CHUA HUAT, ONG CHOAN, DOMINADOR FELINO, RUFINO CLEMENTE, TEODORA CLEMENTE, AND LOURDES MEMPIN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE ELVIRO PERALTA, SHERIFF OF …

Chua Huat versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a consolidated resolution of two petitions brought by the occupants of certain parcels of land and the buildings standing on them in Paco, Manila, against the Court of Appeals, a judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Sheriff of Manila, the City Mayor and City Engineer of Manila, and the private landowner Manuel Uy and Sons, Incorporated. The first petition asks the Supreme Court to reverse the appellate court's refusal to stop the execution of a long final judgment in an action for recovery of possession. The second asks the Court to prohibit the city officials from carrying out condemnation and demolition orders against the buildings the petitioners occupy. The case matters for two reasons: it is a stern restatement of the rule that a final and executory judgment may no longer be disturbed, and it is a warning against using collateral suits to delay the execution of such a judgment.

Procedural History

The original action for recovery of possession was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch Seventeen, on 31 May 1972, in favor of the plaintiff Uy. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision in full on 19 January 1977. Two petitions for review were then brought to the Supreme Court, one by the defendants other than Ong Choan and one by Ong Choan, and both were denied. The judgment thus became final and executory, and on 20 November 1978 the trial court granted a motion for its execution.

To block the execution, Chua Huat and Ong Choan separately filed complaints for annulment of the judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. 119751 and Civil Case No. 119884, both anchored on the claim that the trial court had no jurisdiction because the original action was one for ejectment. The trial court nonetheless ordered execution on 23 February 1979 and denied the motion to suspend proceedings on 5 April 1979. The petitioners then went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and prohibition, which denied the petition on 29 February 1980 and denied both motions for reconsideration. Hence the first petition before the Supreme Court, filed on 7 August 1980. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 119751 was dismissed on 24 September 1979, and that dismissal was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court on 12 March 1984, a fact the petitioners never disclosed to the Supreme Court.

The second petition, for prohibition with preliminary injunction, was filed on 2 May 1983 against the City Mayor, the City Engineer, and Manuel Uy and Sons, Incorporated, to stop the demolition of the buildings. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order and later gave due course to the petition. The two cases were consolidated on 4 January 1984.

Facts

The petitioners occupied land belonging to Uy and the buildings standing on it. In the action for recovery of possession, the trial court ordered them to pay monthly sums beginning January 1963 until they vacated the property, and ordered them to vacate the land and remove or abandon their improvements within sixty days. That judgment was affirmed on appeal and became final.

When execution was ordered, the petitioners tried to undo the judgment by filing separate complaints to annul it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, insisting the case was really one for ejectment. The trial court refused to suspend execution, and the appellate court refused to interfere.

Separately, in September 1982 the landowner asked the City Engineer to condemn the dilapidated structures. The City Engineer issued notices of condemnation, subject to the Mayor's confirmation, based on inspections showing structural deterioration of more than fifty percent and as much as eighty percent. The petitioners protested, relying on a private engineer's report that the buildings were still structurally sound with at least eight years of economic life. The Mayor confirmed the condemnation orders, and demolition orders followed. The petitioners then brought the petition for prohibition.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the final and executory judgment in the recovery of possession case could be executed as a matter of ministerial duty, and that the pending annulment case could not stay the execution.
• Whether or not the pendency of the action to annul the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction justified suspending the execution.
• Whether or not the condemnation and demolition orders issued by the city officials should be annulled by prohibition for grave abuse of discretion.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14 of Rule 39, as cited in the trial court's judgment, governs the execution of a judgment for the recovery of possession. The decision refers to it in this language:

After the lapse of said sixty days, plaintiff can submit the corresponding motion under Section 14, Rule 39.

This provision bears on the case because it is the procedural route by which the winning party may move for execution of a judgment that has become final.

Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila, as invoked by the city officials, requires the Mayor's confirmation of the City Engineer's findings before a condemnation becomes an order to demolish. The decision describes it in this language:

The condemnation orders stated that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.

This provision bears on the case because it shows that the condemnation process is an exercise of police power for public safety, and that the City Engineer's finding is not immediately executory.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition was frivolous and utterly without merit. The judgment in the recovery of possession case had long become firm and final, having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court itself. The Court found a clear pattern of maneuvers meant to make a mockery of the judicial process, and it held that the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals was in full accord with law and jurisprudence.

On the second issue, the Court held that the pendency of the annulment case could not stay the execution. The issue of lack of jurisdiction had already been squarely raised and passed upon in the original case, and it could not be revived in a subsequent suit without violating the principle of res judicata, meaning that a matter already finally decided may not be litigated again between the same parties. The Court stressed that once a judgment becomes final, the winning party must not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict through a mere subterfuge.

On the third issue, the Court likewise found the petition for prohibition to be without merit. The condemnation and demolition orders were issued under the city's police power to promote public safety, and the petitioners had failed to exhaust the administrative remedy available to them. The Court reminded counsel of their duty as officers of the court not to file pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

Doctrine

A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and may no longer be altered, modified, or set aside, and its execution becomes the ministerial duty of the court. A party may not, by changing the form of the lawsuit or adopting a different method of presenting the matter, escape the application of the principle that the same cause of action may not be litigated twice between the same parties. Once an issue has been raised and finally decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, it becomes res judicata and may be the basis of estoppel by judgment between the parties, no matter in what manner it was raised. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and courts must guard against any scheme calculated to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the verdict. Finally, the power to condemn and demolish dangerous buildings is an exercise of police power, and administrative decisions may not be set aside by the courts except on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions for sheer lack of merit, thereby allowing the execution of the final judgment and the enforcement of the condemnation and demolition orders.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a final and executory judgment can no longer be disturbed, and no subterfuge may be used to deprive the winning party of its fruits. Examiners like to use this case on the immutability of final judgments, on res judicata as a bar to a collateral attack on jurisdiction, and on the exhaustion of administrative remedies against condemnation orders.