PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JESUS SALDIVIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Appellant was indicted for the crime of rape before Branch III
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Aklan in an Information which was filed on 24 November 1973 and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 394.  The accusatory
portion thereof reads:

“That on or about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 2,
1973, at Barrio Julita, Municipality Libacao, Province of Aklan,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation and against the will of the offended party, CONRADA
Z. SABAY, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”^[1]

The Information is based on a sworn complaint filed by the offended party on 20 July 1973 before the then Municipal Trial Court of Libacao,
Aklan.^[2]

Upon arraignment
on 20 March 1974, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty.^[3]

After trial on the
merits, the lower court^[4]
promulgated on 19 October 1977 a decision^[5]
finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
sentenced him:

“x x x to a
penalty of TEN (10) YEAR of prision mayor
to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal with
costs against accused.”

Appellant appealed from the said decision to the Court of Appeals^[6]
which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R.
No. 21824-CR.

In his Brief^[7]
filed on 11 July 1978 with the Court of Appeals, appellant
submitted the following errors:

“I.   The lower court erred in finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape through the use of force.

 II.
 The lower court erred in
giving credence to the testimony of the offended party and her witnesses.”

The People, in its Brief^[8] filed by the Solicitor General on 13
December 1978, maintained that the guilt of the appellant for the crime charged
was proved beyond reasonable doubt but asserted, however, that the trial court
erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in imposing upon appellant
the penalty of 10 years of prision
mayor to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal.  Under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, simple rape is penalized by the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua,
which shall be applied regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the offense.^[9] Accordingly, appellant cannot enjoy the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.^[10]

It then recommended that
the case be sent and certified to this Court for resolution pursuant to
Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act, as amended, and Section 3, Rule 50 in
relation to Section 17, Rule 124, and Section 1, Rule 125 of the Rules of
Court.

On 18 September 1980, the
Court of Appeals, per then Justice Emilio A. Gancayco,^[11]
who later became an Associate Justice
of this Court, rendered judgment therein affirming the decision of the trial
court convicting appellant for the crime of rape, but ruling, however, that the
penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua; and, conformably with the ruling in People
vs. Daniel,^[12]
People vs. Ramos,^[13]
and People vs. Traya,^[14]
it did not enter the judgment but certified
the case to this Court for
review.

The action taken by the Court of Appeals is in compliance with the
second paragraph, Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides:

“Whenever the Court of Appeals should be of the opinion that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
higher should be imposed in a case, the court after discussion of the evidence
and the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or higher as the circumstances warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the
entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.  (12a).”

The full decision of the Court of Appeals (caption omitted) reads
as follows:

“Gancayco, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Aklan convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
of rape and imposing upon him the penalty of TEN YEARS (10) of prision mayor, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, with costs
against the accused-appellant.

The assigned errors
allegedly committed by the trial court are as follows:

‘I

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE OFFENDED PARTY AND HER
WITNESSES.’

For the prosecution Conrada Sabay testified that on July 2, 1973, at about 3:00 o’clock
in the afternoon while she was at home in Barrio Julita,
Libacao, Aklan, lying down
and feeding her baby, the appellant came to the house and asked her where
husband Donato Sabay was
and she informed him that he was not around. 
Appellant then went inside the room, sat on the bed and held the face of
her baby.  After this the appellant held
her nipple and she brushed his arm aside. 
He held both of her shoulders
and pinned her down placing himself on her top. 
The appellant unzippered his pants and had his
penis out and he raised her dress (duster) up. 
She boxed him with her two hands and brushed him aside and she shouted,
as he raised her dress, coupled with a blow on his body.  As she shouted twice he took the pillow and
covered her mouth and he did a push and pull movement.  She struggled hard to stand up and the
penis of the appellant was not able to penetrate her vagina because she was
struggling although it was touching her vagina. 
The appellant knelt on her thigh and pinned down the pillow that was
covering her mouth so she lost consciousness. 
And when she regained consciousness the appellant was still doing the push and pull
movement and his penis was able to penetrate her vagina.  It was at that moment when Agripina Icutan arrived who asked
(sic) her what happened to her.  As Agripina was already climbing the ladder the appellant
immediately stood up and jumped out of the window.  Agripina went
inside the room and she looked outside
the window.  She asked the complainant why
she was crying and complainant told her that she was forced by the
appellant.  At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon her husband arrived and then
she told him that she was forced by the appellant.  Her husband looked for the appellant around
the house and when he failed to find the appellant he reported the matter to
the Barrio Captain the following day (tsn., March 26, 1975, pp. 35-43).

