis of the
following findings of fact:

“The claim of ownership
by the plaintiffs with respect to the four parcels of land described in par. 4
of the complaint is preponderantly established by Tax Declaration Nos. 731,
732, 733 and 734, Exhibits “A, A-1, A-2 and A-3” for the plaintiffs. These tax declarations covering the four
parcels of land in question are tax declarations issued in 1948 and is
(sic) in the name of Elpidio Borillo,
husband of plaintiff Esperanza Borillo. Defendants never declared it (sic) in their name (sic) and no action or
attempt whatsoever was made by the defendants to declare it (sic) in their name
(sic) during the lifetime of Elpidio Borillo. It was only after the death of Elpidio Borillo and the institution of
this action by the plaintiffs that defendants took action and strangely declared
it (sic) in their names.

Obviously, the bulk of evidence for the plaintiffs are (sic) the tax declarations in the name
of Elpidio Borillo which do not absolutely prove their ownership. But the circumstances obtaining in this case
renders (sic) the tax declarations — Exhibits “A, A-1, A-2 and A-3″, reliable and predominantly
point that plaintiffs are owners of the four parcels of land described in par.
4 of the complaint as against the plaintiffs (sic). First, it will be noted that Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 were
prepared and issued long before the death of Elpidio Borillo. He was then a bachelor having married the
plaintiff Esperanza Borillo in 1950. Defendant Catalina Borillo married long before the 2nd World War. Defendant Marcos Borillo likewise married
before World War II. Defendants have
properties declared in their names. Marcos Borillo accompanied the Assessors who measured the four parcels
of land according to him (sic). Despite
the status of the parties and the Assessors having been accompanied by
defendant Marcos Borillo, still the four parcels of land were declared in the
name of Elpidio Borillo. It is
unconceivable (sic) why it was (sic) declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo, if it does (sic) not belong to
him. True, that tax declarations are
not conclusive proof of ownership, but it cannot be gainsaid especially in
rural areas like Langiden, Abra where lands are not surveyed and titled, that
tax declarations are strong evidence of possession and ownership.

Secondly, the four parcels of land described in par. 4 of the
complaint were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo for 29 years and no
action whatsoever was taken by the defendants to have the tax declarations
(Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3) be (sic)
cancelled and declared the lands (sic) in their names during the
lifetime of the declared owner Elpidio Borillo and immediately after his
death. It was only in 1977 after the
filing of the complaint and after the plaintiffs caused the cancellation of
Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 and declared the lands in their names when
defendants attempted to declare it (sic) also in their names. The unfathomable tolerance of the defendants
of having the four (4) parcels of land be (sic) declared in the name of their
deceased brother, Elpidio Borillo in 1948 and remained (sic) in his name after
his marriage with (sic) the plaintiff Esperanza Borillo in 1950 even (sic)
after his death in 1971, is fatal and strongly negate their (sic) defendants’
claim of ownership. No person like the
defendants will ever allow his/her property be (sic) declared in the name of
another for twenty-nine (29) years. The
fact that the lands were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo for
twenty-nine (29) years coupled by (sic) his actual possession during his
lifetime until his death in 1971 as testified to by Esperanza Borillo and
Clemente Llaneza who is an uninterested witness strongly outweighed the
evidence for the defendants and convincingly indicate that the four parcels of
land described in par. 4 of the complaint really belong to Elpidio
Borillo. The claim of defendants that
they are (sic) in actual possession before World War II up to the present is
persuasively belied by Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 and the testimony of
Clemente Llaneza.

The claim of defendant Catalina Borillo that she purchased parcels
A, C and D described in par. 4 of the complaint from her deceased brother
Elpidio Borillo before World War II as evidence (sic) by Exhibits “3”
and “4” appears unreliable and incredible. Exhibit “3” which is an acknowledgment receipt dated
May 12, 1946 made no mention of what property has been sold. There is no evidence of any transfer of
ownership. In fact, there is nothing
clear from the evidence as to what land of Elpidio Borillo is referred to in
Exhibit “3”. From the terms
of Exhibit “3” and the alleged consideration thereof, it thus becomes
obvious that it is only a receipt evidencing a loan of P40.00.

