PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL TAN, JR. Y EBLAGAS ALIAS “BOY TAN”, AND HECTOR SELMO Y FLORES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Tan

The Case

This is People of the Philippines versus Manuel Tan, Junior, alias Boy Tan, and Hector Selmo, a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The accused were charged with taking a Ford Fiera jeepney after killing its driver, Mariano de Guzman, Junior. The case matters for two reasons. First, it is a compact lesson on the weight of a single witness, here a former co-accused who turned state witness, and on the weakness of alibi against positive identification. Second, it shows the Supreme Court correcting a death sentence and raising the civil indemnity, which makes it useful for questions on penalty and damages in robbery with homicide.

Procedural History

The information was filed against three men: Manuel Tan, Junior, Hector Selmo, and Nestor Navarro. Navarro pleaded guilty to the offense charged and was sentenced accordingly. Trial then proceeded against Tan and Selmo alone, with Navarro testifying as the principal witness for the prosecution. The Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, Branch Three, rendered its decision on March thirty one, nineteen eighty. It found Tan and Selmo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph one, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, sentenced both to death, and ordered them to pay the heirs of the victim twelve thousand pesos and six thousand five hundred seventy seven pesos, plus costs. From that judgment, Tan and Selmo appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Facts

On the morning of May thirteen, nineteen seventy seven, Nestor Navarro went to the house of Manuel Tan, Junior, behind Camp Olivas in San Fernando, Pampanga, to collect a debt. Tan and Hector Selmo, a Philippine Constabulary soldier, were drinking and invited him to join. Tan then decided to sell an empty liquefied petroleum gas tank and asked Selmo to find a vehicle. Selmo returned on a Ford Fiera jeepney driven by Mariano de Guzman, Junior. The tank was loaded, sold at a store in San Fernando for fifty pesos, and the group then drank in Guagua, in Angeles City, and near Clark Air Field, with the driver waiting in the jeepney throughout.

On the return trip to San Fernando, Navarro sat beside the driver while Tan and Selmo whispered at the back. They stopped along MacArthur Highway, Selmo exchanged seats with Navarro, and Selmo directed the driver onto a narrow road near Sindalan Elementary School and into an open field. About one hundred meters from the highway, Selmo ordered the driver to stop, saying he wanted to urinate. Selmo then handed a forty five caliber pistol to Tan, who struck the driver repeatedly on the head with it until he fell. Tan ignored the victim's pleas and warned Navarro not to interfere. Tan then ordered Navarro to help carry the victim to a nearby sugarcane field. On the way, Selmo shouted, Pare, shoot him, and Tan replied, Talagang babarilin ko, meaning I will really shoot him. Tan shot the victim once in the head, killing him on the spot, and the three left him in the field.

The trio spent the night in Manila, then went to Naga City, where they sold three tires of the jeepney for two hundred twenty five pesos. The jeepney was later recovered in Legaspi City, with the tires missing, by its owner with police assistance. Tan and Navarro were eventually apprehended on a bus. The autopsy showed the victim died of shock from internal cerebral hemorrhage due to a gunshot wound, with a single bullet entering behind the ear and exiting at the back of the head, and with contusions consistent with being struck by a hard object. Tan claimed he was too drunk to remember and asked Navarro to bring him home; Selmo claimed he left at eleven in the morning to report for duty. Both raised alibi.

Issues

• Whether or not the testimony of Nestor Navarro, a former co-accused who pleaded guilty, is credible enough to sustain the conviction of Tan and Selmo.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi can prevail against Navarro's positive identification of the appellants.
• Whether or not proof of motive is essential to convict.
• Whether or not the penalty of death and the amount of indemnity imposed by the trial court were proper.

Applicable Provisions

Article 294, paragraph one, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines the crime charged:

Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

This is the provision under which the trial court convicted the appellants, and it fixes both the elements of the special complex crime and the range of the penalty.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Navarro's testimony was credible. His narration of the sequence of events and of the appellants' behavior was natural, probable, and bore the earmarks of truth; he could not have narrated such detail had the events not occurred. The Court rejected the warning that his testimony came from a polluted source merely because he was originally a co-accused. It also held that even uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict, because witnesses are weighed and not numbered. Here the testimony was in fact corroborated by the medical findings of a blow and a gunshot to the head, and by the recovery of the stolen jeepney with its tires missing.

On the second issue, the Court held that alibi is a weak defense. Against Navarro's positive identification, the alibi dwindles into nothingness. The Court also found the appellants' mutually corroborating testimonies self-serving, since co-accused sharing a common defense of alibi would naturally tailor their stories to match.

On the third issue, the Court held that proof of motive is unessential where there is no doubt as to the identities of the perpetrators.

On the fourth issue, the Court affirmed the conviction but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, and increased the indemnity for the heirs from twelve thousand pesos to thirty thousand pesos.

Doctrine

First, the testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict; witnesses are weighed, not numbered. Second, the testimony of a former co-accused who has pleaded guilty is not automatically polluted, and may be given full faith where it is detailed, natural, and corroborated by physical evidence. Third, alibi is a weak defense that cannot prevail against positive identification. Fourth, proof of motive is unnecessary when the identity of the offender is certain. Fifth, in robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph one, of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, and the civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim must be fixed in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua, and increased the indemnity to the heirs of the victim to thirty thousand pesos.

Remember This

Memorize the line that witnesses are weighed and not numbered, and that alibi dwindles into nothingness against positive identification. Examiners use this case for the sufficiency of a lone witness who was a former co-accused, and for the penalty and indemnity in robbery with homicide.