G.R. No. 53914. September 30, 1984
RODOLFO DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS. CONRADO LINDO AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE PABLO D. SUAREZ, RESPONDENTS.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
for the position of
Mayor of Ternate, Cavite, between petitioner Rodolfo de Leon, the KBL
official candidate, and respondent Conrado Lindo, a KBL member who ran
as an independent candidate, may be discerned from the fact that the
former filed two suits against the latter in this Court. In our
decision promulgated last April 30,[1]
we affirmed a decision of respondent Commission on Elections
dismissing a case for disqualification against private respondent Lindo
on the ground of turncoatism. For petitioner had been proclaimed mayor
after the January 30 election, had assumed such position, and has been
discharging its functions. Under the circumstances, the Venezuela
ruling called for application. As qualified in Aguinaldo v. Commission
on Elections,[2] a
pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable if, after the election
for local officials, the winning candidate had been proclaimed and there
was no pending petition for disqualification before this Court on
January 30.
This petition for certiorari and mandamus with a
prayer for a
restraining order arose from an order of respondent Judge, the late
Pablo D. Suarez, granting private respondent a reasonable period of time
to file an electoral protest. It reads as follows: “The Clerk of
Court is hereby ordered to include among undocketed cases, in the
meanwhile, the significance that Protestant Conrado C. Lindo has been
granted an additional and reasonable period to register an Election
Protest against Protestee Rodolfo de Leon, corresponding with the
previous Local Elections for Ternate, Cavite.”[3]
It is contended by petitioner that on its face it is violative of this
provision of the 1978 Election Code: “A sworn petition contesting the
election of a municipal or municipal district officer shall be filed
with the proper Court of First Instance by any candidate for the same
office who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy, within ten days
after the proclamation of the election.”[4] More specifically, there was a disregard of
the ten-day period imposed by law.
Then, soon after, came a Supplemental Petition. It
was therein
alleged that petitioner was not aware of an order of respondent Judge
denying his motion for reconsideration and at the same time proclaiming
private respondent Lindo duly elected winner for the office of the Mayor
of Ternate until after the original petition was filed. He stressed
anew the jurisdictional infirmity of the actuation of the lower court.
He was specially vehement in his attack on the proclamation of private
respondent as the duly elected Mayor of Ternate, considering that he had
been proclaimed, had assumed the office, and has been discharging his
duties as such. The dispositive portion of this later order of
respondent Judge reads as follows: “[Wherefore], as prayed for, without
prejudice to the ultimate decision congruent with the present election
protest; the Court hereby declares and proclaims Protestant Conrado
Lindo duly elected winner for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
Ternate, Province of Cavite, corresponding with the local elections for
the Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite, effectively as of
January 30, 1980; considering the prior nullity of the election and
proclamation of Protestee Rodolfo de Leon. Protestant Conrado Lindo has
no more lawful inhibitions to immediately assume the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of Ternate, Cavite, effective today, after taking his
Oath of Office as such Mayor of Ternate, Cavite; while Protestee Rodolfo
de Leon is hereby temporarily restrained from further continuing to
discharge his prior duties as former Mayor of Ternate, Cavite, until
further orders from this Court; when he shall have proved that he has a
better right to it than Protestant Conrado Lindo during the hearings of
the present protest.”[5]
Comment was required of respondents, and a temporary
restraining
order was issued after the filing of the petition. Comment was likewise
required of respondents in the Supplemental Petition. In the second of
such Comments submitted after the Supplemental Petition, the grant of
the additional and reasonable period to private respondent to institute
an election protest was justified as within the sound discretion of a
court of justice. That was their submission likewise in the first
Comment submitted. The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition so
that the resumption of the election protest could be ordered
immediately.
Such Comment was considered as the answer and the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
We sustain respondent Judge in granting the
additional period.
We rule against that portion of his order allowing private respondent to
occupy the office of Mayor. In that sense, the restraining order
continues until the final disposition of this litigation.
It was the existence of problems, a number of them
novel in
character, that arose after the elections for local government in 1980,
that led to the exercise by this Court of its equitable powers.
Accordingly, in appropriate cases, an objection raised on purely legal
grounds based on the strict letter of the law was not deemed
controlling. What is undeniable is that ever since Venezuela v.
Commission on Elections,[6]
decided on July 25, 1980, this Court has allowed the losing party a
reasonable period usually ten days within which to file an election
protest. That solution appears to be the most just and fair under the
circumstances. It is a further assurance that the wishes of the
electorate would not be disregarded by what would amount to a definitive
bar on determining who was the real people’s choice. In Venezuela, as
well as in Agcaoili v. Santos and Commission on Elections,[7] and in Disini v.
Commission on Elections,[8] a period of ten days was the one granted. In
Faderanga v. Commission on Elections,[9]
a fifteen-day period was granted the losing party. In sustaining
respondent Commission on Elections in the April decision of this Court,
between petitioner de Leon and private respondent Lindo, it was made
clear in the opening paragraph of the opinion citing Venezuela – the
doctrine being given a more explicit form in Aguinaldo v. Commission on
Elections[10] –
that it is a
“generally accepted principle that a pre-proclamation controversy should
be laid to rest [at a certain stage] there being the remedy of a
protest or a quo warranto proceeding that could be utilized.”[11]
The election protest actually having been filed and having been acted
upon by respondent Judge, it would not be in consonance with equity if
at this stage it would not be allowed to continue. All things
considered, justice, another name for equity, would best be served by
allowing the lower court, acting through the successor of respondent
Judge, to continue hearing such protest until its final disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed
insofar as it
would annul and set aside the challenged orders of respondent Judge
continuing with hearing the election protest. It is granted insofar as
it would make permanent the restraining order preventing private
respondent, Conrado Lindo, from discharging the Office of the Mayor of
Ternate in the meanwhile, petitioner being entitled to continue doing
so. No costs.
Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De La Fuente, and
Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and
Makasiar, JJ., in the result.
Aquino, J., did not take part.
Guerrero and
Concepcion, Jr., JJ., on leave.
[1] De
Leon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 56968, April 30, 1984, 129
SCRA 117.
[2] G.R. No. 53953, January 5, 1981, 102 SCRA 1.
[3] Annex D to Petition.
[4] Article XVIII, Section 190 of the 1978 Election
Code.
[5] Annex O of Supplemental Petition, 6-7.
[6] G.R. No. 53532, 98 SCRA 790.
[7] G.R. No. 52791, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA
350.
[8] G.R. No. 52502, December 30, 1982, 119 SCRA
511.
[9] G.R. No. 55938, June 26, 1981, 105 SCRA 123.
[10] G.R. No. 53953, January 5, 1981, 102 SCRA 1.
[11] 129 SCRA 117, 118.