Exhibit “4” (receipt) which is the main basis of the
claim of ownership by defendant Catalina Borillo with respect to parcels A, C
and D in par. 4 of the complaint, appears unreliable and cannot prevail against
the evidence for the plaintiffs. This
Exhibit “4” for defendant Catalina-Borillo is undated and
unsigned. Defendant Catalina Borillo
testified that she does not know the contents of Exhibit “4”. Elpidio Borillo as shown by Exhibit
“3” for defendant Catalina Borillo and Exhibits E and F for the
plaintiffs knows how to write his name. Yet, Exhibit “4” was not signed by him. Aside from the patent defects of Exhibit
“4” on its face which renders it unreliable, it will be noted that
during the pre-trial proceedings, defendant Catalina Borillo presented Exhibit
“4” to support her claim as alleged in her answer of having purchased
parcels A, C and D from Elpidio Borillo in 1935. Clearly embodied, however, in Exhibit “4” are tax
declarations Nos. 0732, 0731 and 0734 which are indeed tax declarations in 1948
in the name of Elpidio Borillo. Considering that Exhibit “4” is a document executed in 1935
according to the defendant Catalina Borillo, why are Tax Declarations Nos. 731,
732 and 734 which were issued only in 1948 incorporated? The inclusion of non-existent document (sic)
in Exhibit “4” at the time of its alleged execution absolutely
renders Exhibit “4” wholly unworthy undeserving of any
credence.”^[9]

Private respondent appealed from the adverse decision to the
respondent Court. Her co-defendant,
Marcos Borillo, did not.

The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 64536-R. In her Appellant’s Brief, private respondent
assigns the following errors:

“I

THAT THE FACTS RELIED UPON IS (sic) NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

II

THAT THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.”

On 3 September 1980, the respondent Court promulgated its
decision^[10]
reversing the decision of the trial court, thus:

“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and
another judgment is hereby
rendered declaring defendant. Catalina
Borillo as the owner of parcels (a), (c) and (d) and of the one-fifth portion
of Elpidio Borillo in parcels (e) and (f); that defendant Marcos Borillo is the
owner of parcel (b); with costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.”

The respondent Court made the following disquisitions to support
its decision:

“We are convinced that the preponderance of the evidence tilt
(sic) heavily in favor of defendant. Defendant established she has been in possession in the concept of owner
of said three parcels of land (a), (c) and (d) since her purchase of the same
long before the war and she cultivated the same in the concept of owner, paying
the real estate taxes and thereafter declaring it in her name while Marcos
Borillo acquired parcel (b) from Elpidio since 1938 of which he took possession
in the concept of owner, and declared the same in his name paying the real
estate taxes. No less than Melecio
Borillo, son of plaintiff Esperanza, not only withdrew as party plaintiff with
his sister Patricia but he even testified that he knew from the very mouth of
his father Elpidio while he was still alive that he sold the property in
question to defendant Catalina Borillo. It has also been shown that Elpidio Borillo sold his 1/5 portion of
parcels (e) and (f) also before the war to defendant and she had been in
continuous possession since then in the concept of owner.

Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, such uninterrupted, adverse,
open possession for thirty (30) years by the defendants regardless of their
title or good faith upholds said defendants’ right over the property. (Parcotillo vs. Parcotillo, 12 SCRA 435,
440)

In finding for the plaintiffs the trial court relied on the tax
declarations in the name of Elpidio as proof that plaintiffs are the owners of
the questioned property since the property is untitled; that for 29 years no
action was taken by defendants to declare the property in their name (sic) and
it was only in 1977 after the filing of the complaint that defendants so
declared the properties in their name (sic); that Exhibit 4 is unreliable being
unsigned by Elpidio when there is evidence that he could sign his name; that
Exhibit 3 did not mention the property sold; that Exhibit 4 was made in 1935 as
alleged in the answer but surprisingly it embodied Tax Declarations 731, 732
and 734 which were issued only in 1948; and that the alleged sale of the right
of Elpidio over parcels (e) and (f) are without receipts.

