G.R. No. 54952. March 05, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS), PETITIONER, VS. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, WITH ITS EXECUTIVE MINISTER ERAÑO G. MANALO AS CORPORATION SOLE, AND HON. …
DE CASTRO, J.:
the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is qualified to apply for
registration of a 614 sq. meter parcel of land in its name in the light
of the prohibition in Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973[1]
Constitution the same issues raised in the identical case of Republic
vs. Judge Candido P. Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875
(June 29, 1982)[2] , to which this Court has recently given a negative answer.
We can have no different answer in this instant case.
On August 7, 1979, respondent Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) filed with the
defunct Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte an application for
registration of a 614 sq. meter parcel of land situated in San Pedro,
Vintar, Ilocos Norte allegedly acquired by respondent by virtue of a
deed of sale dated April 10, 1978 from a certain Carmen Racimo whose
predecessors-in-interest, it was claimed, possessed the same for more
than thirty (30) years.[3]
The application was filed, as stated therein, under the provisions of
the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529, July 11, 1978).
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
opposed the application, alleging, among others, that neither the
applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (section 48(b),
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073); that the claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of by the applicant who had failed to file an
appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6)
months from February 16, 1976 as required under Presidential Decree No.
892;[4] that the applicant is
a private corporation disqualified under the Constitution to hold
alienable lands of the public domain (Section 11 Article XIV); and that
the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
On July 23, 1980 the respondent court rendered its decision adjudicating
the land applied for registration in favor of the Iglesia ni Cristo,
but with a reservation for road right of way purposes. Respondent
stated, among others, that the Iglesia ni Cristo with its Executive
Minister Eraño Manalo as a corporation sole is not within the
contemplation of Section 11, Article XIV of the new Constitution but
said corporation sole can qualify as applicant pursuant to the provision
of Section 14 of Presidential Decree 1520.
From the decision, the Republic of the Philippines elevated the case to
this Court in this petition for review which We gave due course.
Reiterating its stand in the lower court, petitioner stresses private
respondent’s disqualification to hold lands of the public domain except
by lease pursuant to Section 11 Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
Private respondent argues that Section 11 Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution is inapplicable to the land involved herein because the
land sought to be registered is a private property or has ceased to be
part of the alienable public domain by reason of acquisitive
prescription for more than thirty (30) years, and its adverse,
continuous possession in the concept of an owner; that private
respondent is but a mere administrator of the land titled in its name
for the benefit of its members, creating thus, a trust relationship in
its favor; that as trustee or authorized representative of its members,
private respondent can exercise their right to have the questioned land
titled in its name under the Property Registration Decree (1529) by
express mandate of the law.
We agree with petitioner’s stand, following our decision in Republic vs.
Judge Candido Villanueva, et. al., 114 SCRA 875 (June 29, 1982) to
which We have made reference at the threshold of this decision, as well
as the subsequent cases of Republic vs. Hon. Arsenio Gonong, et. al., G.
R. No. L-56025 (Nov. 25, 1982); Republic vs. vs. Court of Appeals, et.
al., G. R. No.59447, and its companion case of Republic vs. Judge
Dominador Cendaña, et. al., G. R. No. 60188 (Dec. 27, 1982).
All that has been stated by this Court in the aforementioned cases in
interpreting Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law (C.A. 141, as amended
by R.A. 1942) applies with equal force in the instant case where the
application for registration of the herein parcel of land was, in
essence, sought on the basis of the alleged open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the said land by respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
acquisition pr ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for registration on August 7,
1979.
Records reveal that no application for confirmation of incomplete or
imperfect title had been filed by respondent’s predecessors-in-interest
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law. Under the law, the
questioned land retains its public character. The application for
registration under Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D.
1529) which, among others, recognizes possession of alienable lands of
the public domain in the manner and for the length of time therein
required as basis for registration of title to the land, did not remove
the land from the operational effect of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Law. It nevertheless strengthens the conclusion that the land never
ceased to be part of the public domain. Apparently, the pertinent
provisions of law relied upon by respondent in invoking Section 14 of
P.D. 1529 provide:
“Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:“1). Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.x x x x x x
“2). Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
x x x x x x
“3). Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided by law.
x x x x x x
“A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the
instrument creating the trust.”