The complainant is corroborated by Agripina
Icutan who stated that at around 3:00 o’clock of July
2, 1973 while she was at the ricefield at Barrio Julita, about 50 arms stretch from the house of Conrada Sabay, she heard a baby
crying so she went up to Sabay’s house but upon
reaching the stairs she saw Dioscoro Zaballero peeping at one side of the house out of the
room.  When the appellant jumped out she
scolded him.  She asked the complainant
why she was crying and complainant told her that she was forced by the
appellant by being made to lie down the (sic) floor with her face upward, her
mouth was pinned with a pillow, and her two shoulders were pinned down on the
floor.  Complainant also told her that appellant was able
to abuse her and she was even warned to keep quiet otherwise she will be in
danger (tsn., June
27, 1974, pp. 2-5).

Dioscoro Zaballero
also testified that on that fateful day, he went to the house of Conrada Sabay at Barrio Julita, when he heard then complainant crying and so he
went to the corner of the house and peeped and he saw the appellant on top of
the complainant who was continuously boxing him as he did the push and pull
movement.  Then Agripina
Icutan, the mother-in-law of the complainant, arrived
who (sic) asked Dioscoro why he was there and he told
her to go up and see what happened.  As Agripina went up, the appellant jumped out of the house
through the window.  He pulled up his
trousers, and ran away towards his home down
the stream which is over one (1) kilometer away.  After this incident he went to the place
where the nipa thatches are which he bought from Sabay which he tied and brought home (tsn.,
Feb. 4, 1975,
pp. 2-5).

On the other hand the appellant testifying in his defense, stated
that on July 2, 1973, at
about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon
he went to the house of the complainant to inquire about the status of the mountain
land he acquired from Donato Sabay,
husband of the offended party.  The land was verbally sold to him in 1967 for
P200.00 after which he possessed the land. 
As there was no document covering the sale he went to their house to ask
that it be documented.  Therein he found
the offended party and Agripina Icutan.  He seated (sic) on the bench of the balcony
of the house staying there for about half an hour to wait for Donato Sabay, as the offended
party told him that her husband was at his work.  He denied having sexual intercourse with the
offended party much less that he was armed at the time.  Before the incident, that is on June 27, 1973 he went to see Donato Sabay when he talked to
him about the proposed instrument covering the sale of the land but Donato was not agreeable and was even angry.  So he file (sic) a complaint with the Aklan PC Provincial Command on September 10, 1973 (Exh.
5).  Dioscoro Zaballero testified against him because one Fiscal Arrieta mortgaged a land to him and he drove out Dioscoro Zaballero as overseer of said land because he was abusing it by cutting down the coconut trees and
palms.  The mortgage of the land is shown
by letters he sent to the late Fiscal Arrieta (Exhs. 6 & 7). 
The consideration of the mortgage was P1,200.00 (tsn.,
Sept. 13, 1975,
pp. 68-76).