We disagree. Declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes, or assessment declaration and tax receipts do
not constitute evidence of ownership. They are only prima facie evidence of possession. (Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607;
Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562) However, if the holder of a (sic) land
presents a deed of conveyance in his favor from the former owner thereof to
support his claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and tax receipts
relative to the property may be used to prove good faith on his part in
occupying and possessing the same. (Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384) And while it is true that tax
receipts do not prove titled (sic) to a land, nevertheless when considered with
the actual possession of the property by the applicant, they constitute
evidence of great weight in support of the claim of title of ownership by
prescription. (Viernes vs. Agpaoa, 41 Phil.
286; Land Registration and Mortgages by Ventura pp. 125-126)

Plaintiffs admitted that defendants are in possession of the lands
in question and the records show that even during the lifetime of Elpidio, the
defendant had been the real property taxes of the property (Exhs. 1 to 1-I). The sale of parcels (a), (c) and (d) to
defendant is evidenced by Exhibits 3 and 4. Although Exhibit 3 does not indicate the property subject of the sale,
such deficiency can be attributed to the fact that this was a document executed
between brother and sister without the assistance of a lawyer but testimonial
evidence has been adduced that cured this defect. True it is that Exhibit 4 appears not to have been signed by
Elpidio and he merely imprinted a cross over his name when it appears that he
knew how to sign. However, defendants
Catalina and Marcos Borillo categorically testified that Elpidio signed his
name only by copying a sample. Hence,
it is understandable if Elpidio did not sign Exhibit 4 for he must not have
been furnished a (sic) guide to be copied. No evidence was adduced that Exhibit 4 was actually executed in
1935. What was established is that Elpidio sold said three
parcels to defendant Catalina before the war. In confirmation of said sale, Exhibit 4 must have been executed on or
before 1948 that is why it reflects the Tax Declarations of said property to be
effective in the same year.

On the other hand, outside of the fact that the property remained
to be declared in the name of Elpidio plaintiffs have not adduced any other
evidence to buttress their claim of ownership. Plaintiff Esperanza paid for the real property taxes of the property
only on June 22, 1977 after the complaint was filed in court. (Exhibit C) It is not improbable that the
reason why the properties remained in the name of Elpidio inspite of the fact
that it has long been sold to
defendants is because this is a sale between brother and sister where mutual
trust and confidence is to be expected. Indeed, during the lifetime of Elpidio he never questioned the acts of
ownership exercised by the defendants over the property and even after his
death in 1970, plaintiff Esperanza only remembered to assert their alleged
right in 1976 when she attempted to talk to defendant who told her it was
already sold to them and yet it was only in 1977 that the complaint was
filed.”

Petitioner took this present recourse asking Us to review the
respondent Court’s findings of facts and reverse its decision on the ground
that the same is based solely on “speculation, surmise and
conjecture,” and that it committed a “misapprehension
of facts.”

After private respondent filed her Comment and the petitioner
submitted a Reply, this Court gave due course to the petition^[11]
and required the petitioner to submit her Brief within thirty (30) days from
notice,^[12]
which she complied with.^[13]
Private respondent subsequently filed her Brief.^[14]

The petition is meritorious.

To begin with, the respondent Court committed a grave error in
reversing the trial court’s judgment insofar as it concerns defendant Marcos
Borillo. As earlier stated, the latter
did not appeal from the trial court’s decision. As against him, and more particularly with respect to parcel (b),
the decision had long become final and the respondent Court is without jurisdiction
to review the same.^[15]
Otherwise stated, beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within
the scope of the power of review of any court.^[16] The
appeal interposed by private respondent did not benefit Marcos Borillo because
the former does not have anything to do with parcel (b) and the defense in
respect thereto is exclusive to the latter.

The respondent Court likewise erred in reversing the trial court
and ruling that private respondent is the owner of parcels (a), (c) and (d) and
Elpidio Borillo’s 1/5 pro-indiviso share
in parcels (e) and (f).

It is of course
settled that the appellate court’s findings of fact are binding and must be
respected by this Court.^[17]
There are, however, recognized exceptions thereto,^[18]
among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court are conflicting,^[19] when
they are totally devoid of support in the record or are so glaringly erroneous
as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.^[20]

These exceptions obtain in the present case.

The fact that parcels (a), (c) and (d) were originally
owned by Elpidio Borillo is not disputed by private respondent. In fact, she claims to have derived her
title over the same from the former through a sale in 1935. Thus, the question to be resolved is whether
or not Elpidio Borillo did in fact sell
the said parcels of land to the private respondent.

