LILIA B. BARRERA, REPRESENTED BY MIGUEL R. LOGARTA, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH XI…

Barrera versus Militante

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari brought by Lilia B. Barrera, represented by her attorney-in-fact Miguel R. Logarta, against Judge Francis J. Militante of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Barrera asks the Supreme Court to annul and set aside the judge's orders dismissing her complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land and for damages, and denying her motion for reconsideration. The case matters because it fixes the rule on what happens when a plaintiff and her counsel fail to appear at a scheduled pre-trial conference, and it reminds us that the authority of an attorney to compromise his client's litigation cannot lightly be presumed.

Procedural History

Barrera filed her complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the private respondents. The case was set for pre-trial conferences on various dates. The pre-trial scheduled on May 18, 1980 was postponed to June 11, 1980 because petitioner's counsel was not ready to proceed. When the case was called for pre-trial on June 11, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning, neither the petitioner nor her counsel appeared, and the respondent judge issued an order of even date dismissing the case. On June 17, 1980, Barrera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of June 20, 1980. Barrera then came to the Supreme Court by a special civil action of certiorari, claiming that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion both in dismissing her complaint and in denying her motion for reconsideration.

Facts

On December 13, 1978, Lilia B. Barrera filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the private respondents for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land designated as Lot 4356 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate, and for damages. The private respondents were summoned to answer the complaint and to enter into pre-trial and trial. The case was set for pre-trial conferences on various dates, the last two of which were on May 18, 1980 and on June 11, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning.

The pre-trial conference of May 18, 1980 was postponed to June 11, 1980 because petitioner's counsel was not ready to go on with the pre-trial. When the case was called for pre-trial on June 11, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning, neither the petitioner nor her counsel appeared. The respondent judge accordingly issued an order of even date dismissing the case.

On June 17, 1980, Barrera filed a motion for reconsideration. She explained that her counsel, who was allegedly armed with a special power of attorney to appear at the pre-trial and to enter into a compromise, was a little late, because the secretary of the law office did not arrive early at the office where counsel could pick up the records of the case on his way to court. Attached to the motion was an affidavit of the supposed secretary, stating that she was feverish on June 11, 1980 and was thus unable to report for work early. The respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit on June 20, 1980.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner's complaint for her failure, and that of her counsel, to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference.
• Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, on the purpose of pre-trial, provides:

The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider: (a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution; (b) The simplification of the issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e) The limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner; (g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; (h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and (i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

The Court invokes this provision to stress that pre-trial is a measure conducive to the early and expeditious termination of the case, a purpose the petitioner could have easily availed of but did not.

Section 2 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, on the failure to appear at pre-trial, provides:

If the plaintiff fails to appear at the pre-trial, the court may dismiss the action or proceed with the pre-trial and require the defendant to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

This is the provision the Court cites as the ground authorizing dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute when the plaintiff and her counsel fail to appear at the pre-trial.

Section 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the authority of attorneys to bind their clients, provides:

Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

The Court relies on this provision to hold that the alleged special power of attorney to compromise must be duly established, because the authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge committed no reversible error in dismissing the case. The Court understood the considerations that prompted the dismissal, especially since from the filing of the complaint on December 13, 1978 up to the order of dismissal on June 11, 1980, a period of about eighteen months, the pre-trial stage had not yet been terminated, showing that the progress of the case was abnormally very slow. The Court also noted that the private respondents' claim was unrefuted: in all the pre-trial conferences scheduled by the lower court, the petitioner had never appeared, and the record did not show that she had executed a special power of attorney in favor of either her attorney-in-fact or her counsel of record to serve as written authority to represent her in the pre-trial conferences, with power to compromise the case. For the failure of the petitioner and her counsel to appear at the last scheduled pre-trial of June 11, 1980, the lower court was given the discretion to dismiss the case, that failure being a ground to authorize dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute.

On the second issue, the Court held that the denial of the motion for reconsideration was proper. The explanation given regarding counsel's alleged late arrival was far from satisfactory. The affidavit of the secretary was not supported by a medical certificate, authenticated or otherwise, to substantiate her claim of illness. The allegation that the secretary arrived at the law office at almost nine o'clock in the morning did not jibe with counsel's claim that he arrived in court some ten minutes after 8:15 in the morning when the case was called. Counsel also asked the Court to believe that he was armed with a special power of attorney without showing its scope, extent and limits, and that power was allegedly executed not by the petitioner herself but by her attorney-in-fact, whose own authority was likewise not shown. The Court held that the authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed, and if the judge is not satisfied that the authority exists, dismissal for non-appearance at pre-trial is sanctioned by the Rules. The Court nevertheless reminded the lower courts that the issuance of minute orders, like the one denying the motion for reconsideration, is not sanctioned by jurisprudence, and that a trial court should specify in its order the reasons for the dismissal so that the appellate court can readily determine whether there is a prima facie justification for it. Despite this omission, the Court could not grant the petition.

Doctrine

The failure of the plaintiff and her counsel to appear at a scheduled pre-trial conference is a ground authorizing dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute, and the trial court is given the discretion to dismiss the case on that ground. Pre-trial is mandatory and is a measure conducive to the early and expeditious termination of the case, so a plaintiff who does not avail of it does so at her peril. An attorney cannot, without special authority, compromise his client's litigation, and that authority cannot lightly be presumed; if the court is not satisfied that it exists, dismissal for non-appearance at pre-trial is sanctioned by the Rules. Finally, trial courts should not issue minute orders; they should specify in their orders the reasons for dismissal so that the appellate court can readily determine whether there is a prima facie justification for the dismissal.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the failure of the plaintiff and her counsel to appear at pre-trial authorizes dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute, and the authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed. Examiners use this case on pre-trial and dismissal for failure to prosecute, and on the special authority required of attorneys before they may compromise their client's litigation.