PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD VDA. DE PADILLA, SUBSTITUTED BY HER LEGAL HEIRS, NAMELY: AUGUSTO A. PADILLA, ALBERTO A. PADILLA, C…

The only legal issue raised by the petitioner in this
thirty-year-old case is whether the indemnity for the death of private
respondent’s son, the late Nicanor A. Padilla, should
be computed on the basis of his life expectancy, as the trial court and the
Court of Appeals did, rather than the life expectancy
of private respondent, his only legal heir, as the petitioner contends.

On November 23, 1960,
at 5:30 P.M., Starlight Flight No.
26 of the Philippine Air Lines (hereafter PAL) took off from the Manduriao Airport
in Iloilo, on its way to Manila,
with 33 persons on board, including the plane’s complement.  The plane did not reach its destination but
crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and
fifteen minutes after take-off.  The
plane was identified as PI-C133, a DC-3 type aircraft manufactured in 1942 and
acquired by PAL in 1948.  It had flown
almost 18,000 hours at the time of its ill?fated flight.  It had been certified as airworthy by the
Civil Aeronautics Administration.

Among the fatalities was Nicanor
Padilla who was a passenger on the star-crossed flight.  He was 29 years old, single.  His mother, Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla, was his only legal heir.

As a result of her son’s death, Mrs. Padilla filed a complaint
(which was amended twice) against PAL, demanding payment of P600,000 as actual
and compensatory damages, plus exemplary damages and P60,000 as attorney’s
fees.

In its answer, PAL denied that the accident was caused by its
negligence or that of any of the plane’s flight crew, and that, moreover, the
damages sought were excessive and speculative.

On November 23, 1964,
the trial court issued a pre-trial order requiring the parties to file on or
before January 30, 1965 a
stipulation of facts, or a negative manifestation in case they failed to submit
a stipulation.

On June 8, 1965,
the parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts providing as follows:

“1.

“Plaintiff is the widow of the late Alberto R. Padilla,
Filipino, of legal age, and a resident of and with postal address at No. 970
(formerly No. 247) Gral. Solano St., San Miguel,
Manila, while defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. is a corporation duly
organized, registered and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines, engaged, as a common carrier, in the business of carrying or
transporting by air passengers and goods, offering its services to the public as
such for compensation, with offices at Makati Bldg., Makati, Rizal.

“2.

“Nicanor A. Padilla was born on January 10, 1931.  He was a son by lawful marriage of plaintiff
and Alberto R. Padilla, who died on September 2, 1948.

“3.

“Nicanor A. Padilla finished the
elementary grades in 1943, high school in 1947, graduated the Reserve Officer’s
Course (Infantry Basic Course) Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1949, and graduated with the degree of
Bachelor of Literature in 1951 and the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1954, all
in Ateneo de Manila.

“4.

“He was admitted by the Supreme Court of the Philippines
to practice law on January 28, 1955, and from
January 1958, to the time of his death on November 23, 1960, he was associated with the
law offices of Senator Ambrosio Padilla, brother of
his father, Alberto R. Padilla.

“5.

“At the time of his death, he was the President and General
Manager of the Padilla Shipping Co., Inc. 
He was also Vice-President and Treasurer of the Allied Overseas Trading
Co., Inc.

”6.

“He was a member of the Board of Directors of the Junior
Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees) International and Chairman of its Committee on
Governmental Affairs for the term 1960-1961. 
This Committee on Governmental Affairs published a pamphlet entitled
‘Good Government is our Business,’ for which the deceased was named ‘Jaycee of
the Month of January 1960.’

”7.

“Nicanor A, Padilla, while travelling and being transported and flown as a paid passenger on one [of] defendant’s aircraft, a DC-3 with
registry No. PI-C133, on ‘Star Light Flight’ No. 26 bound for Manila
from the City of Iloilo
on November 23, 1960,
was killed when said plane crashed in the area of Mount
Baco,
Oriental Mindoro.

“8.

“Nicanor A. Padilla died single,
leaving as his nearest of kin and sole heiress to his estate his mother the
plaintiff herein with whom he
was residing at the time of his death at 970 Gral. Solano
St., Manila.

“9.

“The aircraft (PI-C133) that crashed on Mt.
Baco,
Oriental Mindoro,
on November 23, 1960,
was a twin-engine passenger plane of the Philippine Air Lines of the DC-3
type.  It was manufactured by Douglas
Aircraft Corporation of the United States
for the U.S.
Army and was purchased from the latter by the Commercial Air Lines, Inc., on
September 25, 1946.  The defendant
Philippine Air Lines acquired the plane from the Commercial Air Lines, Inc., on
October 15, 1948.  The aircraft was
registered by Philippine Air Lines with the Civil Aeronautics Administration as
PI-C142 on May 10, 1949.   On October 15, 1953, PI-C142
met with a non-fatal accident at Pia, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.  PAL requested the Civil Aeronautics
Administration for a change in the identification mark.  Said request was granted and the registration
number was changed from PI-C142 to PI-C133 on July 29, 1954.  As (of) November 22, 1960, the day before the fatal
crash on Mt. Baco, PI-C133 had a
total flying time of 17,996:33 hours.