To substantiate her claim, private respondent presented two (2)
documents, Exhibits “3” and “4”. The trial court in its judgment described Exhibit “3”,
dated 12 May 1946, as a mere acknowledgment receipt of a loan of P40.00
and not a sale for it does not mention any property sold and is not
acknowledged before a notary public. It
then concluded that said instrument is a mere receipt evidencing a loan. On the other hand, Exhibit “4” is
an undated and unsigned document written in lead pencil on simple grade
paper. The instrument has no witnesses,
is not acknowledged before a notary public and has a mere cross over the
written name of Elpidio Borillo. It was
duly proven that Elpidio knew how to write and sign his name. Although Exhibit “4” was,
purportedly executed in 1935, the same mentions Tax Declaration Nos. 0731,
0732, 0733 and 0734 issued in 1948 in the name of Elpidio Borillo. Private respondent herself testified that
she had no knowledge of the contents of said instrument. The trial court ruled Exhibit “4”
as “wholly unworthy and undeserving of any credence.”

In reversing the foregoing findings, the respondent Court tried
to justify the deficiencies and discrepancies in Exhibit “3” by
saying that the absence of specifications as to what property was sold is
understandable because the transaction was between brother and sister. It added that this defect was cured by
testimonial evidence. It made no
attempt, however, to explain the variance in
the date of the alleged sale (1935) and the date of the instrument
(1946).

As to Exhibit
“4”, the respondent Court accepted private respondent’s explanation
for the absence of the signature of Elpidio Borillo of the purported deed of
sale saying that contrary to petitioner’s assertion, Elpidio did not really
know how to write his name. Private
respondent and Marcos Borillo
testified that Elpidio’s signature
appeared on his voter’s registration record and voter’s ID card^[21]
only because he was given a
sample to copy. They declared that
unlike those occasions, at the time of the
sale, Elpidio was not given any sample to copy; this explains why he just
printed a cross over his name. As to
why it mentions tax declarations issued in 1948, although it is claimed to have
been executed in 1935, the respondent Court theorizes and speculates that:

“x x x In confirmation of said sale, Exhibit 4 must have been
executed on or before 1948 that is why
it reflects the Tax Declarations of said property to be effective in the same
year. “^[22]

It is thus clear that what was originally submitted by private
respondent as the original deed of sale was later accepted by the respondent
Court as a deed of confirmation of sale.

Both Exhibits
“3” and “4” are private documents. Hence, before they may be received in evidence, their due execution and
authenticity must first be proven by the party presenting them.^[23]
At the hearing of this case before the trial court, the controlling rule on
this point was Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provided:

“SECTION 21. Private
writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before any private writing may be
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a)   
By anyone who saw the writing executed;

(b)   
By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the
maker; or

(c)   
By a subscribing witnesses.^[24]

Private respondent did not present anyone who actually saw the
execution of Exhibits “3” and “4”, witnessed Elpidio affix
his signature on Exhibit “3” or make the cross over his written name
in Exhibit “4”. There are no
subscribing witnesses. The due execution
then of Exhibits “3” and “4”, as the alleged deeds of sale
transferring title over said parcels of land to private respondent, was not
satisfactorily proven; thus, the same can not be received in evidence.

Even if We are to assume that Exhibits “3” and “4” are
admissible in evidence, they still do not satisfactorily prove the transfers of
titles over the subject parcels to the private respondent. As earlier pointed out, Exhibit
“3” makes no mention of any property sold. Hence, it hardly qualifies as a deed of sale. It suffers from a patent and not, just an
intrinsic ambiguity. The respondent Court
then committed an error by giving credence to the testimonies offered to cure
such ambiguity. It disregarded the
parol evidence rule then applicable, namely, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, which provided as follows:

“SECTION 7. Evidence
of written agreements. — When the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing,
except in the following cases:

(a)    
Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b)     
When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.