Appellant argues that as the offended party failed to
submit herself to medical examination thus the prosecution failed to establish
the alleged sexual intercourse.  Suffice it
to state here that the offended party and her husband are simple and uneducated
people who are not expected to know
the evidentiary value of such a medical examination.  (tsn., April 3,
1975, p. 60) As a
matter of fact when they learned of the need for such an examination, on July
6, 1975 she went to the Aklan Provincial Hospital for
the purpose, but due to the length of time that elapsed, no sign of sexual
intercourse of (sic) force inflicted could be found (tsn.,
March 1, 1975, p. 21). 
Nevertheless such a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.  In the case of People v. Selfaison,
1 SCRA 235, 242, it was held —

‘In fact, it is not even necessary that there be a medical
examination of the victim in cases of rape. 
Whether or not the charge
will prosper depends upon the evidence offered and so long as such evidence
convinces the court, a conviction for rape is proper.’

The appellant’s theory is that, even assuming he had sexual
intercourse with the offended party, it was committed by appellant with her
consent, citing paragraph 4 of the sworn statement of the offended party of
July 20, 1973 before the Municipal Judge of Libacao, Aklan (Exh. 2).  Far supporting the theory of appellant, said
portion of the statement show (sic) that the appellant tried to force his
attention on the offended party.  As she
resisted, he placed a pillow over her mouth and pressed her by the shoulder
placing himself on her top by pressing down her two legs and inserting his
penis in her vagina.  Indeed, in the other portions of the same
statement the offended party stated that the appellant even threatened her to
keep quiet or something will happen to her and that she could not shout because
her mouth was covered with a
pillow (pars. 5 & 8, Exh. 2).

While it is true that at the time the appellant went inside the
room of the offended party she was breast feeding her baby she must have put
down the baby to resist the advances of
the appellant who started to touch her nipple and not as surmised by the
appellant that she voluntarily
put aside her baby at the moment.

The appellant also pointed out alleged material contradictions
between the testimony of the offended party and her sworn statement (Exh. 2).  While in her sworn statement she never alleged
she lost consciousness in her testimony she stated otherwise.  The omission of this fact in her sworn
statement does not detract from the fact that she actually lost consciousness.  Suffice it to say that affidavits, being ex
parte are
almost always incomplete and often inaccurate (People v. Pacala,
58 SCRA 370; People v. Jovellano, 56 SCRA 156).

Another alleged contradiction is that while the complainant
testified she shouted twice in her sworn statement she said she was not able to
shout as her mouth was covered with a pillow there is no contradiction in this
aspect.  She testified that she shouted
so the appellant covered her mouth with
a pillow when (sic) obviously she could not shout anymore.

At any rate, the issue boils down to the matter of credibility of
witnesses and the traditional rule is that
it is the province of the trial court
to determine the credibility of witnesses because of its superior advantage of
observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying on the witness stand, and that on appeal its findings shall not be
disturbed unless some fact or circumstance may have been overlooked that may
otherwise affect the result of the case. 
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court in this
issue.

However, the penalty imposed by the court a quo is incorrect.  Since the
prosecution has established that the crime of rape has been committed then the
imposable penalty shall be reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.  Under Section 2, of Act 4103
as amended by Act 4225, known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said law shall not apply to persons convicted
of offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.  Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,
it provided as follows:

‘ART.  63.  Rules for the application
of indivisible penalties. – In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.’

Thus the penalty that should be imposed for
the offense should be reclusion perpetua.

Since under Section 5, (2) paragraph d, Article 10 of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review all criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, although this Court must render a judgment
imposing the capital penalty based on the evidence, it should not enter the
judgment but certify the case to the Supreme Court for review (People V.
Daniel, 86 SCRA 532-540; People v. Ramos,
88 SCRA 486; People v. Traya, 89 SCRA 274).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed convicting the accused of the crime of rape
with the modification that the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, with costs against accused-appellant.  However, this judgment shall not be entered
and the records of this case are hereby elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court
for review as a matter within its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.”^[15]

The case was docketed in
this Court as G.R. No. 55346 and
was declared submitted for decision on 27
October 1980.^[16] However, Atty. Alejandre
S. Bonifacio, who entered his appearance as
collaborating counsel for appellant, filed on 21 April 1981 a motion for leave to file a supplemental
brief for the appellant,^[17] which this Court granted on 13 May
1981.^[18] In the Supplemental Brief,^[19] which was filed on 19 May
1981, appellant attributes
to the trial court the following
errors:

“I.   The
lower court committed an error in finding rape (sic) was committed.

