🎧 Case Brief Lecture

THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE MABANAG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 543. October 23, 1902 October 23, 1902

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United States versus Mabanag

The Case

This is a criminal appeal from a conviction for assault, brought by the Government of the United States against Jose Mabanag as defendant and appellant. The single serious question is not whether the accused committed the crime, but whether a written statement of the injured man, admitted at trial without any objection from the defense, may afterwards be attacked for the first time on appeal. The case matters because it fixes a rule every practitioner must know: an objection to evidence, if it is to be of any use, must be raised when the evidence is offered, and silence then is consent that cannot later be withdrawn.

Procedural History

The case was tried in the court below, where the prosecution offered in evidence a written declaration signed by the injured man, Gregorio de Leon. Neither the defendant nor his counsel objected, and the statement was admitted. The trial court rendered judgment against the defendant, convicting him of the assault. From that judgment the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. On appeal, his lawyer for the first time raised the claim that the written statement should not have been received. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Willard, confirmed the judgment with costs against the appellant.

Facts

Gregorio de Leon was attacked and so seriously injured that he was taken to a hospital. Eight days after the injury was inflicted, on the twenty fourth day of August, he signed a written statement as to the occurrence, apparently in the presence of the defendant. He recovered from his injuries, and at the time of the trial he was in the provinces and did not take the witness stand.

At the trial, the written statement was formally offered in evidence. No objection was made to it by the defendant or his counsel, and it was admitted. In certain respects the statement contradicted the testimony of the other eyewitness, who had already given his evidence when the declaration was offered.

On appeal, the defendant's new counsel argued that the statement should not have been received, and pressed an alibi. The Court found the alibi insufficient to overcome the positive testimony of two persons who identified the defendant as the author of the assault.

Issues

  • Whether or not the evidence of alibi is sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of two witnesses identifying the defendant as the author of the assault.
  • Whether or not the written statement of the injured person, received at trial without objection, may be rejected on appeal on the ground that it was inadmissible.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. Its rule rests on the settled principle of procedure that a party must object to evidence when it is offered, and that failure to object amounts to consent to its admission. The Court states the governing principle in its own words:

When it was offered he should have objected to it. From his failure to do so may be presumed his consent that it might be received. It is now too late to withdraw that consent.

This principle bears on the case because the only serious question raised on appeal was the admissibility of the statement, and the Court resolved it against the appellant precisely because no objection was made at the trial.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the evidence produced by the defendant to prove an alibi is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of two persons who identified him as the author of the assault. The judgment could not, therefore, be reversed on that ground.

On the second issue, the Court acknowledged that the written declaration was doubtless inadmissible, but held that the defendant did not object to its reception. The Court explained that if Gregorio had been called to testify in court, he might have explained the contradictions and in other respects made the Government's case stronger than the statement made it, and that considerations such as these may have induced counsel to refrain from objecting. But whatever his reasons were, the Court could not hold that he had a right to remain silent, submit the case on the short statement of the injured person, have the chance of an acquittal by reason of its defects, and when the judgment went against him say in the appellate court, for the first time, that the statement should not have been received. The Court put the rule thus:

When it was offered he should have objected to it. From his failure to do so may be presumed his consent that it might be received. It is now too late to withdraw that consent.

Doctrine

An objection to the admissibility of evidence must be made at the time the evidence is offered; failure to object amounts to consent to its admission, and that consent cannot be withdrawn for the first time on appeal. Even evidence that is in fact inadmissible, if received without objection, becomes part of the record and may support the judgment. An alibi, to prevail, must be so convincing as to overcome the positive and categorical testimony of witnesses who identify the accused as the author of the crime.

Disposition

The Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of conviction against Jose Mabanag, with costs of the appeal taxed against him.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that when evidence is offered, a party should object, and from his failure to do so is presumed his consent, which it is too late to withdraw on appeal. Examiners use this case to test the rule on timely objection to evidence and the waiver of admissibility by silence.