G.R. No. 55628. March 02, 1984
GOVERNOR ZOSIMO J. PAREDES AND MAYOR MARIO W. CHILAGAN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECT…
FERNANDO, C.J.:
treated as a special civil action for prohibition, one of first
impression, arose from the issuance of a proclamation by the President,[1] directing that a plebiscite be conducted in certain barangays[2] all within the municipality of Mayoyao, Province of Ifugao, segregated under a Batas Pambansa,[3]
“to determine whether the said Barangays shall become a new
municipality to be known as the Municipality of Aguinaldo, Province of
Ifugao.” In such proclamation, respondent Commission on Elections[4]
was charged with the duty of supervising the conduct of such
plebiscite and empowered to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to implement the proclamation. It is alleged that Batas
Pambansa Blg. 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article XI,
Section 3 of the Constitution.[5]
The basis for such contention is that the state excluded from the
plebiscite the voters from the poblacion and other barangays of the
Municipality of Mayoyao except those mentioned in the Act.
This is the issue specifically posed: Who are to be included in such
plebiscite? As contended by petitioners Zosimo J. Paredes and Mario W.
Chilagan, the former being the incumbent Governor of the Province of
Ifugao and the latter, Mayor of the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao, all
the inhabitants of such municipality should participate in such
plebiscite as they are included in the “unit or units affected.”
Such interpretation is disputed by respondents.[6]
It is their submission that in the interpretation of the above phrase,
the Court “should not lose sight of the fact that this provision is
intended to promote autonomy of our local government units. Thus, in a
case where barrios are being separated from an existing municipality to
form a new municipality, as in the case at bar, the units affected are
the barrios whose transfer is being sought. It is the people in these
barrios who will really be affected by the new grant of autonomy. They
will be under a new set of officials, a new government, a new set of
powers and responsibilities. They should thus be consulted on whether
they are willing to shoulder the responsibilities attendant to autonomy.
Barrios which will remain with the original municipality are not
affected since their autonomy vis-a-vis the national government is not
in any way diminished. They will be under the same local government,
without any diminution whatsoever of their rights. There is therefore
no infringement of the Constitution if people in these barrios do not
vote in the plebiscite. On the contrary, an anomalous situation may
arise if they are allowed to vote and if their voters are numerically
superior to frustrate any attempt of some barrios to break away from the
original municipality. In such an eventuality, one very populous
barrio may for selfish reason prevent the desired autonomy of other
barrios.”[7]
The Court sustains the stand of respondents. The petition must be dismissed.
1. Admittedly, this is one of those cases where the discretion of
the Court is allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element
of ambiguity in the use of the expression “unit or units affected.” It
is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain barangays are
separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters
therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to contend
as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters,
who are not from the barangays to be separated, should be excluded in
the plebiscite.2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine
that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of
unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is
to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy,
commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all
these years is one of validity.[8]
The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to
nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence
that there is an infringement of a constitutional provision, save in
those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a
showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even
if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcolm’s aphorism is apropos: “To doubt is to sustain.”[9]3. Such a doubt moreover is dispelled by a reference to this
fundamental principle declared in the Constitution: “The State shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially
the [barangays], to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.”[10] It is clear that in granting autonomy, priority is to be accorded the smallest unit, the barangay.
That enables its residents the fullest development as a self-reliant
community, with a distinct personality of its own. Adherence to such a
philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that
the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a
parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is more
logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that
purpose. If is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit.
New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A
new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a
matter of choice – their choice. They should be left alone then to
decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not
yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it.
That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons,
and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the
fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the
preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is
to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in
ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to
doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from
provisions in pari materia.4. One last consideration. What is sought in this suit is to
enjoin respondents particularly respondent Commission from implementing
Batas Pambansa Blg. 86, specifically “from conducting, holding and
undertaking the plebiscite provided for in said Act.” The petition was
filed on December 5, 1980. There was a plea for a restraining order,
but Proclamation No. 2034 fixing the date for such plebiscite on
December 6, 1980 had been issued as far back as November 11, 1980. Due
to this delay in filing this suit, attributable solely to petitioners,
there was no time even to consider such a plea. The plebiscite was duly
held. The certificate of canvass and proclamation of the result
disclosed that out of 2,409 total votes cast in such plebiscite, 2,368
votes were cast in favor of the creation of the new municipality, which,
according to the statute, will be named municipality of Aguinaldo.
There were only 40 votes cast against. As a result, such municipality
was created. There is no turning back the clock. The moot and academic
character of this petition is thus apparent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.
Makasiar and Plana, JJ., vote to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it has become moot and academic.
Abad Santos, J., see dissenting opinion.
Teehankee, J., on official leave.
[1] Proclamation No. 2034 (1980).
[2] The barangays are Bunhian, Damag, Galonogon, ltab, Jacmal, Taang, Taleta and Ubao.
[3] Batas Pambansa Blg. 86 (1980).
[4] The other respondents are
the then Executive Secretary to the President of the Philippines and
the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao.
[5] Article XI, Section 3 of
the Constitution reads: “No province, city, municipality, or barrio may
be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.”
[6] The answer was filed by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General
Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino.
[7] Answer, 6.
[8] Cf. Manila Trading Supply
Co. v. E.M. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461 (1935); Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139 (1936); People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937); National
Housing Authority v. Reyes, L-49439, June 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 245.
[9] Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925).
[10] Article II, Section 10 of the Constitution.
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
With all due deference to Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando who has no
peer on the subject of Constitutional Law, I am constrained to dissent.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 86 created the Municipality of Aguinaldo out of
eight barangays within the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao. The same
statute, presumably because of the provision of the Constitution which
stipulates that “No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected” (Art. XI, Sec. 3),
states in Section 3 thereof that a plebiscite be conducted in the areas
constituting the proposed new Municipality of Aguinaldo. Accordingly,
the other barangays of the Municipality a Mayoyao were excluded from the
plebiscite.
I have grave doubts about the constitutionality of B.P. Blg. 86 for two reasons:
1. It was enacted even before there was a local government code and,
therefore, the creation of the Municipality of Aguinaldo or the
division of the Municipality of Mayoyao was done without reference to
any established criteria.2. I believe that when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or
units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the
municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or all of the
people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no
ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.
In the case of the creation of the Municipality of Aguinaldo, it is
obvious that the people in all of the barangays of the Municipality of
Mayoyao have an interest in the matter for it will mean the
dismemberment of their town.
The proposition that:
“Barrios which will remain with the original municipality are not
affected since their autonomy vis-a-vis the national government is not
in any way diminished. They will be under the same local government,
without any diminution whatsoever or their rights. There is therefore
no infringement of the Constitution if people in these barrios do not
vote in the plebiscite”
is utterly false. For to reduce a municipality both in area and
population will produce adverse effects. Rizal was once the premiere
province of the Philippines. But after several towns were removed from
it such as Pasay and Caloocan and after still more towns were detached
from it to form part of Metro Manila, Rizal province has been reduced to
a practically insignificant political entity.
No effect on the barangays which will remain with the Municipality of
Mayoyao? Why then did the Governor of Ifugao and the Mayor of Mayoyao
get excited?