II.  The
lower court committed an error in not sustaining the defense claim of
sufficient motive on the part of the complainant to concoct this charge.

III.  The lower court committed an error in its
finding that the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.”

In the review of rape
cases, this Court has consistently adhered to the following established principles:  a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility;
it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; b) in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and c) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.^[20] Conviction for such a crime should not be
sustained without clear and convincing proof of guilt.^[21] For, as We said in the recent case of People vs. Pido,^[22]
under our democratic system of
Government, a mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt.^[23] Every accused is presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.^[24] The contrary requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces a conviction in an
unprejudiced mind;^[25] short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be
freed; it is, even more, the constitutional duty of the court to acquit him.^[26]

It is, nevertheless, an
equally settled principle that when a woman says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show the rape had been committed and
that if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.^[27] The reason for this is that a rape victim would not publicly disclose that she had been
raped and would not undergo the troubles and humiliations of trial if her
motive was not to bring to
justice the person who had abused her.^[28]

We have carefully
examined the records in this
case, painstakingly read the transcript of the stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses of
both the prosecution and the defense, and judiciously weighed the evidence. 
We are in full accord with the findings and conclusion of the Court of
Appeals and, therefore, We do not hesitate to affirm its decision.

The evidence for the
prosecution conclusively established all the elements of the crime of
rape.  Appellant had carnal knowledge of
the complainant against her will and through force.  As found by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, sufficient force was used by appellant.  The latter, however, contends that, granting
for the sake of argument that there was force, it was not irresistible.  The rule is well-settled that the force
employed in rape need not be irresistible, as long as it is present and brings
the desired result;^[29] all that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient to
consummate his evil purpose,^[30] or that it was successfully used.^[31] It need not be so great or of such a character that it could not be repelled.^[32]

In his main brief,
appellant bases his assertion of absence of force on the mere
failure of complainant to submit herself to a medical examination after the
incident.^[33] However, as correctly ruled by
the Court of Appeals, a medical examination is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape.^[34] We find no rule of evidence which imposes
such a requirement.  Were it so, grave
and irreparable injustice would be inflicted upon hapless victims of the most
detestable crime committed in remote areas of the country where no doctors who
could conduct the medical examination immediately after the commission of the
crime would be available.  We are not
likewise unmindful of the fact
that it is with the utmost reluctance that a victim of rape submits herself to
a medical examination immediately after the commission of the crime for, in
many instances, what pre-occupies her mind is not the filing of a complaint but
rather the fear of what the assailant would further inflict upon her by a
revelation of her harrowing experience, or the embarrassment and humiliation
that a trial would visit upon her as she publicly bares the ignominy undergone
which would forever affect her honor and reputation.

The second assigned error
in the Supplemental Brief is a delayed after-thought.  In his main brief, appellant did not even
intimate that the trial court erred in not sustaining the defense claim of
sufficient motive on the part of the complainant to concoct the
charge.  The basis for this claim is the alleged land dispute between appellant
and the family of the Sabays which, according to the
former, “was more than sufficient motive on the part of the Sabays to concoct this charge.” The testimony of the
appellant both on direct examination^[35]
and on cross-examination^[36]
fails even to remotely suggest such a conclusion.  Moreover, as correctly ruled by the trial
court:

“x x x While
the Court finds that there exists bad blood between the accused and Donato Sabay, to the mind of the
Court such a circumstance could not give rise to a fabrication of the charge of
rape in which the person of the offended party, her honor and good name would
be subject to ridicule and contempt by the people who might hear her having
been ravished by another man.  And much
more, a husband in his right senses would hardly allow that to happen to his
wife.

