M & M MANAGEMENT AIDS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EXEQUIEL B. MIGUEL, FOR AND IN HIS BEHALF, AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF ANTONINA B. MIGUEL, REYNALD…

This case is about the lessee’s liability to pay the rentals during the
pendency of its action for rescission of the lease. On August 8, 1973, M
& M Management Aids, Inc. leased from the Heirs of Candido Miguel,
Sr. a parcel of land with an area of one hectare, to be used as a
factory site, located at Barrio Tipas, Taguig, Rizal (p. 69, Rollo).

The term of the lease was ten years or from August 1, 1973 to July 31,
1983. The lessee was given the option to buy the land. The annual rental
for the first three years was P12,000; P42,000 for the next three years
and for the last four years P96,000 (pp. 68-73, Rollo).

On May 20, 1975, Management Aids filed an action for rescission of the
lease with damages and for a declaration of its rights as a builder in
good faith. It alleged that the Miguels failed to surrender the title
for the registration of the lease and fixed an exorbitant price for the
property.

The trial court issued a pre-trial order, stating that, by agreement
of the parties, Management Aids should pay within thirty days from
January 14, 1976 the back rentals for seven months and should continue
to pay the stipulated rentals (p. 40, Rollo). That order set at rest the question of rentals pendente lite or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased premises.

More than two years later, or on May 20, 1978, the trial court
issued an order, requiring the president and general manager of
Management Aids to pay the Miguel lessors within sixty days from notice
the sum of P46,000 as agreed upon at the 1976 pre-trial conference, otherwise he would be punished for contempt of court (p. 17, Rollo).

That order was assailed by certiorari in the Court of Appeals
which in its decision of March 24, 1980 sustained the order because of
the 1976 pre-trial agreement. Management Aids appealed to this Court.
The Miguels did not file any comment and brief.

Management Aids contends that the trial court erred in holding that
under the pre-trial order it would be liable to pay rental in excess of
P1,000 a month and that it should pay rentals during the pendency of the
rescission case. It argues that the Appellate Court took a myopic view
of the pre-trial order by interpreting it literally.

We hold that the petition is devoid of merit. It should not have been
given due course. No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
trial court in issuing the 1978 contempt order. It was sanctioned by the
1976 pre-trial order which was in the nature of a compromise on the
rentals during the pendency of the suit. In that sense, the pre-trial
order has the force of res judicata.

If the parties cannot amicably settle their dis­pute, the trial court is
directed to give priority to the trial of this case and to finish it as
soon as possible.

Some lawyers assume that every error of judgment of the trial court can be corrected by certiorari and
prohibition. They should remember that only jurisdictional errors can
be the object of certiorari. It is an extraordinary remedy available
only in extraordinary cases where the trial court acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. That means that its
action is whimsical, capricious, arbitrary or patently illegal, or, as
stated by Justice Moreland, its decree is a snare and a delusion, a
recorded falsehood, a standing menace (Herrera vs. Barreto and Joaquin,
25 Phil. 245, 271).

“If every error committed by the trial court were to be a proper object
of review by certiorari, the trial would never come to an end and the
appellate courts’ dockets would be clogged ad infinitum with the aggrieved parties-litigants filing petition after petition for writs of certiorari against
every interlocutory order of the trial court.” That situation would be
intolerable. Appeal in due time would be the proper remedy (De Castro
vs. Delta Motor Sales Corp., L-34971, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 344; Nocon
vs. Hon. Geronimo, 101 Phil. 735).

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is affirmed with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.