“10.

“PI-C133 was issued a certificate of airworthiness by the
Civil Aeronautics Administration on September 13, 1960 which was to expire on
September 12, 1961; a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘1’ and made
a part of this stipulation.

“11.

“Other facts on which the parties cannot agree will be
subject to proof at the trial.” (pp. 34-39, Record on
Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)

On January 15, 1966,
the parties submitted another partial stipulation of facts:

“1.

“That in the book written by Salvador B. Salvosa, M.S., University of Michigan and member of the
Actuarial Society of the Philippines, entitled: 
‘Filipino Experience Mortality Table,’ the complete life expectancy of
Filipinos appear on page 3 thereof, a photostat of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A.’

“2.

“That in said Exhibit ‘A’, the columns under the heading
‘Age x,’ refers to the age of the individual, and the columns ‘oe x’ refers to the corresponding number of years the
individual is expected to live.  Thus,
under the column ‘Age x,’ a person aged 29, the corresponding life expectancy
of said person under column ‘oe x’ is ‘42.60’ years;
and under said column ‘Age x’ a person aged 60, corresponding life expectancy
of said person under column ‘oe x’ is ‘17.90’ years;

“3.

 “That Salvador B. Salvosa’s ‘Filipino Experience Mortality Table,’ including
the table of life expectancy are used by the Philippine International Life
Insurance Co., the Sterling Life Insurance Co., the Cardinal Life Insurance
Co., and Star Life Insurance Co., and that the same has been approved by the
Insurance Commissioner for the use of life insurance companies doing business
in the Philippines as shown by a certificate issued by said Commissioner which
is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘B;’

“4.

“That the book of Nelson and Warren, Consulting Actuaries
of St. Louis and Kansas cities, Missouri, entitled:  ‘Principal Mortality Tables’, contains a
table of comparison of complete life expectancy based on principal mortality
tables used by life insurance companies, a photostat
of which is likewise attached hereto as Exhibits ‘C’, ‘C-1’, ‘C-2’ and ‘C-3;’

“5.

That of the life expectancy based on the different systems
mentioned in said Exhibits ‘C’, ‘C-1, ‘C-2’ and ‘C­-3,’ the following are also
used in the Philippines for life insurance purposes:  (a) the American Experience appearing in
Exhibit ‘B,’ fifth columns on both pages, the first column corresponding to the
age of the individual (pages 12 and 13 of the book); (b) the Standard
Industrial, appearing in the same Exhibit ‘B,’ sixth column on both pages
(pages 12 and 13 of the book); and (c) the 1941 Commissioner Standard Ordinary,
or CSO 1941 for short, appearing in Exhibit ‘B-1,’ third column, on both pages
(pages 14 and 15 of the book).

“6.

“That the materiality
and applicability [sic] of the life expectancy tables shown in Exhibit ‘A,’ or
Exhibits ‘C,’ ‘C-1,’ ‘C-2’ and ‘C-3’ are left to the judgment of the Honorable
Court.” (pp. 39-42, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)

On March 19, 1970,
a third joint partial stipulation of facts was submitted by the parties to the trial court which reads, thus:

“JOINT FIRST PARTIAL
STIPULATION OF FACTS

“Plaintiff and defendant through their respective counsel, respectfully submit the following partial
stipulation of facts:

“1. Defendant in November, 1960 and even before was authorized and rated to repair aircrafts of U.S. and
foreign registries and as such holds the following:

 “2.
Defendant maintained and repaired aircrafts of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and commercial carriers like
PANAM, Northwest Airways, KLM and other foreign airlines.

“3. Also in 1960 defendant was maintaining and following a CAA
approved system of aircraft maintenance control using worksheets and work card
which record the specific job on any particular aircraft.  They are:

“a) Pre-flight inspections consisting of the –

(i) Through Check:  –
the visual inspection of an aircraft prior to flight and performed in stations
where maintenance men are assigned.

(ii) Terminating
Check:  – the visual inspection
of the aircraft performed in stations were aircraft terminated a flight
and where maintenance men are assigned.