The differences existing between the accused and Donato Sabay was (sic)
nevertheless settled at Camp Martelino by the Philippine
Constabulary authorities to (sic) whom the accused, the records show, had filed
a complaint against Donato Sabay
after a complaint of rape was filed against the accused.  Donato Sabay had paid the accused, it was a pure
indebtedness.”

The suggestion of
appellant that complainant was used by her husband to exact vengeance on
appellant is entirely unacceptable, not only because it is pure speculation, but
also because it is so unnatural.  It
makes a mockery of the sanctity of the relationship of husband and wife in an
inviolable social institution, the Filipino family, and of the traditional high
regard and respect the Filipino male has for his wife.

Finally, and in relation
to the third assigned error in the Supplemental Brief, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses Dioscoro Zaballero
and Agrifina Icutan were
not indispensable to prove the commission of the crime of rape in this
case.  In short, their testimonies may
even be disregarded, for the testimony of the complainant is sufficient enough
to produce conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

We finally rule that the
award of moral damages, which neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals
granted, is in order.  Rape necessarily brings to the victim mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock,
and social humiliation.  Accordingly, We
award to the complainant the sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 21824-CR which finds the
appellant JESUS SALDIVIA guilty
of the crime of Rape and imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the modification that he is further
ordered to pay to the offended party, CONRADA SABAY, the sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the appellant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero,
JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Original records, 38.

^[2]
Original Records, 2.

^[3]
Id., 64.

^[4]
Per Judge Gerardo M. Pepito.

^[5]
Loc. cit., 370-382; Rollo, 30, et, seq.

^[6]
Id., 386; Id.,
28.

^[7]
Id., 38, et seq.

^[8]
Rollo, 48, et seq.

^[9]
Article 63, Revised Penal Code.

^[10]
Section 2, Indeterminate Sentence Law.

^[11]
Concurred in by then Associate Justices Milagros A. German and Lino M. Patajo.

^[12]
 86 SCRA 532.

^[13]
88 SCRA 486.

^[14]
89 SCRA 274.

^[15]
Rollo, 55-60.

^[16]
Id., 62.

^[17]
Id., 67.

^[18]
Id., 69.

^[19]
Rollo, 71.

^[20]
People vs. Aldana,
175 SCRA 635; People vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA
313; People vs. Alburo, 184 SCRA 655; People vs.
De Guia, 185 SCRA 336; People vs. Leoparte, 187 SCRA 190; People vs. Giron, 192 SCRA 141.

^[21]
People vs. Geneveza, 169 SCRA 153; People vs. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530.

^[22]
G.R. No. 92427, 2 April
1991.

^[23]
People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 60.

^[24]
Section 14 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

^[25]
Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

^[26]
People vs. Maisug, 27 SCRA 742.

^[27]
People vs. Avero, 165 SCRA 130; People vs.
Cariño, Jr., 167 SCRA 285; People vs. Poculan, 167 SCRA 176; People vs.
Abonada, 169 SCRA 530; People vs. Rosell, 181 SCRA
679; People vs. Barcelona, 191 SCRA 100.

^[28]
People vs. Muñoz, 163 SCRA 730; People vs.
Viray, 164 SCRA 135; People vs. Robles, 170 SCRA 557.

^[29]
People vs. Bugtong, 169 SCRA 797.

^[30]
People vs. Arengo, 181 SCRA 344; People vs. Barcelona, 191 SCRA 100.

^[31]
People vs. Tumalad,
188 SCRA 302; People vs. Poculan, 167 SCRA 176.

^[32]
People vs. Viray,
164 SCRA 135; People vs. Mercado,
190 SCRA 452.

^[33]
Brief for Appellant, 3.

^[34]
Citing People vs. Selfaison, 1 SCRA 235.  See also People vs. Dolores, 188 SCRA
660; People vs. Camasis, 189 SCRA 649.

^[35]
TSN – Peniano, 30 September 1975, 68-76.

^[36]
TSN – Fernando, 12 May 1976,
2-12.