The term ‘agreement’ includes wills.”^[25]

Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify,
explain or define the subject matter of a writing, it must first be shown that
the writing itself already contains a description sufficient to serve as a
foundation for the admission of such parol evidence; the evidence should also
be consistent with the writing. Otherwise stated, in order to admit parol evidence to aid in the
description of the subject matter of a deed or other writing, there must be a
description that will serve as a foundation for such evidence; the writing must
at least give some data from which the description may be found and made
certain. Parol evidence is not
admissible too identify the property where the description thereof is so vague
as to amount to no description at all. In other words, parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description,
but only to apply it.^[26]

In his Commentary on the Rules of Court,^[27]
former Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran explains the rule in the event of patent
ambiguity, as is the case in Exhibit “3”:

“x x x The rule is that ‘if the words of a document are so
defective or ambiguous as to be unmeaning, no evidence can be given to show
what the author of the document intended to say.’ (Steph, Evidence, Art. 91) The reason for the rule, in the language of Mr. Justice Story, is that
‘if the language be too doubtful for any settled construction, by the admission
of parol evidence you create and do not merely construe the contract. You attempt to do that for the party which
he has not chosen to do for himself; and the law very properly denies such an
authority to courts of Justice.’ (Peisch v Dickson, Fed. Cas. No. 10, 911, 1. Mason, 9.) As Lord Bacon
said, ‘Ambiguitas patens cannot
be holpen by averment.’ (Bacon, Max.,
23) A case of patent ambiguity is that of a deed wherein a ‘parcel of land’
without description is donated. The
donation is void. The uncertainty
cannot be explained by parol evidence. (Wigmore on Evidence, 2d. ed., p. 414.) The following appears to be the
most accurate and most comprehensive statement of the rule regarding patent
ambiguity: ‘In other words and more
generally, if the court, placing itself in the situation in which the testator or contracting party stood at the time
of executing the instrument, and with a full understanding of the force and
import of the words, cannot ascertain his meaning and intention from the
language of the instrument, then it is a case of incurable, hopeless
uncertainty and the instrument is, therefore,
so far inoperative and void.’ (Palmer v Albee, 50 Ia., 429; 432, quoting 1
Greenleaf on Evidence, par. 300.)”

As to Exhibit “4”, We agree with the trial court that
it could not have been prepared in 1935, as contended by private respondent,
because it makes reference to Tax Declarations issued in 1948, thirteen (13)
years later. Common sense and logic
reject such contention. Unfortunately,
the respondent Court belabored the explanation that Exhibit “4” must
have been executed on or before
1948 to confirm the prior sale. This is
unacceptable as it is purely conjectural. Absent any evidence that it was signed by Elpidio Borillo, it is not
difficult to conclude that this document does not proceed from any legitimate
source. It is one which could easily be
fabricated. The trial court did not
then err when it considered Exhibit “4” as “wholly unworthy and
undeserving of any credence.”

It is not also true, as was held by the respondent Court, that the
conclusion of the trial court that Elpidio Borillo was in possession of the
property in concept of owner until his death, is based solely on the tax
declarations in his name. As shown
earlier, the court considered the testimonies of the petitioner and one
Clemente Llaneza whom the trial court described as “an uninterested witness.” Thus:

“x x x The fact
that the lands were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo for twenty-nine
(29) years coupled by his actual possession during his lifetime until his death in 1971 as testified
to by Esperanza Borillo and Clemente Llaneza who is an uninterested witness
strongly outweighed the evidence for the defendants and convincingly indicate
that the four parcels of land described in
paragraph 4 of the complaint really belong to Elpidio Borillo. x x x”

It is thus clear that the authorities
cited by the respondent Court on the probative value of the tax declarations
favor the herein petitioner and not the private respondent. For indeed, while tax declarations and tax
receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are prima facie evidence
of possession. Accordingly, since
Elpidio Borillo, during his lifetime, and then the petitioner, after his death,
secured and were issued tax declarations for the parcels of land in question,
and were in fact in possession thereof, the excuse offered by private
respondent as to her failure to obtain the tax declarations deserves no consideration at all. The flimsiness or implausibility of the
excuse becomes more apparent when We consider the findings of the trial court
that private respondent has other properties declared in her name for taxation purposes and that neither she nor
Marcos objected to the measurement by the assessors of the four (4) parcels for
Elpidio Borillo.

The conclusion then is inevitable that the late Elpidio Borillo
did not sell and alienate parcels (a), (c) and (d) to private respondent.

As to parcels (e) and (f), private respondent presented no deed
of sale in her favor.

