G.R. No. 53830. September 21, 1983
SILVESTRE ESPAÑOL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIANO DELA CERNA, RESPONDENTS.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
These two cases trace their roots to CAR Case 317 of the then
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), Iligan City. That was an action instituted by tenant
Silvestre ESPAÑOL against landowner Mariano DE LA CERNA for reinstatement and
payment of backshares and damages. Judgment therein having been adverse to DE LA
CERNA, the latter appealed to the former Court
of Appeals (CA for short). Pending
appeal, ESPAÑOL was reinstated.[1]
The background facts, as
summarized by the Appellate Court, are as follows:
“Sometime in March, 1974, defendant-appellant Mariano dela Cerna executed an agreement
in writing with Silvestre Espanol, plaintiff-appellee (Exhs. C & C-1),
under the terms of which, a three-hectare land of appellant would be worked by appellee. One-third
of the landholding was planted to palay, and the
sharing was 50-50; another third was planted to corn, and the sharing was 60-40
in favor of the appellee; while the last third was
planted to coconuts, the sharing being 1/3?2/3, in favor of
appellant. The written agreement
stipulated that it would be for a term of two years. Appellee was to
stay in a house in that landholding which he would purchase from appellant for
P50.00, on condition that, at the end of the two years, the house would be
returned to appellant with the latter also returning the P50.00 to appellee.
Come March, 1976, appellant began to take charge of working the
landholding, but appellee remained in the
house. On March 17, 1976, appellee through
Exhibit 4-A, surrendered the landholding to appellant; but he (appellee) later on claimed he executed it through
intimidation. On August 2, 1977, appellee
filed the complaint in the case below
praying for reinstatement as a tenant in the landholding.
After trial, the lower court sustained appellee’s
complaint on the ground that the agreement of March, 1974, limiting the term
thereof to two years, was against the law; and that the surrender of the
landholding through Exhibit 4-A was not voluntary on the part of appellee. In
addition to appellee’s share is a tenant; he was
awarded moral and exemplary damages.
Parenthetically, such damages should not have been granted even if appellee was entitled to reinstatement. The case below was due to appellee’s
adherence to a 2-year contract, and he was partly responsible for the
controversy between the parties.”
In the Decision
promulgated on December 14, 1979, the Appellate Court reversed the appealed
judgment and dismissed the Complaint holding that:
“We have resolved to reverse.
x x x It is also to
be conceded that the agreement of March, 1974 (Exhs.
C & C-1), was against the law, and it is precisely
for that reason that we are reversing the appealed decision.
Under Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code, it is provided that
agreements against the law are void, and when both parties, as in this case,
are in pari delicto
neither one can sustain a complaint against the other. Inasmuch as appellee has already been evicted from the landholding, he
should not be allowed to be reinstated pursuant to the cited provision of the
Civil Code.”
On December 24, 1979,
a copy of the CA Decision was received by the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, as ESPAÑOL’s
counsel, addressed at Diliman, Quezon City, as
shown by the Registry Return Receipt, which was attached to the certification of the Clerk of
Court of the Appellate Court.[2] ESPAÑOL claims that he was not
informed of said CA Decision. DE LA CERNA received his copy of the Decision
on December 29, 1979.
On February 12, 1980,
Entry of Judgment was made by the Appellate Court stating that the judgment had
become final and executory on January 9, 1980.[3]
On February
26, 1980, the CA
remanded the records to the CAR,[4] and on March 10, 1980, the CAR notified the parties and their
counsel of its receipt of the records from the CA.[5] The notice from CAR to ESPAÑOL’s
counsel was addressed to “Atty. Ricardo L. Salvañera,
MAR, Kapatagan, Lanao
Norte.”[6]
ESPANOL acknowledges
receipt of said notification and alleges that, for the first time, he personally
learned of the CA Decision on March 19, 1980.[7]
G.R. No. L-53830,
Silvestre
Español vs. Court of Appeals
and Mariano de la Cerna
On April
12, 1980, ESPAÑOL
through Ids new counsel filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the CA Decision (G.R. No. L-53830) alleging that he learned of said Decision
only on March 19, 1980
and that the Petition was filed well within the thirty days period to
appeal. On May 14, 1980, we gave due course.
On May 26,
1980, DE LA CERNA
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging receipt by ESPAÑOL’s
counsel of the CAR Decision on December 24, 1979, a notice binding upon the client, and since
no appeal had been interposed within the reglementary period, the judgment had
become final and executory.[8] We noted the Motion for the time being inasmuch
as the Petition had been given due course.
