🎧 Case Brief Lecture

GREGORIO LABITAD, REYMUNDO GERONA, LEOPOLDO SEGARA, ILUMINADO BORRES, EDGARDO PEPITO, SOFRONIO BORRES, VERGILIO GABATO, PORFERIO MARAASIN, FRANCO BARCELONA, JOEL BACLAY, EDUARDO…

G.R. No. 53877. July 17, 1995 July 17, 1995

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Labitad versus Carruf Agricultural Corporation

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Gregorio Labitad and his co-petitioners against Carruf Agricultural Corporation, the private respondent. The petitioners were farmers sued for recovery of possession of a portion of a 510-hectare agricultural land in Valencia, Bukidnon, which the corporation was leasing from the government. The corporation won before the trial court, and the petitioners lost their appeal on a technicality: the trial court dismissed their appeal as filed out of time. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to fix, with precision, how the thirty-day appeal period is counted when a motion for reconsideration interrupts it — a procedural point that decides whether an appeal lives or dies.

Procedural History

In 1976, Carruf Agricultural Corporation filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the then Court of First Instance of Bukidnon, Branch Six. On August 15, 1977, the trial court ruled for the corporation, ordering the petitioners to vacate the land and to pay damages and attorney's fees, jointly and severally. The petitioners received the decision on August 17, 1977, and moved for reconsideration on September 14, 1977. They received the order denying the motion on October 25, 1977. On October 27, 1977, they filed their notice of appeal, a motion to appeal as paupers, and a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal; the next day, October 28, 1977, they deposited the appeal bond.

The corporation moved for execution, claiming the decision had become final. On December 12, 1977, the trial court dismissed the appeal as filed out of time and ordered a writ of execution. Reconsideration was denied on March 6, 1978. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition on January 15, 1980 and denied reconsideration on April 17, 1980. Hence this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, which issued a temporary restraining order on May 28, 1980.

Facts

The corporation leased from the government a 510-hectare tract in Balanakan, Valencia, Bukidnon. It alleged that the petitioners, disregarding its rights as lessee, unlawfully entered and cultivated approximately 78 hectares of the property. The trial court agreed and ordered them to vacate and to pay damages and attorney's fees.

The petitioners received the adverse decision on August 17, 1977. Twenty-eight days later, on September 14, 1977, they filed a motion for reconsideration. The denial reached them on October 25, 1977. Two days later, on October 27, they filed their notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal, and on October 28 they deposited the appeal bond.

The trial court counted the appeal period differently. It held that the thirty-day period expired on October 27, not October 28, and that the appeal bond, filed on October 28, came one day late. It dismissed the appeal and ordered execution. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The petitioners insisted they still had three days left when they filed their motion for reconsideration, so that the appeal period ran to October 28.

Issues

  • Whether or not the petitioners perfected their appeal within the reglementary period, considering that they filed a motion for reconsideration before the thirty-day appeal period had lapsed.
  • Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the appeal bond was filed one day late, and in refusing to rule on the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the operative provision when the notice of appeal was filed, provides:

How appeal is taken. Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37. But where such a motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.

This provision supplies the rule of counting: the thirty days run from notice of the judgment, are suspended while a motion for reconsideration is pending, and resume upon receipt of the order denying it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled for the petitioners. An appeal is perfected when the aggrieved party files the notice of appeal, the appeal bond, and the record on appeal, and serves copies on the adverse party, within thirty days from receipt of the judgment. The period is suspended by a motion for reconsideration or new trial and continues to run upon receipt of the denial, as if no interruption had occurred. The time during which the motion was pending is counted from the date it was duly filed to the date the movant was duly notified of the denial. Crucially, the period includes the very day the motion is filed, because the motion is already under the court's consideration during the remaining hours of that day.

Applying this, the petitioners received the decision on August 17 and filed their motion on September 14. That day is excluded from the appeal period, so they had used only twenty-seven days and had three days left. The motion was pending from September 14 until October 25, when they received the denial. The period then continued on October 26 and ended on October 28 — exactly as the petitioners claimed.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the appeal bond was filed one day late. The bond was in fact filed on time. And where a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal is made within the original thirty-day period, the record subsequently submitted is considered seasonably filed. It was therefore unnecessary, and wrong, for the trial court to refuse to rule on that motion.

Doctrine

Under Section 3 of Rule 41, the thirty-day appeal period runs from notice of the judgment and is interrupted by a timely motion for reconsideration or new trial. The time during which the motion is pending — counted from the day it is filed, inclusive, to the day the movant is notified of the denial — is deducted, and the period resumes upon receipt of the denial. The day of filing the motion is excluded from the appeal period because the motion is already before the court for the rest of that day. A motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal, made within the original thirty-day period, makes the record subsequently submitted seasonably filed.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were reversed, and the Court of Appeals was directed to decide the petitioners' appeal with dispatch.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the day a motion for reconsideration is filed is excluded from the appeal period, and the period resumes upon receipt of the denial — so count carefully, because one day decides the appeal. Examiners use this case in civil procedure to test the computation of the reglementary appeal period and the perfection of appeals.