Private respondent can not likewise seek refuge under a claim of ownership by virtue
of acquisitive prescription.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion requires that there be
public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner^[28]
for a period of ten (10) years, in case of ordinary prescription,^[29]
and thirty (30) years, in case of extraordinary prescription.^[30]

After reviewing the evidence presented before it, the trial court
concluded that Elpidio Borillo had actual, peaceful and continuous possession
of the subject parcels of land during his lifetime and until death in
1970. The respondent Court reversed
this finding and ruled that it was private respondent who had the possession
since her purchase thereof in 1935.

It is a matter of judicial policy to accord the trial court’s findings of facts
with the highest respect and not to disturb the same on appeal unless there are
strong and impelling reasons to do so.^[31] The
reason for this is that trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to
examine factual matters than appellate courts.^[32] They
are in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses, not only by the nature of
their testimonies, but also by
their demeanor on stand.^[33]

In Shauf vs. Court of Appeals^[34]
We ruled:

“Elementary is the rule that the conclusions and findings of
fact of the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons. (Vda. de
Alberto, et al. vs. CA, et al.,
173 SCRA 436 [1989]) Absent any substantial proof, therefore, that the trial
court’s decision was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures, the same must be accorded full consideration and respect. This should be so because the trial court
is, after all, in a much better position to observe and correctly appreciate
the respective parties’ evidence as they were presented. (Matabuena vs. CA, et al., 173 SCRA 170 [1989]”

We find no impelling, compelling or cogent reason to overturn the
findings of fact of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Abra dated 3 June 1978 in Civil Case No. 1043 is hereby AFFIRMED and
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Rollo, 46-54.

^[2]
Rollo, 46-47.

^[3]
Id., 47.

^[4]
Exhibits “A”, “A-1”, “A-2” and “A-3”, respectively.

^[5]
Exhibits “B”, “B-1”, “B-2” and “B-3”, respectively.

^[6]
Exhibits “13”-A” to “13-H”, inclusive.

^[7]
Rollo, 37.

^[8]
Rollo, 37.

^[9]
Rollo, 93-96.

^[10]
Id., 46-54.

^[11]
Rollo, 97.

^[12]
Rollo, 107.

^[13]
Id., 116, et seq.

^[14]
Id., 162, et seq.

^[15]
Layda vs. Legaspi, 39
Phil. 83 [1918]; Valdez vs. Ocumen, 106 Phil. 929 [1960]; Ramirez vs.
Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]; Abad vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 817
[1989].

^[16]
Pan Realty Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 564 [1988]; Rizo vs. Solano, 197 SCRA 711
[1991].

^[17]
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737[1970].

^[18]
Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola
Bottling Co. of the P.I., 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Lim Yhi Luya vs. Court of
Appeals, 99 SCRA 668 [1980]; Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988];
Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 [1990].

^[19]
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Metro Port Service,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 365 [1984]; Rañeses vs. IAC,
187 SCRA 397 [1990]: Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 603
[1991]; Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 833 [1991].

^[20]
Santa Ana Jr., vs. Hernandez, 18 SCRA 973 [1966].

^[21]
Exhibits “E” and “F”, respectively.

^[22]
Rollo, 53.

^[23]
Section 21, now Section 20, Rule
132, Rules of Court; Bunag vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 299 [1988],
citing Nolan vs. Salas, 7 Phil, 1 [1906]; U.S. vs. Evangelista,
29 Phil. 215 [1915]; Antillon vs. Barcelon,
37 Phil. 148 [1917].

^[24]
This was subsequently amended and renumbered as Section 20. As amended, it now reads:

“SECTION 20. Proof of private document.
— Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

a)      
By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

b)      
By evidence of the genuineness of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need
only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.”

^[25]
This was amended and renumbered as Section 9, Rule 130.

^[26]
32A C.J.S. 575-580.

^[27]
Vol. 5, 1980 ed., 121-122.

^[28]
Article 1118, Civil Code.

^[29]
Article 1134, Civil Code.

^[30]
Article 1137, Id.

^[31]
Ayco vs. Fernandez, 195 SCRA 328 [1991], People vs. Laureta, 159
SCRA 236 [1988].

^[32]
Pe vs. IAC., 195 SCRA 137 [1991].

^[33]
People vs. Solis, 195 SCRA 405 [1991]; People vs. Francisco, 182
SCRA 305 [1990]; People vs. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141 [1985].

^[34]
191 SCRA 713 [1990].