Further proceedings
before CAR
In the meantime, on April
7, 1980, upon DE LE CERNA’s motion and over ESPANOL’s objection, the CAR, pursuant to the CA Decision,
issued a Writ of Execution ordering the return of the landholding to DE
LA CERNA.[9] On April 11, 1980, the Sheriff placed DE LA
CERNA in possession.[10]
On June 10, 1980, ESPAÑOL
sought to set aside the Order of Execution of April 7, 1980 asserting that
execution was premature because of the pendency of this Petition before this Court, which had been given due course.[11] DE LA CERNA opposed stating that the CA
Decision had become final and that this Court’s Resolution giving due course to
ESPAÑOL’s petition was because of the latter’s
misrepresentation that he had received copy of the CA Decision only on March
19, 1980.[12]
Resolving ESPANOL’s Motion, on July 23, 1980, the CAR set aside its
Order of Execution and reinstated
ESPANOL to the landholding stating that considering the pendency
of G. R. No. L-53830, the Order of April 7, 1980 ejecting ESPAÑOL violated
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure of the Court
of Agrarian Relations.[13] DE LA CERNA’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied on July 30, 1980.
G.R. No. L-54751
(Mariano De la Cerna
Vs. Hon. Javier and Silvestre Español.
Thus, on August 29, 1980,
DE LA CERNA filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this
Court (L-54751) attacking the CAR Order dated July 23, 1980, reinstating
ESPAÑOL, as null and void and in excess of jurisdiction. The Petition was similarly given due
course, and the cases were ordered
consolidated.
Resolution
There is no question that
if the date of service on ESPANOL were to be reckoned from the date that BALA,
at Diliman, Quezon City,
had received the CA Decision, ESPAÑOL’s Petition for
Review before this Court (L-53830) would have been filed beyond the thirty-day reglementary period.
However, the Appellate Court erred in sending copy of the CA Decision to
BALA, MAR, Diliman, Quezon
City. It should have been sent
instead to the “MAR Office, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte” in the same
manner that the notification of
receipt of records by the CAR was sent to that address.[14] There is justification, therefore, for
ESPANOL to claim that he was notified of the CA Decision only on March 19, 1980
after he had received the Notification of receipt of the records and of the CA
Decision from the CAR.[15]
Consequently, ESPANOL’s Petition for Review must be held to have been
timely filed and DE LA CERNA’s Motion to Dismiss
accordingly denied. And while the
Appellate Court had stated that ESPAÑOL should not be reinstated, that
was upon the fact that he was no longer within the landholding (CA Decision, supra). However, in its Decision, the Appellate Court
also went on to state:
“The indication is that following the provision enunciated in
the Civil Code, a tenant under a void tenancy arrangement can no longer be
reinstated once he loses possession of the landholding; otherwise, it will be
tantamount to the enforcement of a void contract. However, if the tenant under the void
contract continues in possession, he can neither be ejected under the same
principle that the owner can not sue for the enforcement of the void
agreement.”
By virtue of the CAR
Order dated July 23, 1980, ESPAÑOL had been ordered reinstated. That reinstatement was only
proper because considering the pendency of G.R. No.
L-53830 before this Court, the CA
Decision holding that ESPAÑOL should not be reinstated had not become
final. As of the CAR Decision of July 23, 1979, it was ESPAÑOL, who was put in possession and pursuant to the
same CA Decision he can “neither be ejected under the same principle
that the owner cannot sue for the enforcement of the void agreement”.
It follows that the DE LA
CERNA Petition in G.R. No. L-54751 challenging the CAR Order of July 23, 1980 ordering ESPAÑOL’s reinstatement
must perforce be dismissed.
In fine, the CAR correctly ordered the
reinstatement of ESPAÑOL because the agreement limiting the term to 2 years is
against the law. The Appellate Court
should also be upheld in its having eliminated the award of damages to
ESPAÑOL.
WHEREFORE, the Motion
to Dismiss
filed by Mariano de la Cerna in G. R. No. L-53830 is
hereby denied. The Order of the former Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch VI, Iligan City, dated July 23,
1980, in CAR Case No. 317, ordering the reinstatement of Silvestre Espanol to the
landholding in question is hereby upheld.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 09961-R, in so far as it eliminated the award of
damages and payment of back shares to Silvestre
Espanol, is hereby affirmed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
p. 56, Rollo, L-53830.
[2]
p. 51, ibid.
[3]
p. 53, ibid.
[4]
p. 54, ibid.
[5]
p. 55, ibid.
[6]
ibid.
[7]
Memorandum, p. 3, p. 95, ibid.
[8]
p. 38, ibid.
[9]
p. 59, ibid.
[10]
p. 4, Rollo, L-54751.
[11]
p. 25, ibid.
[12]
p. 27, ibid.
[13]
“Execution when issued; exception – On motion of the prevailing party, the Court shall order execution of an
order or decision that has already become final and executory.”
“Appeal shall not stay the
decision or order except when the ejectment
of a tenant farmer, agricultural lessee or
tiller, settler, or amortizing owner-cultivator is directed.”
“When the decision is based on
an amicable settlement, the same shall be executory
only after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from notice” (underlining
supplied)
[14]
p. 55, Rollo, L-53830.
[15]
ibid.