(iii) After Maintenance Check:  – the visual inspection of an aircraft preparatory to any flight following the
completion of any check from Check No. 1 to Check No. 6, to wit:

(a)  Check No. 1 known as daily inspection check;

(b)  Check No. 2 which is accomplished every 125
hours;

(c)  Check No. 3 which is accomplished every 250
flying hours;

(d)  Check No. 4 which is accomplished every 500 flying
hours;

(e)  Check No. 5 which is accomplished every 1,250
flying hours;

(f)   Check No. 6 which is a series broken down
into 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 6-D, 6-E and 6-F.

“4. The
Quality Control Division is the custodian of all worksheets for the checks
performed and under PI-CAA regulations, is required to keep the records for at
least 90 days.

“5. The forms used and accomplished
for the various checks were:

“The parties reserve their right to agree to additional stipulation of
facts and/or to adduce evidence on other matters not covered by this
stipulation.

“All exhibits mentioned and identified are attached to this
stipulation.” (pp. 42-46, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)

During the hearing on September
4, 1972, the parties stipulated that they were reproducing the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented in Civil Cases Nos. 5728 and
2790 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, arising out of the same
accident.  Certified copy
of said transcript of stenographic notes were then submitted to the
trial court.

A fourth partial stipulation of facts was submitted by the
parties, reading as follows:

“PARTIAL STIPULATION OF FACTS

“Plaintiff and
defendant respectfully submit the following partial stipulation of
facts:

“1. For the convenience and brevity of these proceedings,
considering that defendant’s evidence on the basic issues of fortuitous event
and extraordinary diligence of the carrier consists of the witnesses and
documents presented in Civil Case No. 5720 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo entitled ‘Pedro R. Davila vs. Preciosa C. Tirol,’ now pending appeal before the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. L-­28512, defendant has proposed to reproduce in this case the testimonies
of same witnesses and documentary evidence identified and marked in the course
of the same proceedings, as reflected in the corresponding transcript of
stenographic notes, to wit:

“2. The transcript of stenographic notes are attached
hereto and marked as above set forth.

“3. If aforenamed witnesses were
called to testify in this case, they would give the same testimony as shown in
the afore-mentioned transcript of stenographic notes on direct examination,
cross-examination and re-direct examination, as the case may be, plaintiff’s
counsel hereby adopting the manifestations, objections, cross and re-cross examination
by the plaintiff’s
counsels in Davila vs.
PAL, supra and so far as the joint hearings held on December 20, 1963 and
February 6, 1964, also of plaintiff’s counsels in Abeto,
et al. vs. PAL, Civil Case No. 5790, also of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

“4. All the documentary evidence marked in the course of the
hearings shown in the transcripts of stenographic notes attached hereto have
already been marked correspondingly before the Commissioner of this Honorable
Court on a hearing held on May 24, 1968 with the same exhibit identification.

“5. Defendant reserves its right to present evidence on the question of damages.

“6. Plaintiff reserves her right to present such further
evidence as she may deem
proper in rebuttal.” (pp. 47-50, Record on
Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)

In addition to the stipulations of facts, private respondent
Padilla testified that her son, Nicanor Padilla,
prior to his death, was 29 years old, single, in good health, President and
General Manager of Padilla Shipping Company at Iloilo City, and a legal
assistant of the Padilla Law Office; that upon learning of the death of her son
in the plane crash, she suffered shock and mental anguish, because her son who
was still single was living with her; and that Nicanor
had a life insurance of P20,000, the proceeds of which were paid to his sister.

Eduardo Mate, manager of the Allied Overseas Trading Company, testified that the deceased, Nicanor Padilla, was one of the incorporators of the
company and also its vice-president and treasurer, receiving a monthly salary of P455.

Isaac M. Reyes, auditor of the Padilla Shipping Company, declared
that the deceased was the President and General Manager of the firm and
received a salary of P1,500 monthly.

The trial court in its decision stated that on March 19, 1970, it
was manifested in court that “the parties agreed that they will abide with whatever decision the
Supreme Court may have in similar cases involving the same airplane crash
accident then pending before other courts pending decision in Supreme
Court” (p. 51, Rec. on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo).

On August 31, 1973,
the trial court promulgated a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. to pay the plaintiff Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla the sum of P477,000.00 as award for the
expected income of the deceased Nicanor; P10,000.00
as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.” (pp. 59-60, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)

On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 56079-R) dated July 17, 1980, the decision of the
trial court was affirmed in toto.

As pointed out at the outset, the lone issue is whether or not
the respondent court erred in computing the
awarded indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of the late Nicanor
A. Padilla rather than on the life expectancy of private respondent, and thus
erred in awarding what appears to the petitioner as the excessive sum of P477,000 as indemnity for loss of earnings.

Petitioner relies on “the principle of law generally
recognized and applied by the courts in the United States” that “the
controlling element in determining
loss of earnings arising from death is, as
established by authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of
the beneficiary, whichever is shorter” (p. 19, Brief for the Defendant-Appellant; p. 119, Rollo).

However, resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if
no law or jurisprudence is available locally
to settle a controversy.  Even in
the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is only
persuasive.

For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough applicable local laws and
jurisprudence.  Under Article 1764 and
Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, the award of damages for death is computed
on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not of beneficiary.  The articles provide:

“ART. 1764. Damages
in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII
of this Book, concerning Damages. 
Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the
breach of contract by a common carrier.”

“ART. 2206.  The amount of damages for death caused
by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.  In addition:

“(1)  The defendant
shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death; x x x.” (Underscoring supplied.)

In the case of Davila vs. PAL, 49 SCRA 497 which involved the
same tragic plane crash, this Court determined not only PAL’s
liability for negligence or breach of contract, but also the manner of
computing the damages due the plaintiff therein which it based on the life
expectancy of the deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr. 
This Court held thus:

“The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years
of age when he died.  At that age one’s
normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years, according to the formula (2/3 x
[80-30]) adopted by this Court in the case of Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals on the basis of the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of
Mortality.  However, although the
deceased was in relatively good health, his medical history shows that he had
complained of and been treated for such ailments as backaches, chest pains and
occasional feelings of tiredness.  It is
reasonable to make an allowance for these circumstances and consider, for
purposes of this case, a reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years.

“x x x                        x
x x                x x x.

“Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his
income from three (3)
different sources, namely, from managing a radio station, from law practice and
from farming, the expenses incidental to the generation of such income were
necessarily more than if he had only one source.  Together with his
living expenses, a
deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a year,
seems to Us reasonable, leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00.  This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the amount which should be awarded to the
plaintiffs in this particular respect.” (pp. 504-505, Rollo.)

The petitioner’s recourse to our decision in Alcantara
vs. Surro, 93 Phil. 472,
undermines instead of supporting
its stand here, for the indemnity in that case was also based on the life
expectancy of the deceased and not of his
beneficiaries.

The petitioner’s contention that actual damages under Article
2206 of the Civil Code must be proven by clear and satisfactory evidence is
correct, but its perception that such evidence was not presented in this case,
is error.

The witnesses Mate and Reyes, who were respectively the manager and auditor of Allied Overseas
Trading Company and Padilla Shipping Company, were competent to testify on
matters within their personal knowledge because of their positions, such as the income and salary of the deceased, Nicanor A. Padilla (Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules
of Court).  As observed by the Court of
Appeals, since they were cross-examined by petitioner’s counsel, any objections
to their competence and the admissibility of their testimonies,
were deemed waived.  The payrolls of the
companies and the decedent’s income tax returns could, it is true, have
constituted the best evidence of his salaries, but there is no rule
disqualifying competent officers of the corporation from testifying on the
compensation of the deceased as an officer of the same corporation, and in any event, no timely objection was made to their testimonies.

Following the procedure used by the Supreme Court in the case of
Davila vs. PAL, 49 SCRA 497, the trial court determined the victim’s gross
annual income to be P23,100 based on his yearly salaries of P18,000 from the
Padilla Shipping Company and P5,100 from the Allied Overseas Trading
Corporation.  Considering that he was
single, the court deducted P9,200 as yearly living
expenses, resulting in a net income of P13,900 (not P15,900 as erroneously
stated in the decision).  Since Nicanor Padilla was only 29 years old and in good health,
the trial court allowed him a life expectancy of 30 years.  Multiplying his annual net income of P13,900
by his life expectancy of 30 years, the product is P417,000 (not P477,000)
which is the amount of death indemnity due his mother and only forced heir (p.
58, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo).

While as a general rule, an appellee
who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative relief other than the ones
granted in the decision of the court below
(Aparri vs. CA, 13 SCRA 611; Dy
vs. Kuizon, 113 Phil. 592; Borromeo
vs. Zaballero, 109 Phil. 332), we nevertheless find
merit in the private respondent’s plea for relief for the long delay this case
has suffered on account of the petitioner’s multiple appeals.  Indeed, because of the 16-year delay in the
disposition of this case, the private respondent herself has already joined her
son in the Great Beyond without being able to receive the indemnity she well
deserved.  Considering how inflation has
depleted the value of the judgment in her favor, in the interest of justice,
the petitioner should pay legal rate of interest on the indemnity due her.  The failure of the trial court to award such
interest amounts to a “plain error” which we may rectify on appeal
although it was not specified in the appellee’s brief
(Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court).

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.  The decision of the trial court is affirmed
with modification.  The petitioner is
ordered to pay the private respondent or her heirs death indemnity in the sum
of P417,000 (not P477,000), with legal rate of
interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31, 1973, until it is fully paid.  Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), and Medialdea, J., concur.

Cruz, J., no part. Related to petioner’s
counsel.

 Gancayco,
J., no part.