THE MUNICIPALITY OF TACLOBAN, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OPPONENT AND APPELLANT.

On April 6, 1908, the municipal  president of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, filed an application in the Court of Land Registration,  in  representation  of  the said  municipality, soliciting the inscription in the registry, in conformity with the law, of a parcel of land which it was alleged belonged to the municipality mentioned,  as  absolute owner of the same,  situated within  the town proper  of  Tacloban, not comprised  within the reservation,  bounded on  the  north by the land owned by the Chinaman  La Layco, on the south by Calle San Roque, on  the east by the lands belonging to Hilarion Asuncion  and  the municipality referred to, and on the west by Calle Rizal.  The application further recited that the land concerned contained an area of 4,054.85 square meters, the description and boundaries of  which were given in detail in the accompanying plan;  that the said land was appraised  at the last assessment, for  the purpose of the payment of the land tax, at $3,041, United States currency; that there  was no  incumbrance on  the property,  nor did any  person have  any right or  interest therein,  except the applicant;  that it was  acquired  by  being filled in by the municipality  in 1893  and 1894; and that it was  then occupied by the houses  of Vicenta  Bagay, Victor Cipres, Cirila Almeria, Sinforoso Labajo, Manuel Catalan, Hilaria Opiiio, Dalmacio Agaton, Gervasio Brillantes, Manuel Padilla, Rosa  Juson, and Teresa Escorial.  The applicant furthermore stated that, in case of the remote possibility of his appl:cation not being admissible under the Land Registration Act,  he would, as municipal president, claim the  benefits offered by  Chapter  VI  of Act No.  926,  inasmuch as the municipality had been in possession of the land since  1893, had used it for building purposes for the past fifteen years, and  the  property was   inclosed  on two  of its sides by buildings.

On June 8, by reason of the summons and publications made in connection with the  action taken on  the aforementioned  application,  the  Attorney-General  appeared in representation  of the Director of Lands and opposed the applicant’s petition, on the ground that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States and was under the control of the Government of these Islands, and asked that the registration applied for be denied.

The case came to trial on January 18, 1909; the court, in view of  the oral  evidence adduced by the applicant, rendered judgment by decreeing, after entry of a  general default, the adjudication  and  registration  of the property described in the application and plan  aforementioned, in favor of the applicant, in conformity with the provisions of Act No, 926.  To this judgment the Attorney-General took exception  and moved for  a new trial on the grounds that the court’s findings of fact were openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence  and that the latter did not warrant  the conclusions of the judgment, which judgment was contrary to law.  This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the Solicitor-General and the proper bill of exceptions having been filed, the same was certified to and forwarded to the clerk of this court.

The land sought to be inscribed in the property registry by the municipality of Tacloban, was, prior to 1891-1892, a mangrove swamp which was inundated by  the water of a nearby estero,  although situated  within the  town proper,  and was  gradually  filled in by  order of the  said municipality, between  the years 1892 and 1894,  when it was  successively occupied by the houses of several of the residents of  Tacloban,  as the  portions  of the  land  were successively raised m level and freed from the water.

Since then, the municipality has exercised control over the said  land and found  it  to  its interest to collect rents from those who, without impediment of any kind, occupied it with their dwellings.   Notwithstanding the  effoits and labor expended by the municipality in improving the land for the benefit of the town, by reducing  more and more the inundated area, and it is unquestionable that the said land, which  was originally a mangrove swamp and was little by little  converted  into habitable ground, was and is unappropriated land belonging to the State; that it has not been granted or conveyed to any private party, nor to the municipality itself, without which condition it could not be considered as private property.

It was not shown that any building belonging to the municipality of Tacloban and intended for the public service was erected on the said land, nor that the property had been conveyed to the aforementioned municipality to form a part of the municipal assets or estate; therefore  it can not be considered as  one of the patrimonial  properties of the municipality, nor entered in  the name of the same in the property registry.

The mere fact that the municipality of Tacloban continued to charge and collect rents from the persons who built houses upon and occupied portions of the said land, is not proof that the municipality was the proprietor, for, as it had erected thereon no building intended for the service of the pueblo –  a circumstance which, had it  existed, would have led to the presumption  that,  in  obtaining permission  to erect the building, it also obtained  a grant, if only an implied one, of the land, from the Government in the name of the State –  in order that the said municipality may be deemed to be the owner of the land in question, it  must prove that an express grant of the said land, as one of the properties that form a part of its patrimony, was made to it by the Government.

The municipality  may be,  at the most, a usufructuary of the  land  in  question,  but not the proprietor thereof having the right to enter the same in the property registry.

It is true that the  land  herein  concerned is neither mineral nor forest land, but is comprised within the term of agricultural land; yet the  mere  occupation of the said property by the municipality  during more than ten years immediately preceding the passage  of  Act No. 926,  which went into effect on July 26, 1904,  can not serve as a title  whereby to acquire the ownership thereof pursuant to the provisions of paragraph  6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, inasmuch as, to do so, it is necessary that the municipality shall have an implied or express grant from the Government, without the  fulfillment of which requisite it  can not  be  presumed  that  a municipality  owns and holds in good faith realty admittedly belonging to the State, enabling it to convert the  same into terreno propio  so  as to form a part of its estate or municipal assets.

The benefit granted by section 54 of the said Act, to foster agriculture and increase the wealth of the country, can not be deemed to be granted, according to economic principles, to the municipal  corporations which, on account of their special  conditions, the  idiosyncrasy and character of the functions which they exercise, and because of  the administrative mission  which they have to  fulfill in the name of the Government and at the same time in representation of the people who elected them, can not engage in agriculture and other pursuits, nor  can they, attend to the development, cultivation, or administration of agricultural land, and give special attention to other business, proper only  for private parties, and other  undertakings especially  designed  for their promotion, without serious  detriment to the interests of the community.

Finally,  it is to  be  noted that the said land  situated within the town, is not common land or pasture land (terreno o dehesa comunal),  because this  class of land was usually laid off  outside of  the town; it had to be uncultivated land, and was granted for the pasturage  of stock and for other needs of the pueblo, in accordance with an express  provision of the law.

For the foregoing reasons, it  is our  opinion  that  the judgment appealed from  should  be reversed and the case dismissed, without special finding as to costs.  So ordered.

Johnson, Carson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C. J., and Mapa, J., dissent.