As indicated earlier, the issue raised is already a settled matter. In Republic vs. Judge Candido Villanueva, et. al., supra, this Court made the following categorical pronouncement:
“As correctly contended by the Solicitor-General the Iglesia ni
Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical person is disqualified to
acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, like the two lots
in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already
mentioned and because the said church is not entitled to avail itself
of the benefits of Section 48(b) which applies only to Filipino citizens
or natural persons. A corporation sole (an “unhappy freak of English
law”) has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc.
vs. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds
vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and Section 49 of the Public Land
Law).“The contention in the comments of the Iglesia ni Cristo (its
lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands,
following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48
Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land possessed
by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular
Government, 212 U.S. 449, 531 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132.
The lots sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that
category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding
under Section 48(b) ‘presupposes that the land is public’ (Mindanao vs.
Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).“As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, “all lands
that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. As exception to the rule would be
any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.“In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of
an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a “derecho dominical
incoative” and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since
it still pertains to the State.” (114 SCRA 881-882)
Moreover, it may be observed that respondent relies strongly on the
doctrine laid down in the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424,
reiterated in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 108 Phil. 361, Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 21 SCRA 743, Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760, Herico vs. Dar,
95 SCRA 437, to the effect that lands of the public domain which, by
reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant
by the State to the occupant Is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to
form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no
longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose
under the public land laws or statutes. As pointed out in the separate
opinion by the herein ponente in the cases, of Meralco vs. Hon. Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G. R. No. 49623 and Republic vs. Hon. Candido P. Villanueva, G. R. No. 55289 (June 29, 1982), to wit:
“I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described
has become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this
stage, said to be still “an incomplete or imperfect title,” has been
fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as
judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. This is the
only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be
granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such
judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of
Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is
concerned. His authority is limited to another form of disposition of
public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in
the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in which case,
as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved is
undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would
have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation
or administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter
case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by the Director of
Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject
to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except
possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and
decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents.“It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of
incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many
cases, such as those cited to the effect that such land has ceased to be
public land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the
land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of public domain still
disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority granted him by
the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land
covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private
land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited
Act which deals With “public land” gives rise to the very strong
implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is
still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately
owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public
land, depending on the evidence.”
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge’s decision dated July 23, 1980, is hereby
SET ASIDE and the application for registration of the Iglesia ni Cristo
is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, Acting C.J., (Chairman), see dissent.
[1] Section 11, Article XIV, 1973 Constitution –
x x x No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; x x x.
[2] The same issue was
resolved in the subsequent cases of Republic vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong,
et. al., G. R. No.L-56025 (November 25, 1982); Republic vs. Hon. Court
of Appeals et. al., G. R. No..L-69447 and its companion case of Republic
vs. Judge Dominador S. Cendaña, et. al., G. R No. L-60188 (December 27,
1982).
[3] p. 32, Rollo.
[4] Presidential Decree 892,
“Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of
the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings”
(February 16, 1976).
DISSENTING OPINION
MAKASIAR, J.:
I reiterate my dissent in Director of Lands vs. Hon. Guardson Lood, et al. (Sept. 2, 1983, 124 SCRA 460, 470, 5).
The parcel of land of about 614 sq. m. sought to be registered by the
Iglesia ni Kristo under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) and P.D.
1529, is a private land, not a public land, originally owned by
Florencio Recimo who acquired the same long before 1931. On February
18, 1931, Backrate Motor Co. acquired the same land by virtue of a deed
of sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte on October
23, 1937. Backrate Motor Co. sold the same to Pablo Agbayani who
resold the same in May, 1945 to spouses Jose A. Racino and Carmen F.
Racino, who in turn sold the same on April 10, 1978 to private
respondent Iglesia ni Kristo.
As above stated, private respondent Iglesia ni Kristo applied for a
voluntary registration of the same land under the Land Registration Act
and P.D. 1529, and not for a confirmation of its title under Sec. 48(b)
of the Public Land Act. His application to title a private land was
under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) and pars. 2 and 3 of Sec.
14, of P.D. 1529, not under Sec. 1 thereof on disposable land of the
public domain.
Par. 2 of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that the applicant must
“have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws” or under par. 3 must “have acquired
ownership of land in any manner provided by law.”
That the application of private respondent Iglesia ni Kristo, is for a
private parcel of land acquired by prescription or in any other manner
recognized by law, and not a parcel of land of the public domain, is
emphasized by the fact that his application is based on both the Land
Registration Act, otherwise known as Act 496, which relates to private
lands only and never to lands of the public domain. The
predecessors-in-interest of the Iglesia ni Kristo had possession of the
same openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely against the whole
world even before 1931. The parcel of land in question therefore, being
a private land, is not governed by Section 11 of Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution.