THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. UI MATIAO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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United States versus Ui Matiao
The Case
This is a criminal case from the early years of the American regime in the Philippines. The United States, as complainant, prosecuted Ui Matiao, a private person, for the offense of attempting to bribe a public official — a sanitary inspector of the city of Manila named Doctor Altman. The action is one for bribery under the old Penal Code, and the question that gives the case its lasting value is a structural one: because the bribe-giver under Article 387 is punished with the very same penalties imposed on the officer suborned, the prosecution of the giver can only succeed if the facts charged would also have made the officer himself guilty of bribery. The case matters to a reviewee because it teaches that the corruptor's liability is derivative and measured by the official's, and that an information which fails to allege the elements of the official's crime is fatally defective.
Procedural History
Ui Matiao was charged in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila with the offense of an attempt to bribe a public official. Before trial he interposed a demurrer to the complaint, one paragraph of which alleged that the facts charged in the complaint constitute no offense. The demurrer was not sustained. The Court of First Instance convicted him, basing the conviction on Articles 381 and 387 of the Penal Code, taken in connection with Article 354 of the same Code, and giving him the benefit of Article 11 of the Penal Code. He was sentenced to imprisonment for six months and one day, to pay a fine of three times the amount of the alleged bribe, and to pay the costs of the suit. From that judgment he appealed to the Supreme Court.
Facts
Ui Matiao had applied for a license to sell oil in the city of Manila. One of the sanitary inspectors of the city, Doctor Altman, visited the defendant's premises in order to make a report on that application. It was Altman's duty to report on the petition.
During the visit, the defendant offered the officer money. To secure evidence against him, the officer wrote out a note and obtained the defendant's signature to it. The note, whose form is reproduced in the complaint, read in substance that Ui Matiao had offered and promised to the bearer ten pesos to expedite his license to sell oil, and that he understood well what he was signing, dated the twenty-eighth of September, nineteen hundred and one, and signed by him.
The complaint alleged that Altman was an official of the Health Inspector and that it was his duty to report on the petition, and that Ui Matiao then and there offered the note as a bribe to Altman on condition and for the purpose of securing a favorable indorsement and report from him, contrary to law.
Issues
- Whether or not the facts charged in the complaint constitute the offense of bribery, given that the bribe-giver under Article 387 is punished with the same penalties as the officer suborned.
- Whether or not the information sufficiently alleges that the act which the officer was to perform in the discharge of his office would have constituted a crime, as required to convict the officer under Article 381 in connection with Article 354.
Applicable Provisions
Article 381 of the Penal Code, on the public official who receives a gift or accepts a promise, provides:
Article 381. The public official who shall receive, directly or through an intermediary, a gift or present, or who shall accept offers or promises for his committing, in the discharge of his office, an act constituting a crime, shall be punished with the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum to its medium degree and a fine of an amount equal up to three times the value of the gift, without prejudice to the imposition of the penalty pertaining to the crime committed in consideration of the gift or promise should it have been executed.
This is the crime of the officer suborned, and its elements define what the bribe-giver must be shown to have procured.
Article 387 of the same Code, on the corruptor, provides:
Those who shall corrupt public officials with gifts, presents, offers, or promises, shall be punished with the same penalties as those imposed on the officers suborned, excepting that of disqualification.
This is the provision under which the defendant was charged, and it makes his penalty identical to the officer's, so that the officer's crime must first exist.
Article 354 of the same Code, on knowingly rendering an unjust decision, provides:
The public official who shall knowingly render or advise an unjust interlocutory decree or decision in a matter of administrative litigation, or merely administrative, shall incur the penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum degree to perpetual special disqualification.
This is the crime the Court examined to test whether a favorable report, if rendered for the bribe, would have been an act constituting a crime.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the charge does not stand. Under Article 387, those who corrupt officials are punishable with the same penalties as those imposed upon the officer suborned, excepting disqualification. It follows that in order that a public official may be convicted of bribery, he must have accepted a bribe for his committing, in the discharge of the duties of his office, an act constituting a crime. The Court therefore found it necessary to consider whether the official, had he accepted the bribe in the discharge of his office in this particular case, would have committed an act constituting a crime as defined in Article 354.
On the second issue, the Court held that the information is defective. Suppose the officer, in consideration of the note, had decided to make a favorable report on the application and had made such a report. This would not of itself have constituted the offense defined in Article 354. It must have been an unjust decision knowingly rendered, and the information contains no allegation embodying this requisite. For the same reason the charge is defective under Article 382. The Court acknowledged that perhaps the information might be held sufficient under Article 386, against the public official who accepts presents in consideration of his official position, but the punishment for that offense is suspension in its minimum and medium degree and public censure; and since the same penalty applies to persons offering or giving the bribe as those imposed on the officer suborned, it is evident that the punishment cannot be the same and is therefore not applicable to the case. Other interesting questions were raised but the Court found them unnecessary to consider.
Doctrine
The liability of the corruptor is derivative: he suffers the same penalty as the officer suborned, except disqualification, so the information must allege every element that would convict the officer. Where the officer's supposed crime is the knowing rendering of an unjust decision or report under Article 354, the information must allege that the act was unjust and knowingly rendered; a bare allegation of a favorable report for money does not suffice. An information that fails to allege an essential element of the offense charged states no offense, and a demurrer on that ground should be sustained.
Disposition
On account of the insufficiency of the information in the particulars indicated, the judgment of the Court of First Instance was reversed and the case remanded, with costs of the appeal de oficio. The defendant thus won his appeal on the pleadings.
Remember This
Memorize the rule that the bribe-giver under Article 387 carries exactly the officer's penalty, so no conviction of the giver can stand unless the facts charged would convict the officer. Examiners use this case to test the elements of bribery and the sufficiency of an information that omits the element of a knowingly rendered unjust act.