🎧 Case Brief Lecture

THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. MARTIN PEREZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 553. August 09, 1902 August 9, 1902

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United States versus Perez

The Case

This is a criminal case in which the United States, as complainant and appellee, proceeded against Martin Perez, the defendant and appellant, upon a judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. The defendant was condemned to suffer six months of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of 6,250 pesetas. The question brought before the Supreme Court is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but a narrow and procedural one: whether his appeal was taken within the period fixed by law. The case matters because it fixes, for the early years of the new procedural regime, the exact moment at which a judgment is deemed rendered for purposes of appeal, and settles that a motion to reopen the case does not suspend or extend the time to appeal.

Procedural History

The trial court rendered judgment against Martin Perez on the 20th of November, 1901, convicting him and imposing six months of arresto mayor and a fine of 6,250 pesetas. The time to appeal from that judgment expired on the 5th of December, 1901. The defendant did not appeal within that period; his appeal was taken only on the 9th of December, 1901. The case then reached the Supreme Court by appeal from the judgment of the trial court, and it is that appeal which the Court here passes upon.

Facts

On the 20th of November, 1901, the trial court entered its judgment condemning Martin Perez to six months of arresto mayor and a fine of 6,250 pesetas. The period within which an appeal from that judgment could be taken expired on the 5th of December, 1901.

In the meantime the defendant sought to have the case reopened. He first moved for that relief on the 21st of November. The motion was denied on the 26th of November, but without prejudice to his right to renew it. He renewed the motion on the 2nd of December, and that renewed motion was still undecided on the 5th of December, when the time to appeal expired. The motion was finally determined on the 9th of December, and on that same day the defendant took his appeal from the judgment.

The defendant's attempt to reopen the case therefore straddled the entire appeal period, but the judgment itself had been entered and pronounced well before that period began to run.

Issues

  • Whether or not the appeal taken on the 9th of December, 1901, from the judgment of the 20th of November, 1901, was filed within the period allowed by law.
  • Whether or not the pendency of the defendant's motion to reopen the case suspended or extended the time within which to appeal from the judgment.
  • Whether or not the order of the 9th of December denying the motion to reopen the case could itself be the subject of the appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Article 42 of General Orders, Number 58 governs the motion to reopen a case, and the Court applies the rule laid down in the case of United States versus Flemister, just decided, construing it:

It is there held that such a motion must be heard and decided before the time to appeal from the judgment expires, and that the pendency of such a motion does not extend the time to appeal from the judgment.

This rule is decisive of the second issue, because the defendant's renewed motion was still undecided when the appeal period lapsed.

Articles 44 and 47 of General Orders, Number 58 provide for an appeal from a final judgment or from an order made after judgment, and the Court reads them thus:

This is made clear by the provisions of articles 44 and 47, which provide for an appeal from a final judgment or from an order made after judgment.

These provisions distinguish a final judgment from an order made after judgment, and so identify which document the appeal must be taken from and when it must be taken.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal was too late and must be dismissed. The judgment was rendered on the 20th of November, 1901; the time to appeal expired on the 5th of December; the appeal was not taken until the 9th of December. The Court stated the consequence plainly: it must, therefore, be dismissed.

On the second issue, the Court held that the defendant's attempt to reopen the case could not affect the timeliness of the appeal. The first motion was denied on the 26th of November without prejudice to renewal; the renewed motion was filed on the 2nd of December and was still undecided on the 5th of December, when the appeal period expired. Applying the rule of United States versus Flemister, the Court held that such a motion must be heard and decided before the time to appeal expires, and that its pendency does not extend that time.

On the third issue, the Court held that the judgment was the resolution entered on the 20th of November, and not the order of the 9th of December denying the motion to reopen. General Orders, Number 58 was ingrafted upon the then existing Spanish proceedings, under which the judgment was that document which, after reciting the facts proved, the claims of the attorneys, and the conclusions of law, pronounced the punishment the defendant must suffer. The words final judgment in General Orders, Number 58 refer to that determination. The appeal in this case was plainly stated to be from the judgment, and it was too late. Even had it been taken from the order, it would not have availed the defendant, because that order, having been made after the judgment below became final, was void, and to have it so declared would not help him.

Doctrine

First, the judgment in a criminal case is the resolution of the court which, after reciting the facts proved, the claims of the attorneys, and the conclusions of law, pronounces the punishment the defendant must suffer. It is that document, and not a subsequent order denying a motion to reopen, from which the period to appeal is counted.

Second, under Article 42 of General Orders, Number 58, a motion to reopen the case must be heard and decided before the time to appeal from the judgment expires, and the pendency of such a motion does not extend the time to appeal. The period therefore continues to run while the motion is pending.

Third, an order made after the judgment has become final is void, and an appeal taken from such an order, or a declaration of its nullity, cannot cure an appeal from the judgment that was taken out of time.

Disposition

The appeal was dismissed, with the costs of the instance de oficio, that is, at the expense of the government rather than charged to the defendant.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that the pendency of a motion to reopen the case does not extend the time to appeal from the judgment, which runs from the judgment itself and not from the order denying the motion. Examiners use this case to test the reckoning of the appeal period and the distinction between a final judgment and an order made after judgment.